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Why are atomic propositions and states of affairs mutually independent in the "Tractatus"?
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In this article I attempt to reply to the question of whether, in the framework of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, reasons and arguments are given which might plausibly motivate the claim - made by Wittgenstein himself - that atomic propositions and their correlates (states of affairs) are mutually independent. My first step is to make clear that an answer to this question demands a detailed interpretation of Tractarian objects and, specifically, whether they are only particulars, or properties and relations too. After sketching the evidential support for both interpretations, I incline to a reading that takes properties and relations to be objects. In the context of the narrower and broader conceptions of objects, I then give a detailed analysis of the metaphor “the space of states of affairs” and “logical space”, which I consider to be the principal guide in our understanding the reasons for the independence of states of affairs and thus, more generally, of atomic propositions too.
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Tom
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61-76
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ARTICLE
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- Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
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Bibliografia
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