Some values for constant-sum and bilateral cooperative games

• Autorzy: Andrzej Młodak
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We prove new axiomatizations of the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value, defined on the class of nonnegative constant-sum games with nonzero worth of the grand coalition as well as on nonnegative bilateral games with nonzero worth of the grand coalition. A characteristic feature of the latter class of cooperative games is that for such a game any coalition and its complement in the set of all players have the same worth. The axiomatizations are then generalized to the entire class of constant-sum or bilateral games, respectively. Moreover, a new axiomatization of the Deegan-Packel value on the set of all cooperative games is presented and possibilities of creation of its version in those special cases are discussed.

• Wydawca: Institute of Mathematics Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Applicationes Mathematicae
• Rocznik: 2007
• Tom: 34
• Numer: 3
• Strony: 359-371

Daty

wydano

2007

Twórcy

autor

Andrzej Młodak

• Central Statistical Office, Statistical Office in Poznań, Branch in Kalisz, Pl. J. Kilińskiego 13, 62-800 Kalisz, Poland

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.4064/am34-3-7