Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
We compare the welfare effects of government credit subsidies and guarantees in transition and post-transition economies in the conditions of asymmetric information. We show that the guarantees and subsidies targeted to low risk borrowers decrease efficiency while those targeted to high risk borrowers increase efficiency both in transition and post-transition economies. The uniform non-targeted guarantees improve welfare. The uniform subsidies may be used to improve welfare in the economy subjected to credit rationing, but they do not have any effect on the size of collateral required in post-transition economy.
Słowa kluczowe
Wydawca
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Tom
Numer
Strony
383-398
Opis fizyczny
Rodzaj publikacji
ARTICLE
Twórcy
autor
- K. Janda, Ustav slovenskej a svetovej ekonomiky SAV, Sancová 56, 811 05 Bratislava 1, Slovak Republic
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
CEJSH db identifier
06SKAAAA00882116
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.83cd7adf-e2e4-31f4-a3a7-b3f76b7c55cb