General aptitude and the assumption of truth in deductively rational reasoning about probable but false antecedent to consequent relations

• Autorzy: Walter Schroyens , Lieve Fleerackers , Sunile Maes

Abstrakty

EN

Two experiments (N1= 117 andN2= 245) on reasoning with knowledge-rich conditionals showed a main effect of logical validity, which was due to the negative effect of counter-examples being smaller for valid than for invalid arguments. These findings support the thesis that some people tend to inhibit background inconsistent with the hypothetical truth of the premises, while others tend to abandon the implicit truth-assumption when they have factual evidence to the contrary. Findings show that adhering to the truth-assumption in the face of conflicting evidence to the contrary requires an investment of time and effort which people with a higher general aptitude are more likely to do.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

rationality; reasoning; conditionals; truth

• Wydawca: Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Zarządzania w Warszawie
• Czasopismo: Advances in Cognitive Psychology
• Rocznik: 2010
• Tom: 6
• Strony: 88-102

Twórcy

autor

Walter Schroyens

• Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Belgium

autor

Lieve Fleerackers

• Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Belgium

autor

Sunile Maes

• Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Belgium

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.2478/v10053-008-0079-z