Optimal Bidding Strategies On Energy Market Under Imperfect Information

• Autorzy: Borgosz-Koczwara, M.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The emerging electricity market behaves more like an oligopoly than a perfectly competitive market due to special features such as few producers, barrier to entry, transmission constraints. This makes it practicable for only a few independent power suppliers to service a given geographic region. On this market each power supplier can extend his own profit through the application the optimal bidding strategy. In this paper we apply a new approach to build bidding strategies for power suppliers on electricity market. Generally, this approach is presented in. It is assumed that each supplier’s bid is a linear function. Moreover each supplier tends to maximise his profit, which is dependent on the generation output, coefficients of bid function and cost function. Also each supplier’s profit is dependent on strategies of the other player and suppliers’ decisions are the subjects to expectations of the rivals’ bids. Therefore playing at electricity market is connected with the imperfect information about decisions of the rivals. We extend the approach used in and for some examples of load forecasting we obtain the optimal suppliers’ bids. The main results are illustrated by the numerical examples. To the analysis we use the real data from electricity power market.

Słowa kluczowe

PL

rynek energii

EN

energy market

• Czasopismo: Biuletyn Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki
• Rocznik: 2005
• Tom: nr 5
• Strony: 4751-4751
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 7 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Borgosz-Koczwara, M.

• Wrocław University of Technology

Bibliografia

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• 3. Ferrero R. W, Rivera J. F, Shahidehpour S. M., .Application of games with incomplete Information for pricing electricity in deregulated power pools". IEEE Trans, on Power Systems, Vol. 13, no. 1, Feb. 1998, pp. 184-189.
• 4. Hirshey M., Pappas J. L., Whigham D., „Managerial Economies. European Edition". The Dryden Press, London 1995.
• 5. Luo Z. O., Pang J. S., Ralph D., „Mathematical Pro-grams with Equilibrium Constraints". Cambridge University Press, 1996.
• 6. Ray D., Vohra R., „Equilibrium binding agreements". Journal of Economic Theory, no. 73,1997, pp. 30-78.
• 7. Wen F, David A. K., „Optimal Bidding Strategies and Modeling of imperfect Information Among Competitive Generators". IEEE Trans, on Power Systems, Vol. 16, no. 1, Feb. 2001, pp. 15-21.