Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
The emerging electricity market behaves more like an oligopoly than a perfectly competitive market due to special features such as few producers, barrier to entry, transmission constraints. This makes it practicable for only a few independent power suppliers to serve a given geographic region. On this market each power supplier can extend his own profit through the application of the optimal bidding strategy. This paper compares a cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to analyzing the day ahead market as an example of a spot market. Recent work has shown that the profit maximizing problem of the power suppliers can be written as a mathematical model. By considering these two cases as a game theory problem, the existence of Nash points are analyzed in the Cournot model.
Rocznik
Strony
141--147
Opis fizyczny
Bibliogr. 8 poz., rys.
Twórcy
autor
- Instytut Matematyki i Informatyki, Politechnika Wrocławska, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław
autor
- Instytut Organizacji i Zarządzania, Politechnika Wrocławska, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław
Bibliografia
- [1] LA. BARROSO, R.D. CARNEIRO, S. GRANVILLE, M.V.PEREIRA, M.FAMPA, Nash equilibrium in strategie bidding: a binary expansion approach, IEEE Trans. Power Syst, vol. 21 no.2: 629-638, 2006
- [2] M. BORGOSZ-KOCZWARA, A. WYŁOMAŃSKA, The equilibrium models in oligopoly electricity market. In: “The European Electricity Market EEM-04": 67-75, 2004
- [3] M. BORGOSZ-KOCZWARA, A. WYŁOMAŃSKA, Optimal bidding strategies on energy market under imperfect information, In: "The European Electricity Market EEM-05": 67-73,2005
- [4] C.J. DAY, B.E HOBBS, Oligopolistic competition in power networks: A conjectured supply function approach, IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol.17 no.3: 597-607, 2002
- [5] R.D. LUCE, H. RATFFA, Games and Decisions: An Introduction and Critical Survey, Willey & Sons, 1957.
- [6] J. NASH, Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of the USA 36(1): 48-49,1950
- [7] N.I. VOROPAI, F,.Y. IVANOVA, Shapley game for expansion planning of generating companies at many non-coincident criteria, IEEE Trans. Power Syąt, vol.21 no.4: 1630-1637, 2006
- [8] http://www.polpx.pl
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-840cf87e-7eea-49c4-ac68-a6bfe2c941af