POTREBUJEME PRI VYMEDZOVANÍ SOCIÁLNYCH FENOMÉNOV NEVYHNUTNE POJEM PRAVIDLA?

• Autorzy: Tatiana Sedová

Warianty tytułu

EN

Do we necessarily need the concept of rule in defining social phenomena?

• Języki publikacji: SK

Abstrakty

EN

The paper discusses the concept of rule and its role in understanding and defining social facts. On the background of the main objections against Winch’s conception of rule as the necessary and sufficient means for identifying a social phenomenon (M. Hollis, J. Bohmann, M. Gilbert) it questions the analogy between the linguistic activity, the Wittgensteinian conception of meaning and conceiving of agency as a meaningful social activity.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

MEANING; THOUGHT; SOCIAL SCIENCE; ANTINATURALISMUS; WITTGENSTEIN

• Wydawca: Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Filozofia (Philosophy)
• Rocznik: 2012
• Tom: 67
• Numer: 7
• Strony: 582 – 591

Twórcy

autor

Tatiana Sedová

• Filozofický ústav SAV, Klemensova 19, 813 64 Bratislava, Slovak Republic,