A PROBLEM WITH OBJECTS OF IMAGINATION AND THEIR APPEARENCES (Problem wygladów przedmiotu wyobrazonego)
The article consists of four parts. In the first three parts the author investigates Husserl's and Ingarden's theses concerning the appearances of objects of perception and imagination. Though Ingarden's concept differs from Husserl's in some important respects, both philosophers agree that objects of imagination present themselves to our consciousness via appearances. According to Husserl only acts of immanent perception do not require appearances to present their object. As far as Ingarden's concept is concerned, the necessity of appearances stems from the thesis of the transcendence of intentional objects. In part four the author argues that objects of imagination, in opposition to real spatio-temporal objects, cannot present themselves through appearances, thus an object of perception is nothing more than its 'appearances'. In turn his arguments are pointed against the thesis of the transcendence of intentional objects and go in the direction of a critique of their (double) subject-properties structure.
CEJSH db identifier