Descartes' "Radical" Rationalism? On the History of the Theory of Science

• Autorzy: Stanisław Janeczek
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper addresses the issue of categorisation of the theory of science worked out by R. Descartes. In as much as it is justifiable to claim that Descartes is a typical rationalist in epistemology and metaphysics, we may still ask whether it is correct to do the same in his theory of science in relation to modern philosophy of nature, of which he was one of its founders. Descartes intended to work out a universal method which was supposed to be certain, easy, fertile, and complete. In principle, this task is satisfied by intuitive and deductive procedures. In practice, however, he had to consent to a multilevel character of certainty of the theses in his system. This concerns especially philosophy of nature. If he had granted experience the principal role in the starting point of physical analyses, or even it was supposed to decided about his choice of one a priori and hypothetical explanation, out of many, then at least in comparison with the certainty of metaphysical truths the theses of physics must of neces- sity remain only hypothetical, excluding only the most general questions. Thus it is also justifiable to think that Descartes had two models of methodology that is, as it were, one official elaborated in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Discourse on the Method and in Meditations, and the second one semi-official, formulated in the Principles of Philosophy, where he agreed to use hypotheses. It is therefore difficult to treat his views taken en bloc as a manifestation of radical rationalism connected with equally radical apriorism and nativism, a fact that if further supported by numerous textbooks on the history of philosophy.

• Wydawca: Sciendo
• Czasopismo: Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
• Rocznik: 2010
• Numer: 20(33)
• Strony: 25-38

Twórcy

autor

Stanisław Janeczek

• The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin