EMPIRICAL INCONSISTENCIES DEFYING SIMULATIONISM

• Authors: Neumann Saskia Janina
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In our common understanding, remembering and imagining are two different entities. These common understanding of remembering and imagining changes significantly. Simulationists go as far as to claim that remembering and imagining only differ in their temporal orientation but are part of the same system. In what follows, I want to defend our common understanding of how to distinguish between remembering and imagining. With the help of empirical studies, I will defend the view that remembering and imagining are significantly different and not only different in their temporal orientation. I will base my argumentation on empirical studies which are suggestive of simulationism having gotten it wrong. In this paper, I will firstly introduce the two opposing views of simulationism and the causal theory of memory. With the help of empirical studies, I will secondly show that simulationism faces significant evidence of being wrong and thirdly, will suggest that a slightly changed version of the causal theory of memory does a better job in explaining the introduced research results.

Keywords

EN

THEORY OF MEMORY; PHILOSOPHY OF MEMORY; COGNITIVE SCIENCE; SIMULATIONISM

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2023
• Volume: 30
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 350 – 371

Contributors

author

Neumann Saskia Janina

• Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös Loránd University, Múzeum krt. 4-6, 1088 Budapest, Hungary

• https://orcid.org/0009-0003-8777-4534

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30404