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Czasopismo
2005 | nr 2(59) | 43-57
Tytuł artykułu

Eksport surowców strategicznych a bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Polski

Autorzy
Warianty tytułu
EN
Export of strategic resources vs. Poland’s energy security
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
EN
Energy security is one of the economic security dimensions and makes up an important component of the economic potential of the state. It is essential for Poland as it has very limited possibilities to meet its fuel demands. In the course of time the rate of Poland’s energy self-sufficiency decreases, i.e. more and more amount of energy in the balance of needs is imported. The most serious dependence on fuel import concerns crude oil. Russia plays a dominant role in the geographical structure of crude oil and natural gas import. However, it has to be stressed that transportation and reloading possibilities exceed current needs of refineries, thus there is potential to increase crude oil import from other directions in case of difficulties to acquire Russian crude oil. The current domination of the import from Russia results mainly from reasonable price and technological factors (using existing transfer systems), not from the lack of alternative sources. The European Union, being in a similar position to Poland, not having sufficient energy resources, natural gas including, has to co-operate and trade with Russia where are world’s biggest crude oil deposits. Due to the network of oil and gas pipelines inherited from the Soviet Union, Russia has become a monopolist in the area of hydrocarbons transportation which are excavated by former Soviet republics. This is Russia’s tool of control of the countries’ oil and gas sectors. It allows completing probable shortage of gas necessary to fulfil the foreign contracts’ obligations and, finally, brings substantial profits from transportation services. In turn, some former Soviet republics’ dependence on crude oil or natural gas deliveries, not financially attractive, gives Moscow the possibility to exert influence on the politics of whole countries. It also enables attempts to take over control of transmission lines of energy resources that cross their territories. Thus did we encounter natural gas blackmail towards Poland in February 2004? No, we didn’t, in spite of the fact that previous dependence on import from Russia remained in our market (over 60%) and other central European and Baltic states’ markets. It resulted from a specific character of natural gas market where is a “fixed” connection between the receivers and producers with a network of gas pipes. No central European country has connections other than from Gazprom. Secondly, Russian natural gas is cheaper than other producers’ resource and its deliveries are guaranteed by many- year contracts. Poland’s entrance to the European Union is a chance for our energy system but also a great challenge - to improve the energy sector’s competitiveness. Obviously it does not mean that the gas problem does not exist. Polish governments have been negotiating for years with Gazprom and Russia in order to rationalise deliveries and trade exchange of energy resources. However, it can be said that after 13 years of regaining the sovereignty, Poland is still dependent on one basic gas provider, whereas alternative supply sources, or even appearing a potential competition, could ease the negative consequences of Russia’s hegemony.
Wydawca

Czasopismo
Rocznik
Tom
Strony
43-57
Opis fizyczny
rys., tab.
Twórcy
autor
  • Akademia Obrony Narodowej
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-c7649168-681e-4a09-b078-e1a3b6906467
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