Wyniki wyszukiwania - BazTech

1

Designing the process of managing the security of the state : an example of solutions in the case of Poland

Kośmider T.

Studia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego

|

2018

|

R. 8, Nr 14

21--36

EN

The process of national security management must take into account each state’s interests in order to meet the expectations, needs and aspirations of the whole nation. In the initial conceptual and decision-making stage, this process includes ideological and doctrinal-level thinking as well as considerations at the program and operational levels. The following implementation stage covers the initiation of concrete security measures. This process must be flexible and take into account all changes taking place in the external environment of the state, as well as all transformations occurring within the security system, in order to create an effective and long-term security policy. An efficient organization of national security management requires a broad interdisciplinary approach taking into account executive issues, as well as decisions made at the central - ministerial level. In Poland, there are two mechanisms to derive national security strategies, adjudicate their results, and then adapt to evolving conditions and needs. These mechanisms are the state defense strategy verified by Strategic Defence Review process and national security system verified by the Strategic National Security Review. This article will summarize these two processes to include recent changes based on the evolving international security arena.

PL

Proces zarządzania bezpieczeństwem narodowym musi uwzględniać każdy interes państwa, aby sprostać oczekiwaniom, potrzebom i aspiracjom całego narodu. Na wstępnym etapie koncepcyjnym i decyzyjnym obejmuje on myślenie na poziomie ideologicznym i doktrynalnym, a także rozważania na poziomie programu i operacji. Poniższy etap wdrożenia obejmuje rozpoczęcie konkretnych środków bezpieczeństwa. Proces ten musi być elastyczny i uwzględniać wszelkie zmiany zachodzące w zewnętrznym otoczeniu państwa, a także wszystkie przekształcenia, do których dochodzi w systemie bezpieczeństwa, w celu stworzenia skutecznej i długoterminowej polityki bezpieczeństwa. Sprawna organizacja zarządzania bezpieczeństwem narodowym wymaga szerokiego interdyscyplinarnego podejścia uwzględniającego kwestie wykonawcze, a także decyzje podejmowane na poziomie centralnym−ministerialnym. W Polsce istnieją dwa mechanizmy wyprowadzania strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego, rozstrzygania ich wyników, a następnie dostosowywania się do zmieniających się warunków i potrzeb. Mechanizmy te stanowią strategię obrony państwa zweryfikowaną przez proces Strategic Defense Review oraz system bezpieczeństwa narodowego zweryfikowany przez Strategiczny Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego. W artykule te dwa procesy zostają podsumowane, aby uwzględnić ostatnie zmiany oparte na rozwijającej się międzynarodowej arenie bezpieczeństwa.

2

Bezpieczeństwo polityczno-militarne Europy w czasach „Belle Epoque”

Ślipiec J., Kośmider T.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

2009

|

nr 1(74)

298-311

EN

The article features a chronological review of major military alliances signed by then existing European powers. The starting point for the considerations is the end of French – Prussian war (1870-1871) and setting up the German Empire which inspired a new style of European security. Its main aim was to keep peace, basing on the principle of mutual balance of forces. Pursuing this balance was an inspiration to sign military treaties. While discussing the military alliances and treaties, the authors analyse the process of development of the Dual Alliance, Triple Alliance and Triple Agreement. Those military pacts of 1914 transformed into military blocks of the Great War (1914-1918). Basing on the process of shaping these major military alliances in Europe, also some other minor, often bilateral, military alliances are discussed. The authors conclude that in the times of steam, electricity and automobile, European military alliances and divisions divided the Old Continent into two opposite camps. Here, the authors agree with Norman Davies’ thesis that since the 80s of the 19th century we can talk about Europe’s bipolarity. That division, with certain changes, remained until the 80s of the 20th century.

3

Rozwój poglądów na operacje wojsk lądowych w europejskiej myśli wojskowej okresu nowożytnego

Kośmider T., Ślipiec T.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

2006

|

nr 1(62)

248-260

EN

The article presents the problem of operations in modern European military thought. There was presented the theoretical output of Humphrey Lloyd, Heinrich Dietricha Bulow, Henri Jomini, Helmuth von Moltke, Sigismund von Schlichting, Colmar von der Goltza, John Frederick Charles Fuller, Basil Henri Liddell-Hart, Ludwik von Eimannsberger, Siergiey Kamieniev, Vladimir Triandafillov, Mikchail Tuchaczevski, and also Stefan Mossor. The first views suggesting the necessity to introduce research on operations appeared before mass armies emerged on the war arena. Although they did not define the notion but suggested the necessity to introduce operational forms of fighting. Therefore these operational forms of fighting in the time of mass armies had to take shape of fighting, battles, assaults and maneuvers (groups) joined by common task, the final effect of which was to achieve a strategic goal of the war. A general battle had to fall into a number of simultaneous or successive armed encounters. A serious impulse to look for new solutions in the art of war, operations including, was the First World War. Also the time between the wars brought a special development of research in land forces operations. This phenomenon was distinguished in military sciences. A detailed analysis was undertaken in methods of conducting operations.

4

Zapasy wojenne w Polsce w latach 1921-1926

Kośmider T.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

2002

|

nr 2(47)

403-415

EN

War reserves, apart from war industrial production, import and services in kind constituted an essential element of material preparation to war. In the between the wars period they were called supply reserves by the state budget. They included mobilisation reserves and strategic reserves. Financial aspects caused that the state of Poland at the threshold of independence could not afford to collect both mobilisation and strategic reserves. According to the Chief of General Staff’s directive the main effort was concentrated on creating mobilisation reserves first. However, “inheriting in 1921 after the war (...) various assets of suspicious quality (...), that weathered two wars” and also limited budget possibilities caused that the state of war reserves radically departed from real armed forces needs. The lack of appropriate number of stores and organisational solutions also posed a serious problem.

5

Problem mobilizacji przemysłu wojennego w Polsce w latach 1921-1926

Kośmider T.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

2001

|

nr 3(44)

280-293

EN

The First World War experiences and also forecast common character of future armed fighting caused the necessity to pay a special attention to engaging national economy for war production. The military authorities undertook serious planning in this area resulted in many achievements such as Ordre de Bataille of detailed war industry, including at the beginning of 1926 almost 200 private companies, military ones and general Ordre de Bataille excluding, embracing about 500 production works that had guaranteed „reliefs from the military in case of mobilisation to advertise their employees”. A number of initiatives conducted by the military authorities, however, could not be implemented due to the lack of legal solutions, standards and laws, which would allow to grasp the war industry mobilisation problem as an enity. A weak point of the developed in the early twenties war industry mobilisation plan was to base it on war materiel demand, exceeding greatly Polish Industry production possibilities.

6

Plan obrony granicy zachodniej Polski autorstwa gen. Skierskiego (z 1921 r.)

Kośmider T.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

1998

|

nr 3(32)

247-256

EN

In the article, the author discusses basic assumptions of Poland’s western border defence plan in the operational responsibility area of 3rd Army Inspectorate, headed by General Leonard Skierski. Gen. Skierski’s plan was worked out to answer the military threat from the side of Germany on the turn of 1920 and 1921. The plan assumed that Germany would conduct two simultaneous operations in northern direction: one aiming at conquering Pomerania as fast as possible and joining Eastern Prussia in Bydgoszcz - Grudziądz direction, the other - of secondary importance - conducted from Piła - Krzyż area towards Poznań and Gniezno. Due to this, Gen. Skierski’s plan assumed creating, at the moment of war break out, two operational groups, the task of which would be to carry out active defence using the Grudziądz - Chełmno - Toruń - Poznań fortification system and resistance points to the west of these fortifications line. Gen. Skierski’s plan was not implemented. But it became an inspiration to work out the conception basis for Pomerania’s military use in case of war with Germany.