The notion of aggregator oblivious (AO) security for privacy preserving data aggregation was formalized with a specific construction of AO-secure blinding technique over a cyclic group by Shi et al. Some of proposals of data aggregation protocols use the blinding technique of Shi et al. for BGN cryptosystem, an additive homomorphic encryption. Previously, there have been some security analysis on some of BGN based data aggregation protocols in the context of integrity or authenticity of data. Even with such security analysis, the BGN cryptosystem has been a popular building block of privacy preserving data aggregation protocol. In this paper, we study the privacy issues in the blinding technique of Shi et al. used for BGN cryptosystem. We show that the blinding techniques for the BGN cryptosystem used in several protocols are not privacy preserving against the recipient, the decryptor. Our analysis is based on the fact that the BGN cryptosystem uses a pairing e : G × G → GT and the existence of the pairing makes the DDH problem on G easy to solve. We also suggest how to prevent such privacy leakage in the blinding technique of Shi et al. used for BGN cryptosystem.
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In LATTE, a lattice based hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme, each hierarchical level user delegates a trapdoor basis to the next level by solving a generalized NTRU equation of level ℓ ≥ 3. For ℓ = 2, Howgrave-Graham, Pipher, Silverman, and Whyte presented an algorithm using resultant and Pornin and Prest presented an algorithm using a field norm with complexity analysis. Even though their ideas of solving NTRU equations can be conceptually extended for ℓ ≥ 3, no explicit algorithmic extensions with the storage analysis are known so far. In this paper, we interpret the generalized NTRU equation as the determinant of a matrix. By using the mathematical properties of the determinant, we show that how to construct algorithms for solving the generalized NTRU equation either using resultant or a field norm for any ℓ ≥ 3. We also obtain an upper bound of the size of solutions by using the properties of the determinant. From our analysis, the storage requirement of the algorithm using resultant is O (ℓ2 n 2 logB ) and that of the algorithm using a field norm is O (ℓ2 n logB ), where B is an upper bound of the coefficients of the input polynomials of the generalized NTRU equations. We present examples of our algorithms for ℓ = 3 and the average storage requirements for ℓ = 3, 4.
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