Deskrypcje określone i przedmioty nieistniejące

• Authors: Arkadiusz Chrudzimski

Title variants

EN

Definite descriptions and nonexistent objects

Abstracts

EN

According to the usual, simplified picture of the Meinong‑Russell controversy, Meinong’s semantics is structurally amazingly simple but ontologically very expensive, while Russell’s theory contains some counter‑intuitive syntactic complications, but to make up for this expense it releases us from almost all ontological troubles. Now the reality is much more complex. On the one hand it appears that the alleged ontological innocence of Russell’s solution has been highly exaggerated. In particular it assumes a Platonic ontology of universal properties. At the same time, if we look a bit closer, also Meinong’s theory turns out to be much more complicated than it looks at the first sight. It involves a hierarchy of objects exhibiting different degrees of completeness and in the later period of Meinong’s thought the structure of intentional reference takes a form very similar to that which has been proposed by Russell in his On Denoting.

Keywords

PL

deskrypcja określona; intencjonalność; istnienie; kwantyfikacja; A. Meinong; przedmioty nieistniejące; B. Russell; semantyka

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Nauk
• Journal: Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
• Year: 2022
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 191-211

Dates

published

2022

Contributors

author

Arkadiusz Chrudzimski

• Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Instytut Filozofii, Kraków

• https://orcid.org/0000000169241839

Identifiers

DOI

10.24425/pfns.2022.143859

Biblioteka Nauki

55789383