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Tytuł artykułu
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Warianty tytułu
Objects and Instruments of Reference: What Russell’s Theory of Descriptions Shows and What it Conceals
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
Russell’s theory of descriptions has famously shown how a traditional epistemological position, consequently developed, imposes specific requirements on the logical analysis. Its result is, according to some Russellians, applicable not only to logical but also to communicative functions of sentences with definite descriptions as their components. This holds only under an apropriate explanation of the role played by Russellian propositions in communication. According to the author, they are introduced into communication as by-products of (successful or unsuccessful) acts of making singular statements and reflect the instrumental side of these acts. This “multipropositional” approach opens the possibility of combining the Russellian truth-evaluation of utterances of sentences including descriptions with the Strawsonian analysis of the communicative function of these utterances, based on the notion of presuposition.
Słowa kluczowe
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Tom
Strony
7-26
Opis fizyczny
Rodzaj publikacji
ARTICLE
Twórcy
autor
- Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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Identyfikator YADDA
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