CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERIPHERAL SELF-AWARENESS

• Autorzy: Simen Elkatip Hatipoğlu
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

It has been argued that consciousness is not possible without peripheral self-consciousness; i.e., without an implicit awareness of oneself as the subject of one’s mental state. The author ś purpose is to undermine this view. He contend that a subject’s first-personal access to her conscious mental states and an awareness of them as hers, along with a particular approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things motivate the view that consciousness is not possible without self-consciousness. In order to undermine this view he argues that not all conscious states are accompanied by a sense of mineness. He rejects also the reasons for endorsing an approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things. Then he examines critically Kriegel’s arguments for the dependence of consciousness on self-consciousness based on the first-personal access a subject has to her conscious mental states and discuss the difficulties involved.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

CONSCIOUSNESS; SELF-AWARENESS; SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

• Wydawca: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Czasopismo: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Rocznik: 2013
• Tom: 20
• Numer: 3
• Strony: 323 – 340

Twórcy

autor

Simen Elkatip Hatipoğlu

• Department of Philosophy, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Istanbul Şehir University, Istanbul 34660, Turkey,