Czasopismo
Tytuł artykułu
Autorzy
Wybrane pełne teksty z tego czasopisma
Warianty tytułu
THE TRUTH, CONCEPTUAL SCHEME AND THE WORLD
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
In my article I criticize the conception which says that the conceptual character of human cognition makes false the theory of truth understood as a kind of correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker. Arguing against the conceptions of Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty and Andrzej Szahaj, I defend the claim that the conceptual character of human cognition is irrelevant to the critique of correspondence theories of truth. I justify this claim with the example of Nicholas Rescher’s conception of conceptual idealism, which is similar to the internal realism of Hilary Putnam but does not rule out the truth as a kind of correspondence.
Słowa kluczowe
Wydawca
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Tom
Numer
Strony
181-205
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-59a6a5a2-91dd-4f27-808b-8e172af37227