Czasopismo
Tytuł artykułu
Autorzy
Warianty tytułu
Certainties and the sceptical problem
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
The aim of the article is to develop the dialectics and potential of a specific philosophical approach to the problem of epistemological scepticism: Wittgenstein’s ideas about the function of fundamental certainties in our epistemic practices. I begin with an excursion into the problematic of sceptical arguments and explain G. E. Moore’s anti-sceptical strategy, which influenced Wittgenstein’s thoughts in On Certainty. I then offer a reconstruction of the Wittgensteinian approach that I favour. On this basis I argue that although there is a grain of truth in scepticism, the idea of an indefinitely-iterated doubt and request for reasons (driving the Pyrrhonian-style of scepticism), as well as the idea of a hyperbolic doubt (driving Cartesian-style scepticism), are philosophical illusions from the perspective of the rules and standards of our epistemic operating - the would-be sceptic offers us no compelling alternative.
Słowa kluczowe
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Tom
Numer
Strony
643-680
Opis fizyczny
Rodzaj publikacji
ARTICLE
Twórcy
autor
- Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
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