

# Hybrid Threats and Warfare, Are We Really Facing Something New?

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**Abstract.** Since 2014 the term *hybrid warfare and threats* has become catchword. This term (*hybrid warfare*) was introduced to academic discourse by William J. Nemeth in 2002 in relation to the wars in Chechnya and popularised in 2006 by Frank G. Hoffman in relation, among other things, to the second Intifada. In 2014 after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, the terms *hybrid war* and *hybrid threats* were transferred from scholarly discussion to politics and official documents. The author seeks to answer the following question: is the invention of so called *hybrid warfare and hybrid threats* something new, or rather a confused reaction to European Union and NATO astonishment at Russian activity in the eastern and southern frontiers of Ukraine. The fact that armed conflict includes mixed elements of regular and irregular forms of armed combat, guerillas and terrorists, criminal acts, use of new technologies to conduct armed, information, psychological or economic warfare is not new. Scholars who investigate hybrid conflicts give examples of historic wars starting from the war between Rome and the Germans (Publius Quinctilius Varus campaign in 9 AD against German tribes led by Arminius), through the war of independence in the USA, to the Chechen wars. Nowadays, greater and greater dependence on technology, information delivered in almost real time and the creation of more elaborate and complicated procedures and decisive processes in Western countries have increased the vulnerability to hostile actions other than military ones and ones that use military force.

DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0012.1698

<http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.1698>

**Keywords:** hybrid warfare, hybrid threats, military activities

The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, in which Russian special forces played crucial role, not only popularised the term *hybrid warfare* but also triggered a discussion about Polish military doctrine. The generals and analysts, surprised by the apparently strange nature of the Russian military action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, placed emphasis on the totally new Russian modus operandi and exploited the term *hybrid war*.

## Contemporary Security Environment

The present-day security environment may be described by adjectives such as unstable, unpredictable, and surprising. At the same time modern threats may be characterised in the following way:

- they often seem unlikely,

- they take a form which is difficult to categorise in terms of the rules of war and therefore it is difficult or impossible to employ armed forces openly.
- they seem to be ostensibly harmless, therefore, they are not included, or they are of marginal significance in regulations and analyses concerning security,
- they exploit loopholes in the traditional understanding of the concept of security,
- a proportional (symmetrical) response cannot be made,
- they often cannot be responded to effectively.

The results of the nature of such contemporary threats are the following:

1. All the threats cannot be predicted (unless there is brilliant and effective intelligence, counter-intelligence and reconnaissance, as well as outstanding analysts).
2. A common tendency is to concentrate on events that happened not so long ago, at the same time fearing the predicted threat and lacking time for broad historic reflection.

In relation to Poland or allied countries in central and eastern Europe one cannot eliminate aggression or armed intervention which may be a consequence of:

1. Fulfilment of political or economic goals by neighbouring country or countries.
2. Destabilisation of the domestic state of affairs (e.g. the situation in Poland may be destabilised socially or economically as a result of planned and long-term actions). As a consequence, international sanctions, or even intervention, may be legitimised in the eyes of international public opinion.<sup>1</sup>
3. Political and social changes in neighbouring countries.

Obviously, this does not mean that one should reject lessons based on past experience. History tends to repeat itself and this also constitutes a treasury of experiences.<sup>2</sup> The best examples of these are the contemporary events in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine which have deep roots and not only in Russian history of wars.<sup>3</sup> When one uses the term hybrid threat or war not only their military aspects should be discussed. *Hybridisation means a complexity and multidimensional character of actions in the areas of politics, economics, military, community, information and infrastructure (PEMSII). The absence of declaring war or introducing a state of emergency (or martial law) hinders effective use of non-military and military forces in accordance within both the national and international letter of the law. Hybrid actions are actions purposefully limited and maintained by an aggressor at a level below the one that can be explicitly defined as regular open war. The aim of such subliminal aggression is to achieve planned objectives without open confrontation but also to hamper at the same time the process of reaching consensus by national and international (in particular) allied organisations*

<sup>1</sup> See for instance: Wojnowski M, *Koncepcja „wojny nowej generacji” w ujęciu strategów Sztabu Generalnego Sił Zbrojnych Federacji Rosyjskiej. Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrzznego*, 2015, No. 13 (7), pp.13–39.

<sup>2</sup> 'History is universal experience — the experience not of another but of many others under manifold conditions', quotation Liddell Hart B.H, *Strategia: działania pośrednie*, Warsaw: MON, 1959, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> For an interesting article on the subject see: Dura M, *Wojna hybrydowa. Powtórka z historii*. Electronic source: <http://www.defence24.pl/231107,wojna-hybrydowa-powtorka-z-historii>, accessed: 2.06.2017; and also: Parafianowicz Z, Potocki M, *Atak chaosem. Rosja realizuje na Ukrainie strategię carskiego oficera*. Electronic source: <http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/456125,atak-chaosem-rosja-realizuje-na-ukrainie-strategie-bylego-carskiego-oficera.html>, accessed: 21.06.2017.

and international security institutions.<sup>4</sup> Use of military force is only a final act, or one of many elements of handling a conflict. In analysing the aforementioned quote one can state that it actually paraphrases the work of Sun Tzu in *The art of war* probably written some 600 years before Christ. This Chinese strategist pointed out that the best solution is to challenge opponent's plans and strategies rendering them impossible to implement, and to loosen and undermine alliances and the opponent's economy so that they would be defeated before the war even started.<sup>5</sup>

To sum up, the evolution of the security environment faced by developed countries brings the necessity to revise security strategy in the military area also. Although they are ready for a regular war waged in accordance with international law, developed countries appear to be vulnerable to the irregular form of military actions performed by an opponent not respecting international law or looking for a niche outside international law in innovative and non-standard ways (including the cultural ones). Nowadays a fashionable term for such a type of military conflict is 'hybrid warfare'.

## Hybrid War — Old Idea and New Technologies

A hybrid is something that consists of many elements, very often not matching, a mongrel, the result of cross-breeding.<sup>6</sup> With reference to the art of warfare, the terms 'hybrid war', 'hybrid actions' and 'hybrid threats' appeared at the beginning of 21st century. The term 'hybrid warfare' emerged in 2002 in the work of William J Nemeth titled *Future war and Chechnya: a case for hybrid warfare*.<sup>7</sup> Analysing the Russian and Chechen conflict, the author used the concept of 'hybridisation' with reference not only to the military modus operandi of the Chechens but also to their community organisation, linking the model of conducting military actions with the societal model. According to W J Nemeth:

- Military organisation reflects the level of socio-political development and societal military theory and doctrine reflects prevailing societal norms.
- Indicators of military force do not match the Western conceptions of military strength (and they focus on the following areas: ideas, individuals and charismatic leaders, acceptance of heavy losses, deep belief in the cause, decentralisation and tactical independence).
- So called hybrid forces can effectively adopt technologically advanced solutions and implement them in a way that is creative and goes beyond their inventors' intentions.
- Asymmetry in armed conflict does not only refer to military capabilities but also to approval of social and international norms.

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<sup>4</sup> Keplin J, Pawlak C, Hybrydowość wyzwaniem dla bezpieczeństwa przyszłości. *Biuletyn CDiS SZ. Zagrożenia hybrydowe*. 2016, No. 2, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Sun Tzu, *Sztuka wojny* czyli trzynaście rozdziałów. Chapter — Strategia ataku, pp. 21–27. *Electronic source*: [https://www.lazarski.pl/fileadmin/user\\_upload/dokumenty/student/Sun\\_Tzu\\_sztuka\\_wojny.pdf](https://www.lazarski.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumenty/student/Sun_Tzu_sztuka_wojny.pdf), accessed: 26.12.2017.

<sup>6</sup> Bańko M (Ed.), *Wielki słownik wyrazów obcych*. Warsaw, 2005, p. 518.

<sup>7</sup> Published in Monterey in California as a Master's thesis in Naval Postgraduate School. *Electronic source*: [http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5865/02Jun\\_Nemeth.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y](http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5865/02Jun_Nemeth.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y), accessed: 1.05.2016.

Then the author states that such a form of armed conflict as in Chechnya, in which the state and non-state actors accept non-conforming legal and social norms are involved, would become more common.<sup>8</sup>

The most cited definition of hybrid wars has been included in Frank G Hoffman's book *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*.<sup>9</sup> Based on an analysis of the theory of fourth-generation warfare (4GW), compound wars, unrestricted warfare and war beyond limits<sup>10</sup>, as well as on the history of the uprising in Ireland in 1919–1920, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Middle East particularly in Lebanon in 2006, Hoffman has defined hybrid wars. According to his definition: *Hybrid wars are fought by countries or political groups and involve different methods of warfare, including conventional potential, irregular tactics and formations, mass violence and force, and criminal incidents*.<sup>11</sup>

In 2013, in Russia, similar conclusions were presented by General Valery Gerasimov, though he did not then use the term hybrid threats. Both Hoffman's and Gerasimov's concepts highlight changes occurring in contemporary military conflicts: the decentralisation of command and control structures, combination of a strategic, operational and tactical sphere of operations and a significant increase in a non-military approach to warfare. The two above-mentioned authors also indicate that irregular forms of war operations play an important role, including the methods used by guerillas and small combat detachments. The authors claim that future warfare will not include a clear distinction between war and peace, or soldiers and civilians. Hoffman, using the notion of hybrid wars, mainly focuses on activities performed by combat detachments and pays less attention to non-military means of creating hybrid conflicts, to which Gerasimov often refers, emphasising the importance of the strategic dimension of future conflicts and psychological and informative activities.<sup>12</sup> It is worth emphasising that the area of psychology, information and everything that can be called strategic communication has always been a vital element of Russian and Soviet policy, a tool for achieving geopolitical and autocratic objectives. Therefore, there exists a so-called active performance and, a kind of the extension of this term, the concept of net war by Aleksander Dugin.<sup>13</sup>

It is worth highlighting that Gerasimov's views (also known as Gerasimov's doctrine), and those of Hoffman are in fact an attempt to refresh a description of the

<sup>8</sup> Nemeth W.J, *Future war and Chechnya: a case for hybrid warfare*. Monterey, 2002, pp. 71–76.

<sup>9</sup> Published by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington in 2007. *Electronic source*: [http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac\\_hybridwar\\_0108.pdf](http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf), accessed: 1.05.2016.

<sup>10</sup> Hoffman F.G, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Arlington, 2007, pp.17–23.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p.58.

<sup>12</sup> Skoneczny Ł, *Wojna hybrydowa — wyzwanie przyszłości? Wybrane zagadnienia, Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego. Wojna hybrydowa*. Wydanie specjalne. 2015, pp. 43–44. The article also includes a broader understanding of the concept by Nemeth, Hoffman and Gerasimov.

<sup>13</sup> Golicyn A, *Nowe kłamstwa w miejsce starych. Komunistyczna strategia podstępu i dezinformacji*. Warsaw, 2007; *see also*: Wojnowski M, *Koncepcja wojny sieciowej Aleksandra Dugina jako narzędzie realizacji celów geopolitycznych Federacji Rosyjskiej. Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, 2017, No. 16 (9), pp.11–37.

essence of armed conflicts, which has been present before. There can be mentioned, for example, the theory of so-called rebel wars by Jewgenij Messner from the 60s of the 20th century. Messner points out the process of a blurring of the differences between the state of peace and war, and the process of eliminating the difference between regular and irregular military detachments, paramilitary formations (such as; police, border guard, intelligence), non-state military formations, rebel and armed social groups (trade unions, criminal gangs, armed business formations, fighting party squads, political and social organisations, etc.). Messner claims that the basic form of wars of rebellion is irregular activity, including sabotage<sup>14</sup>, acts of terror, guerilla activity and uprisings. According to the author of rebel wars, a classic example of irregular activity is the Poland of 1939–1945, including the Warsaw uprising.<sup>15</sup>

In examining the nature of hybrid wars, one can agree with the saying that in the approach to hybridity of armed conflicts it is a mistake to create a dichotomy between a stable state and changeable, flexible, amorphous and non-state

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<sup>14</sup> In the Polish military literature the terms sabotage and covert operations are often considered as equivalents. However, such an understanding of the terms seems to be totally incorrect.

Sabotage involves operations (activities) which lead to the breach, disruption and immobilisation of national defence of the state through vandalising or destroying, or causing damage or destroying all national defence or war-related materials, facilities and devices, including human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys and neutralises an enemy's opportunities with the use of limited human and material resources. Sabotage can be more effective or the only possible measure to attack (distract) specific targets impossible to be destroyed (distracted) using conventional armament systems.

Covert operations are targeted at creating distractions, misleading an enemy, for instance as regards the point of main operation or direction of an attack. Covert operations prevent the enemy from using forces and measures in a planned and effective way.

In order to illustrate better what sabotage is one can refer to the examples of the first war in the Persian Gulf (1990–1991). The first one includes the destruction of underground, light-wave conductor communications cables by the British special units. The other one includes a planned, but not carried out, operation aimed at distracting the Iraqi air-defence system. The Iraqi air-command and control system, called Kari, was designed by the French and it was based on French and USSR equipment. The system was well-known to Americans. The joint plan of the National Defense Agency and Central Intelligence Agency was to infect the system. The virus was to be installed in the system components, which the Iraqis wanted to smuggle through Jordan. One of the main tasks of the Iraqi special units present was the destruction of their enemy's command and control communications systems.

An example of covert operations is the reconnaissance of the Kuwait coast by soldiers of Special Operations Forces of the American Navy, which was to convince the Iraqis that the attack would be aimed at liberating Kuwait and amphibious warfare would be used. (*Compare* — *Electronic source*: <https://www.militarydictionary.org/term/sabotage>, accessed: 5.12.2017); *Joint Interdiction. Joint Publication 3-03*, Washington, 2016, p.11-7; *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, 2017, p.70 and *Joint Interdiction*, p. 1-2, GL-4).

<sup>15</sup> *For more about rebel wars*: Sykulski L, Rosyjska koncepcja wojen buntowniczych Jewgienija Messnera. *Przegląd Geopolityczny*, 2015, Vol. 11, pp. 103–112; *see also*: Kraj K, *Wojny asymetryczne czy miatężewojna Jewgienija Messnera zagrożeniem dla bezpieczeństwa w XXI wieku. Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i praktyka*, 2012, No. 3, pp. 33–39.

opponent<sup>16</sup>, because the difference between the potential and applied tactics is an example of asymmetry, and it does not refer to the imbalance between the two parties, for instance in the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

The theory of hybrid wars, based on the experience gained by Ukraine and Middle East, becomes more and more recognised worldwide. The term has been introduced into the language of international politics and NATO: *We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design. It is essential that the Alliance possesses the necessary tools and procedures required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid warfare threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national forces.*<sup>17</sup>

Similarly, the European Parliament and Council issued on 6 April 2016 the communication entitled: Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats. A European Union response, in which one can read: *While definitions of hybrid threats vary and need to remain flexible to respond to their evolving nature, the concept aims to capture the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity to hinder decision-making processes. Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats. Insofar as countering hybrid threats relates to national security and defence and the maintenance of law and order, the primary responsibility lies with Member States, as most national vulnerabilities are country-specific. However, many EU Member States face common threats, which can also target cross-border networks or infrastructures. Such threats can be addressed more effectively with a coordinated response at EU level by using EU policies and instruments, to build on European solidarity, mutual assistance and the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty. EU policies and instruments can and, to a significant degree already do, play a key value-adding role in building awareness. This is helping to improve the resilience of Member States to respond to common threats. The Union's external action proposed under this framework is guided by the principles set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which include democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. And more: Hybrid threats aim to exploit a country's vulnerabilities and often seek to undermine fundamental democratic values and liberties.*<sup>18</sup> According to the communication cited, the response to so-called hybrid threats includes a few activities which are as follows:

<sup>16</sup> Gruszczak A, *Hybrydowość współczesnych wojen — analiza krytyczna*, [in:] Sokała W, Zapała B (Eds), *Asymetria i hybrydowość — stare armie wobec nowych konfliktów*. Warsaw 2011, p.16.

<sup>17</sup> Wales Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales on 5 September 2014, p.13.

<sup>18</sup> Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats. A European Union response, JOIN(2016) 18 final, European Commission, Brussels, 6 April 2016.

Increasing awareness through the creation of the European Union Cell for the analysis of information related to hybrid threats, development of strategic communication, creation of the centre of excellence for counteracting hybrid threats. The latter activity was implemented on 2 October 2017 in Helsinki, and the Centre for Counteracting Hybrid Threats has already been opened. The institution constitutes a joint undertaking of the European Union and NATO.<sup>19</sup> In favour of the opening of the centre in the capital of Finland, which is an EU member state but does not belong to NATO, was the experience of the state with counteracting threats posed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and later Russia.

Other activities recommended by the EU include the organisation of those which develop resistance through critical infrastructure protection, in particular, of power grids, transport, public and food safety, chains of supply, development of defensive abilities, protection of public health and food, cybernetic security, especially in the area of industry, power, financial systems and transport.

Moreover, those activities aim at financing hybrid threats, developing resistance in the face of radicalisation of attitudes and brutal extremism, strengthening the cooperation among the third parties, preventing crises, responding to emergencies, counteracting their effects and strengthening cooperation with NATO.

Taking into consideration the European Union's attitude towards „hybrid threats“ it is clear that counteracting them is considered holistically, as a task of the whole state security system and not only of its military component.

In order to summarise the above considerations and definitions, so called hybrid war may be characterised by the following points:

- The participants are state and non-state actors.
- It is not limited to an armed conflict, very often a military effect is one of several and not the main area of operation. The use of military and paramilitary means is a supplementation of information, psychological, economical, diplomatic and other operations.
- Regular and irregular forms of armed combat are used in military areas.
- Military and paramilitary formations (state and non-state) are engaged openly or implicitly.
- Terrorist and criminal modus operandi and organisations are used.
- A combination of methods and means applied make it impossible or difficult to acknowledge the operations as one conducted under international law.

Such conflicts have already been described and defined as „fourth generations wars“, „complex wars“, „non-limited warfare“, „grey zone“<sup>20</sup>, „political warfare“,

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<sup>19</sup> The opening ceremony of the Centre for Counteracting Hybrid Threats in Helsinki was chaired by NATO Secretary General NATO Jens Stoltenberg and a high EU representative for foreign affairs and security policy Federica Mogherini. The opening ceremony speech was delivered by Jens Stoltenberg. He explained that hybrid threats, considered as deceitful and misleading activities, are at least as old as the Trojan horse. He also reminded participants of the EU definition of such threats. *Electronic source:* <http://www.dw.com/pl/centrum-przedziwdzia%C5%82ania-zagro%C5%BCeniom-hybradowym-w-helsinki-ach-stare-jak-ko%C5%84-troja%C5%84ski/a-40803485>, accessed: 28.12.2017.

<sup>20</sup> Votel J.L, Cleveland C.T, Connett C.T, Irwin W, *Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone. Joint Force Quarterly*, 2016, No. 1, pp. 101–109.

“ambiguous warfare”, „non linear warfare”<sup>21</sup>, „postmodernist warfare”<sup>22</sup> or finally a little forgotten recently, but revolutionary in 1990’s the theory of third wave warfare.<sup>23</sup>

It is worth noticing that the concept of fourth generation warfare for example is largely identical with the concept of warfare, or hybrid conflict and rebellious warfare. Fourth generation warfare involves operations aimed at outwitting or undermining an opponent’s power by making use of weaknesses and using methods which basically differ from the opponent’s own way of acting.

Strategically, the following phenomena are assigned to fourth generation warfare:

- the loss of the state monopoly to wage a war,
- the return to the word of cultures and countries in a state of conflict,
- the inner division of society (ethnic, religious, according to interests).

In the strategic and economic sphere:

- searching for the main target for a psychological strike (will to fight, public opinion),
- disproportion between results and investments),

In the tactical sphere:

- redirecting efforts from the front of the enemy to the rear,
- using the enemy’s power against them.

The increasing role of non-public factors (terrorists, criminal organisations, transnational corporations), disproportions in the wealth of countries as well as non-public organisations, marketisation of the access to technologies and information<sup>24</sup> have been emphasised. Very similar if not identical elements are connected with description of dangers and asymmetric conflicts.<sup>25</sup>

So called hybrid war in its nature, in the military dimension, is close to so called unconventional war<sup>26</sup>; one of the types of operations (special operations). Uncon-

<sup>21</sup> Dewit D, The Inauguration of 21st Century Political Warfare: A Strategy for Countering Russian Non-Linear Warfare Capabilities. *Electronic source*: <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:649Huz0MGrQJ:smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/33805+&cd=4&hl=pl&ct=clnk&gl=pl&client=firefox-b>, accessed: 18.06.2016; Connell M.E, Evans R, Russia’s “Ambiguous Warfare” and Implications for the U.S. Marine Corps. Arlington, 2015. *Electronic source*: [https://www.cna.org/CNA\\_files/PDF/DOP-2015-U-010447-Final.pdf](https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2015-U-010447-Final.pdf), accessed: 18.06.2016.

<sup>22</sup> Pietraś M, Wojna hybrydowa Rosji na wschodzie Ukrainy w kontekście współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych, [in:] Baluk W, Doroszenko M (Eds), *Wojna hybrydowa Rosji przeciwko Ukrainie w latach 2014–2016*. Lublin, 2017, pp. 13–32.

<sup>23</sup> Toffler A, Toffler H, *Wojna i antywojna. Jak przetrwać na progu XXI wieku*. Warsaw, 1997.

<sup>24</sup> *More about fourth generation war, e.g. in:* Reginia-Zacharski J, *Wojna w świecie współczesnym*. Łódź, 2014.

<sup>25</sup> *More about fourth generation war, e.g. in:* Reginia-Zacharski J, *Wojna...*, op.cit, pp. 294–304. Term „4<sup>th</sup> generation war” appeared at the end of 1980’s XX c., used by American military analysts (William S. Lind), as a script of future war. The concept was first described in: Lind W.S, Nightengale K, Schmitt J.F, Sutton J.W, Wilson G, *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*. *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989, pp. 22–26.

<sup>26</sup> Unconventional Warfare is operations which include a wide spectrum of military and paramilitary activities usually long lasting, mostly conducted indirectly, commonly or by a native power surrogate, which are organised trained, equipped, supported and directed in different degrees by external sources. Unconventional warfare is exceptional special operations which may be carried out both as a part of campaign subordinate to a combative regional command or as an independent campaign. As an independent



ventional warfare, according to a military doctrine, is supposed to force a particular mode of behaviour, destabilisation or bring down governments of other countries. In such operations resistance movements and opposition which is sponsored and motivated externally are often used. Examples of such operations and their use to gain strategic aims are provided by the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, Russian operations in Ukraine starting with the annexation of Crimea, or the use of Hezbollah by Iran in order to execute their own strategies.<sup>27</sup>

## Summary

The phenomenon of mixed elements of regular and irregular forms of armed combat, guerrillas and terrorists, criminal incidents and use of new technologies for armed, informative, psychological and economic combat in an armed conflict are not a novelty. In any case, scientists who deal with hybrid conflicts refer to historical examples from the Roman-Germanic wars, the American War of independence up to the Chechen wars.<sup>28</sup>

At the same time, regular and irregular operations as a form of a strategic element were used during the Swedish invasion, the Seven Years' War, Napoleonic Wars in Spain and Russia, the First World War. Additionally, the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War bears the hallmarks of hybridity.

Information and diplomatic activities supplementing military operations were carried out during the great war against the Teutonic Order and the latter wars

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campaign unconventional war mainly concentrates on political-military and psychological aims. Unconventional war includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movement. Military actions in an unconventional war are a culmination of successful efforts to organise and mobilise civilians against hostile government or occupation forces.

From the perspective of the United States an intention is to develop and maintain resistance organisations and synchronise its operations with the further aims of national security of the United States. Special operations troops do not create a resistance movement. They advise, train and support already existing native resistance movements in conducting an unconventional war and, if it is required, they take part in combat. If unconventional war operations support conventional military operations, the main effort is shifted to military aims, however political and psychological implications remain. Headquarters and commanders as well as a strategic level of command must avoid limiting an irregular war to a defined set of conditions and activities resulting from both recent events and personal experience. The most common mistake is a belief that an unconventional war is limited to guerrilla war and uprisings. Based on: *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. Joint Pub 3-05*, Washington, 2014, s. XI; *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. Joint Pub 3-05*, Washington 2003, p. II-7 – II-8; *Unconventional Warfare. Pocket Guide.*, Fort Bragg s. I.

<sup>27</sup> On the subject e.g.: Grodzki R, *Wojna gruzińsko-rosyjska 2008 przyczyny — przebieg — skutki*. Zakrzewo, 2009; see more: Wojnowski M, Mit „wojny hybrydowej”. Konflikt na terenie państwa ukraińskiego w świetle rosyjskiej myśli wojskowej XIX–XXI wieku, *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego. Wojna hybrydowa*. Wydanie Specjalne, 2015, pp. 7–38; see also: Harik J.P, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism*. London, New York, 2005.

<sup>28</sup> See e.g.: Hoffman F.G, *op. cit.*; also: Murray W, Mansoor P.R (Eds), *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present*. New York, 2012; McCulloh T, Johnson R, *Hybrid Warfare*. Tampa, 2013.

against Teutonic knights. Brethren of the Order of Brothers of the German House of Saint Mary in Jerusalem not only spread “fake news” about the Polish king Władysław Jagiełło in order to undermine Poland’s and Lithuania’s authority in the international area, impede forming alliances, and to justify and gain international support for their own violent policy. They also used to forge coins and documents in order to weaken the economic position.

So called national-liberation wars such as the war in Algeria, were fought against a non-national enemy using terrorist tactics and even criminal activities. A model example of hybrid conflict is the Silesian uprisings. Taking into consideration instruments and methods of carrying out armed conflicts, a hybrid war is a kind of novelty. *The concept of hybridity of modern wars is an attempt to formulate a new analytical interpretation of armed conflicts in the context of contemporary security problems asymmetry of military actions, lengthiness of regional conflicts, cultural divisions and negative results of globalisation.*<sup>29</sup>

Looking for a definition of hybrid war is searching for an answer to the question how the international situation after the cold war, new technologies, world asymmetry, commercialisation and globalisation affect the way and proportions of using methods and means to conduct a fight. So the Prussian luminary of the art of war was right when he stated that: ... *the goal set by a person who starts a war, means used by him will be shaped entirely according to aspects of individual location, will include time nature and general relations and finally will be submitted to general conclusions which must be drawn from the essence of war.*<sup>30</sup>

So called hybrid war is not a new phenomenon. Such elements as: information war, application of economic instruments, shocking by means of terror and cultural confrontation are not anything new in the history of wars. Greater and greater dependence on technology, information being passed in almost real time, extension and complication of procedures and decision-making process in the Western world increased susceptibility to hostile operations other than military and those using military force. On the other hand, if we agree to Clausewitz’s understanding of war, where: ... *war is only a continuation of policy (and further) war is not only a political act, but also a real political instrument, continuation of political relations, carrying them out by other means*<sup>31</sup>, technological progress and social development interweave policy with war even more strongly not only in the decision-making dimension and in motives, but also in the means applied to wage the struggle.

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**Streszczenie.** Od 2014 r. zawrotną karierę robią pojęcia wojny i zagrożeń hybrydowych. Termin ten (wojna hybrydowa) został wprowadzony do naukowego dyskursu przez Williama J. Nemetha w 2002 r. w związku z wojnami w Czeczenii i rozpowszechniony w 2006 r. przez Franka G. Hoffmana w związku m.in. z drugą Intifadą. W 2014 r. po aneksji Krymu przez Rosję i wybuchu walk na wschodzie Ukrainy wojna hybrydowa i zagrożenia hybrydowe z naukowej dyskusji przeszły do polityki i oficjalnych dokumentów. Autor próbuje udzielić odpowiedzi na pytanie: czy odkrycie tzw. wojny hybrydowej i zagrożeń hybrydowych jest odkryciem czegoś nowego, czy raczej pełną konfuzji reakcją na zaskoczenie Unii Europejskiej i NATO działaniami rosyjskimi na wschodnich i południowych rubieżach Ukrainy. Zjawisko występowania w konflikcie zbrojnym pomieszanych elementów regularnej i nieregularnej formy walki zbrojnej, partyzantów i terrorystów, zjawisk kryminalnych, wykorzystania nowych technologii do prowadzenia walki zbrojnej, informacyjnej, psychologicznej, ekonomicznej nie jest nowe. Sami naukowcy, którzy zajmują się konfliktami hybrydowymi odwołują się do przykładów historycznych od wojen Rzymu z Germanami (kampania z 9 r. n.e. Publiusza Kwintyliusza Warusa przeciw germańskim plemionom pod wodzą Arminiusza), przez wojnę o niepodległość Stanów Zjednoczonych, po wojny czeczeńskie. Obecnie, coraz większe uzależnienie od technologii, informacji przekazywanych w czasie niemal rzeczywistym, rozbudowa i skomplikowanie procedur oraz procesu decyzyjnego w świecie zachodnim zwiększyły podatność na wrogie działania inne niż militarne oraz te, wykorzystujące siłę militarną.

**Резюме.** С 2014 г. очень часто применяемыми стали понятия, связанные с гибридной войной и гибридными угрозами. Это понятие (гибридная война) было введено в научный дискурс Уильямом Дж. Неметом в 2002 г. в связи с войнами в Чечене и широко распространено в 2006 г. Фрэнком Хоффманом в связи со второй интифадой. В 2014 г. после аннексии Крыма Россией и начала боевых действий на востоке Украины, термины гибридная война и гибридные угрозы, которые до сих пор присутствовали в научном дискурсе, стали применяться в сфере политики и официальных документах. Автор пытается ответить на вопрос является ли понятие т.н. гибридной войны и гибридных угроз чем-то новым или скорее они являются полностью обеспокоенной реакцией ЕС и НАТО, которые в изумлении от российских действий на восточных и южных границах Украины. Применение в вооруженном конфликте смешанных элементов регулярных и нерегулярных форм вооруженной борьбы, партизан и террористов, уголовных явлений, использование новых технологий для ведения вооруженной, информационной, психологической, экономической борьбы — это не новое явление. Сами ученые, которые занимаются вопросом гибридных конфликтов, ссылаются на исторические примеры, учитывая войны Рима с Германами ( поход в 9 в. н.э. Публия Квинтилия Вара против германских племен во главе с Арминием), войну за независимость США, чеченские войны. Растущая в настоящее время зависимость от технологий, информация, предоставляемая практически в реальное время, расширение и усложнение процедур и процесса принятия решений в западном мире, преимущественно увеличили подверженность враждебным действиям другим чем боевые и тем, которые используют военную силу.

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