Monizm neutralny a teorie redukcji i emergencji

• Authors: Robert Poczobut

Title variants

EN

Neutral monism and theories of reduction and emergence

Abstracts

EN

The aim of the article is presentation and critical analysis of various interpretations of neutral monism (in Bertrand Russell’s version). The subject of the author’s particular interest is the analysis of the main methodological assumptions of neutral monism, which are presented as a method of deriving logical constructions. The article discusses problems inspired by the following questions: What is the declared neutrality of base objects? Is neutral monism a kind of reductionism? Is it an ontological or logical‑epistemological position? What is the place of phenomenal consciousness in the universe of neutral monism? Can neutral monism be reconciled with different versions of emergence theory? Does neutral monism solve the mind‑body problem? Finally, the possibility of non‑standard interpretation of neutral monism is outlined by reference to information theory.

Keywords

PL

emergencja; konstrukcje logiczne; materia; monizm neutralny; redukcja; B. Russell; teoria informacji; umysł

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Nauk
• Journal: Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
• Year: 2022
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 367-381

Dates

published

2022

Contributors

author

Robert Poczobut

• Uniwersytet w Białymstoku, Instytut Filozofii

• https://orcid.org/0000000325917002

Identifiers

DOI

10.24425/pfns.2022.143869

Biblioteka Nauki

55789376