PROPER NAMES AND APOSTERIORITY OF IDENTITY STATEMENTS

• Autorzy: Cmorej P.
• Języki publikacji: HU

Abstrakty

EN

The author of the article seeks to find an answer to the question whether it is possible to determine a priori the truth value of the statement 'M = N' where 'M' and 'N' are proper names of the same particular. He analyses the argumentation of the conception defending the positive answer to the question and tries to present arguments in favor of the opposite view. Let us suppose that the individual 'I' is named by 'M' at time 't1' and by 'N' at time 't2'. If the individual changes considerably during the interval (t1, t2) or presents us from quite different sides at 't1' and 't2', respectively (e.g., as a mountain seen from different sides at the respective time moments), we will be unable to find out a priori, without certain empirical knowledge, whether 'M = N', although there were any doubts about the identity of the baptized individual neither at 't1' nor at 't2'.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE; IDENTITY STATEMENT; PROPER NAMES; TRUTH VALUE

• Wydawca: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Czasopismo: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Rocznik: 2006
• Tom: 13
• Numer: 4
• Strony: 481-494
• Rodzaj publikacji: ARTICLE

Twórcy

autor

Cmorej P.,

• P. Cmorej, Filozoficky ustav SAV, Klemensova 19, 813 64 Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Identyfikatory

CEJSH db identifier

07SKAAAA02244713