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1
Content available remote Wizje wojen po rozpadzie dwubiegunowego systemu polityczno-militarnego świata. Cz. 2
Wyszczelski L.
Kwartalnik Bellona
|
2016
|
Nr 1
92--110
PL
Autor omawia współczesne teorie wojen. Najobszerniej charakteryzuje teorie wojen muzułmańskich i wojen hybrydowych ze względu na ich popularność i skalę zagrożenia. Obecnie największym zagrożeniem światowego pokoju stał się terroryzm muzułmański (umieszczany w szerszej teorii wojen muzułmańskich). Ton tej refleksji nadal nadają Amerykanie, ale pojawili się również dość interesujący teoretycy z Europy Zachodniej, przede wszystkim Brytyjczycy i Niemcy. Za krok wstecz można uznać brak rozważań nad długoterminowymi prognozami wojen, zwłaszcza nad próbami przewidywań charakteru wojen oraz stosowanymi zasadami sztuki wojennej. Teoretycy koncentrują się na ukazywaniu specyfiki współczesnych wojen i konfliktów zbrojnych w kontekście przewartościowań strategii i doktryn wojennych. Znajomość wymienionych teorii wydaje się konieczna do uchwycenia zmian zarówno w refleksji teoretycznej, jak i w doktrynach wojennych oraz organizacji wojsk. W pierwszej kolejności trzeba odnieść to do najsilniejszych militarnie państw świata.
EN
The author discusses modern war theories, devoting most attention to characterizing theories of Islamic and hybrid wars, because of their popularity and the scale of threat they pose. Currently, the greatest challenge to the world peace is Islamic terrorism, considered as a part of a wider Islamic war theory. The tone of the reflection on the subject is still set by Americans. However, some new, quite interesting theoreticians have appeared in Western Europe, mainly Great Britain and Germany. Lack of discussion or reflection on long-term prognoses regarding war, especially attempts to predict the character of wars and used Art of War rules, can be considered a step back. Theoreticians focus on showing the specificity of modern wars and armed conflicts in the context of reevaluating strategies and war doctrines. Familiarity with the mentioned theories seems to be essential in order to grasp the changes in theoretical reflection, as well as war doctrines and organization of armed forces. In the first place, it is necessary to relate them to the world's military powers.
2
Content available remote Korpusy kadetów w Polsce (1918–1939)
Wyszczelski L., Niewęgłowska A.
Kwartalnik Bellona
|
2016
|
Nr 3
167--182
PL
Korpusy kadetów, które istniały w Polsce w latach 1918–1939, były specyficznymi placówkami edukacyjnymi przeznaczonymi dla młodszej młodzieży męskiej, w szczególności zainteresowanej wstąpieniem do szkoły oficerskiej. Tworzono je z myślą o upowszechnieniu wiedzy obronnej i wychowaniu patriotycznym. Korpusy kadetów umożliwiały uzyskanie ogólnego wykształcenia średniego. Cieszyły się dużą popularnością wśród młodzieży, o czym świadczyły liczby ubiegających się o przyjęcie do nich. Autorzy przedstawiają losy korpusów kadetów od momentu ich powstania po odzyskaniu przez Polskę niepodległości w 1918 roku do czasu wybuchu II wojny światowej.
EN
The Cadet Corps that existed in Poland between 1918-1930, were distinctive educational establishments intended for younger male teenagers, especially those interested in joining military academics later on. The Cadet Corpe wero created with a view to promoting knowledge of defense and patriotic upbringing. They enabled young people to get general secondary education and were very popular among teenagers, which wow confirmed by the great number of people applying to join them. The authors present the history of the Cadet Corps from the moment of their creation after regaining, independence by Poland in 1918, to the outbreak of the Second World War.
3
Content available remote Wizje wojen po rozpadzie dwubiegunowego systemu polityczno-militarnego świata. Cz. 1
Wyszczelski L.
Kwartalnik Bellona
|
2015
|
Nr 3
94--111
PL
Po rozpadzie na przełomie lat osiemdziesiątych i dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku starego systemu społeczno-politycznego świata zaczęły rozwijać się nowe teorie prowadzenia wojen. Przodują w tej dziedzinie Amerykanie. Nie zawsze są to całkowicie nowe teorie. Ich autorzy często odwołują się do elementów już znanych w sztuce wojennej i przedstawiają je w nowej oprawie teoretycznej. W artykule autor omawia trzy teorie: fal cywilizacyjnych, walki informacyjnej i „nowych wojen”.
EN
After the collapse at the break of 1980s and 1990s of the old world social-political system, the new theories on war conduct appeared. The Americans are among the leaders in inventing new theories. Their authors often refer to elements already known in the art of war, and present them in a new theoretical form. The article discusses three theories: of civilization waves; information warfare; and “new wars”.
4
Content available remote Polska sztuka wojenna w bitwie na przedpolach Warszawy w sierpniu 1920 roku. Cz. 2, Próba okrążenia przeciwnika : bilans bitwy : doświadczenia i wnioski
Wyszczelski L.
Kwartalnik Bellona
|
2015
|
Nr 2
70--88
PL
Zablokowanie marszu wojsk Frontu Zachodniego Michaiła Tuchaczewskiego w kierunku Wisły, a następnie ich wypieranie za Narew przez 5 Armię, oraz działania znad Wieprza zagrażające nie tylko rozbiciem lewego skrzydła wojsk rosyjskich, lecz także możliwością odcięcia dróg odwrotu na wschód – to czynniki, które przyczyniły się do przełomu w bitwie prowadzonej na przedpolach Warszawy. Polacy zyskali szansę na pełne okrążenie wojsk rosyjskich, a nawet na ich unicestwienie. Stąd decyzja o prowadzeniu pościgu strategicznego oraz lokalnego odcięcia i zniszczenia 4 Armii Aleksandra Dmitrowicza Szuwajewa. Rozpoczęła się ostatnia faza bitwy na przedpolach Warszawy.
EN
Blocking the marching troops of Mikhail Tukhachevsky’s Western Front towards the Vistula River, and later pushing them outside the Narev River by the 5th Army, as well as activities at the Wieprz River threatening not only to destroy the left flank of the Russian forces, but also to cut off the retreat to the east – are all factors which contributed to the breakthrough in the battle at the outskirts of Warsaw. The Polish troops got a chance to menace the enemy by flanking movement, or even to destroy them. Hence the decision on strategic pursuit, cutting off and finally destroying the 4th Army of Alexander Dmitrevich Shuvaev.
5
Content available remote Polska sztuka wojenna w bitwie na przedpolach Warszawy w sierpniu 1920 roku. Cz. 1, Planowanie, działania zaczepno-obronne, manewr znad Wieprza
Wyszczelski L.
Kwartalnik Bellona
|
2015
|
Nr 1
76--95
PL
Bitwa na przedpolach Warszawy stoczona 13-25 sierpnia 1920 roku miała duże znaczenie dla wojny polsko-rosyjskiej lat 1919-1920. Stanowiła przełom o wymiarze strategicznym - Polacy przejęli inicjatywę ofensywną, która zakończyła się zwycięską wojną. Miała też wymiar co najmniej europejski, załamała bowiem strategię bolszewików eksportu rewolucji na zachód Europy. O polskim sukcesie zadecydowało wiele czynników, przede wszystkim wola narodu obrony niezawisłości, ale niebagatelne znaczenie miała też sztuka wojenna, ściślej zaś - plan bitwy i jego perfekcyjna realizacja.
EN
The battle fought on the outskirts of Warsaw on August 13-25, 1920 was of great significance to the Polish–Russian war of 1919-1920. It became a strategic breakthrough - Poles took over offensive initiative which brought victory in the war. Furthermore, it had at least European dimension, as the Bolsheviks’ strategy of expanding the revolution to western Europe failed. Many factors determined the Polish success; the primary one was the will of the people to defend independence; however the art of war was of great importance, to be more precise the battle plan and its perfect execution.
6
Content available remote Sztuka wojenna w I wojnie światowej. Cz. 1, Lata 1914-1916
Wyszczelski L.
Kwartalnik Bellona
|
2014
|
Nr 1
95--115
PL
Z I wojny światowej wyniesiono wiele cennych doświadczeń z obszaru sztuki wojennej. Działania miały jednak inny przebieg niż zakładano. Była to wojna pozycyjna, długotrwała, materiałowa. W 1914 roku sytuacja na frontach się ustabilizowała, dało się zauważyć zużycie wojsk okresu pokoju, wojna zaś poszerzyła zasięg terytorialny. W następnym roku bezskutecznie próbowano przejąć inicjatywę strategiczną. W 1916 roku podjęto próby zaktywizowania działań, zwłaszcza na froncie wschodnim (operacja Brusiłowa).
EN
World War I was a source of many valuable experiences as regards the art of war. The operations would proceed differently than it had been anticipated, and were characterized by stationary warfare activities. The war was long-lasting and material. In 1914, the front situation was stabilized, troops were noticeably worn-out, and the war extended its territorial range. Next year, there were attempts to take a strategic initiative, however with no results. In 1916, Brusilov Operation was an attempt to accelerate war activities.
7
Content available remote Polska sztuka wojenna w okresie narastania zagrożenia wojennego : 1935-1939
Wyszczelski L.
Kwartalnik Bellona
|
2012
|
Nr 1
89--107
PL
Narastające w drugiej połowie lat 30. XX wieku zagrożenie wojenne spowodowało, że czołowe armie europejskie zaczęły zmieniać narodowe zasady prowadzenia wojny. Takich zmian dokonano również w polskiej sztuce wojennej. Autor przyjmuje, że polska doktryna wojenna w analizowanych latach ewoluowała ku wariantowi wojny długotrwałej, preferowała działania obronne przy coraz bardziej pesymistycznej ocenie własnych możliwości wyjścia zwycięsko z tej konfrontacji. W doktrynie nie sprecyzowano, jaką rolę w przyszłej wojnie będzie odgrywał potencjał wojenno-ekonomiczny państw, a zwłaszcza zaopatrzenie materiałowe wojsk. Działania podejmowane w celu dozbrojenia i zmodernizowania armii były jednak ograniczone z powodu niedoinwestowania, zwłaszcza materiałowego, Wojska Polskiego. Z pewnością nie były to zmiany na miarę narastającego zagrożenia, a co dopiero stawienia czoła agresji dwóch potężnych sąsiadów we wrześniu 1939 roku.
EN
A growing in the second half of 1930s threat of war made top European armies change their national war rules of engagement. Such changes were also applied in the Polish art of war. The author assumes that Polish war doctrine in those years evolved around an idea of a long-term war, and preferred defense activities, pessimistically estimating own capabilities to win such confrontation. The doctrine did not specify how significant in the future war would be a war and economic potential of the states, particularly material supply of troops. The undertaken activities to arm and modernize troops were however insufficient due to weak financing in the Polish Army. Surely, these were not the changes adequate to response to a growing threat, not to say to counteract the aggression of two powerful neighbors in September of 1939.
8
Content available remote Geopolityczne uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski w latach 1918-1939
Wyszczelski L.
Zeszyty Naukowe AON
|
2008
|
nr 1(70)
265-283
EN
Poland’s geo-political position in 1918-1939 changed as a result of political changes in Europe, especially at the end of the 30s after Germany’s territorial annexes. The Treaty of Versailles provisions, wars for independent Poland’s borders in 1918-1921 and to a certain extent Poland’s annexation of Zaolzie in 1938 contributed to that position. The breakthrough events included signing the Treaty of Versailles (1919), Locarno Treaties (1925), Hitler’s rise to power (1933), the Munich Agreement (1938), consequently the collapse of Czechoslovakia and the subordination of this territory to the Reich and the Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact (23.08.1939). These events were prompted by western superpowers’ policy which in spite of signing political and military agreements with Poland did not act according to them and therefore Poland fought single-handedly with a double aggressor in September 1939 and was severely defeated. Taking into consideration Poland’s geo-strategic position in the problem mentioned above, Poland’s location was stressed on the trail of military expansions from the east to the west and vice versa, location among countries - Germany, Russia - which supported the expansion on the Polish territory, as well as unfavourable shape of Poland’s borders after World War I, especially lack of natural terrain obstacles.
9
Content available remote Zasady zorganizowanego doszkalania wyższych dowódców i oficerów sztabowych Wojska Polskiego w latach 1921-1939
Wyszczelski L.
Zeszyty Naukowe AON
|
2007
|
nr 2(67)
260-270
EN
This article presents the main forms of senior commanders supplementary education in the Armed Forces of the Second Republic of Poland. The fundamental content was tailored according to the chronology and problems. As a result, the Reader has a possibility to follow the development of the educational system of staff officers and Generals of the Polish Army. This process was conditioned by the development of the then Polish Armed Forces. To write this article, the Author used the archive and secondary sources. The article, therefore, presents a wide-ranging and exhaustive description of the established research problem. The main considerations concentrated on three main periods, which include the following years: 1921-1926; 1926-1935 and 1935-1939. These periods are determined by changes which happened in the field of structure and organization of Polish Armed Forces between 1921 and 1939. The content discussed in this material is a valuable completion of historical knowledge concerning the interwar period, but it can also have some modem applications to similar contemporary problems.
10
Content available remote Ocena zagrożenia wojennego w latach 1926-1935 w opinii kierownictwa wojska i jej wpływ na doktrynę wojenną
Wyszczelski L.
Zeszyty Naukowe AON
|
2004
|
nr 1(54)
323-341
EN
The May coup carried out by Piłsudski in May 1926 exerted a profound influence on the concept of the state defence, ensuring security on the eastern border including. However, the developments more conservative than in the period 1921- 1926 were adopted in the Polish war doctrine of the time under analysis, in spite of the fact that leading European countries adopted modern variants of waging war. The doctrine, which was suggested by Piłsudski, not taking into consideration real possibilities, rejected these assumptions which based on the French doctrine, not giving its own in return. The conservatism of the Polish war doctrine of the period under analysis showed in the fact that its main assumptions were not formed basing on scientific anticipations of professionals but on Piłsudski’s own opinions who ignored changes taking place in the military.
11
Content available remote Działania nieregularne w polskiej myśli wojskowej XIX i XX wieku
Wyszczelski L.
Zeszyty Naukowe AON
|
2004
|
nr 3(56)A Numer specjalny
13-29
EN
The theory of irregular operations dates back to the beginning of the 19th century and it was connected with experiences of partisan operations in Spain. The Italians were its creators. The Poles contributed immensely to it thanks to Gen. Wojciech Chrzanowski, the author of the book entitled “On Partisan War” published in 1835. Also the literary outputs of Gen. Józef Zachariasz Bem, Aleksander Jelocicki and Ludwik Bystrzowski were significant. In turn, the Poles, namely Karol Bogumił Stolzman and Henryk Kamieński, created the theory of people's war. The theory of irregular operations had been undergoing a revival until World War II. American and French theoreticians contributed mostly to it. It was an after- math of partisan wars waged mainly in Asia and Africa.
12
Content available remote Sztab Generalny Naczelnego Dowództwa Wojska Polskiego : 1919-1921
Wyszczelski L.
Zeszyty Naukowe AON
|
2003
|
nr 1(50)
339-357
EN
The Polish Armed Forces and its supreme structures were established before independent Poland was reborn. The Polish Armed Forces General Staff was set up on October 25th, 1918 by the terms of a decree of Regency Board of the Polish Kingdom. The article deals with the activities of the General Staff in the period of fighting for the reborn Poland's borders. A special role is assigned to tasks of recognising the enemy’s plans, the location of its forces, developing homogenous organisational army structures, training doctrine, supporting front units and, limited, operational planning.
13
Content available remote Teoria globalnej wojny jądrowej
Wyszczelski L.
Zeszyty Naukowe AON
|
2002
|
nr 3-4(48-49)
133-151
EN
Nuclear weapon appeared as a fighting means and was used in 1945. It was recognised as revolutionary for the art of war. The theory of a global nuclear war as developed in the field of war theory in the late 40s of the 20th century. Its creators were mainly Americans, partly the French and the British. The author outlines the history of this theory development, its creators and the basic assumptions. He proves that in the initial stage nuclear weapon was supposed to be carried by strategic bombers, whereas in the late 50s by missiles, mainly ballistic ones. There are presented viewpoints of such theoreticians as: the Americans - Henry Kahn, Maxwell d. Taylor, William Kaufmann, Henry Kissingier, Bernard Brodie, the British - Brasil Henri Liddell-Hart and the French - Charles Ailleret and A. Beaufre. The common feature of their viewpoints was the assumption that nuclear weapon was to dominate military operations in a future war. Some theoreticians even wrote about eliminating other combat means. Thereby the necessity to break away with currently existing principles of art of war and to develop new ones was proved. The theory of a global nuclear war dominated the military thought and doctrines of leading world countries until the 60s. Since then it was gradually replaced by realistic deterrence concepts and thus going away from the vision of a global nuclear war. It became history at the beginning of the 70s when the superpowers adopted the strategy of realistic deterrence.
14
Content available remote Wizje budowy bezpieczeństwa państwa w teoriach wojennych XX wieku
Wyszczelski L.
Zeszyty Naukowe AON
|
2001
|
nr 4(45)
233-244
EN
The first military theoretician who at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries appeared with an original vision to build the state and coalition of states security was Jan Gotleb Bloch, the author of "Future War in Technological, Economic and Political Aspects". He foresaw that the future war was likely to be transformed into a common European war with all major European contries' participation. The vision of future war developed by Bloch was the most complete in military thought and proved during the First World War. Both the course of World War I and the political relations in the world after its finish showed an increasing importance of collective military actions. The security problems of selective countries went beyond national interests and were subordinated to the coalition strategy. In the between-the-wars period the most complete and most realistic vision to ensure military security was presented by Gen. Władysław Sikorski in his work entitled "Future War. Its Potentials, Character and Relating to Them State Defence Issues". He thought that right alliances are the basic guarantee of the state security. World War II proved that single states' security might be assured by their isolated actions. Powerful coalitions were to decide on the countries' lots. It was believed that security should be considered in a bipolar, coalition system.
15
Content available remote Praca oświatowo-wychowawcza w formacjach frontowych Wojska Polskiego w latach 1918-1921
Wyszczelski L.
Zeszyty Naukowe AON
|
2001
|
nr 3(44)
263-279
EN
The institutionalised educational activity in the Polish Republic's Army began in December 1918. Initially it was not conducted by permanent educational authority. Different forms and methods of this job were binding in the rear formations subordinated to the Ministry of Military of Military Affairs white others in font formations included in the Polish Army Supreme Command. Certain forms of this activity were also conducted by military chaplains. A central structure to carry out educational activities on the Supreme Command level the Section of Propaganda and Care for Soldiers. It was responsible for strengthening the moral and ideological state of soldiers in the rear formations. Counteracting enemy propaganda was an important task. The simplest forms to reach a solder were prefered. It was difficult to carry out the educational form due to the conditions of service in the front formations. On the front forces operational level there was established a front or an army Educational Authority. An educational supervisor was responsible for educational activities on tactical level. Mobile Educational Columns played an important role in educational activities in combat formations. There were ten of them. The educational section in the front formations existed till 10 February 1921 when it was demobilised and included into the Third Department of the Ministry of Military Affairs Staff.
16
Content available remote Działalność oświatowo-wychowawcza w Wojsku Polskim do czasu odzyskania niepodległości w 1918 r.
Wyszczelski L.
Zeszyty Naukowe AON
|
2000
|
nr 4(41)
259-276
EN
The beginnings of educational activities in the Polish army date back to the second half of the 18th century and are connected with patterns worked out at the Knights’ School. The article presents the educational activities from the Knights’ School times until the First World War. The forms and methods of conducting such activities have been characterised and its influence on raising the level of education among soldiers and shaping patriotic attitudes have been discussed.
17
Content available remote Przygotowania Wojska Polskiego do wojny w drugiej połowie lat trzydziestych
Wyszczelski L.
Zeszyty Naukowe AON
|
1999
|
nr 2(35)A Numer specialny
40-54
18
Content available remote Edukacja obronna społeczeństwa polskiego w II Rzeczypospolitej
Wyszczelski L.
Zeszyty Naukowe AON
|
1999
|
nr 3(36)
161-175
EN
Polish defence education after the First World War gained a significant importance due to the changes in the character of the war, that was waged on large areas of the fighting states territories. The educational activities can be divided into four phases including the I following years: 1918-1921, 1921-1926, 1926-1935, and 1935-1939. In the years of 1918-1921, due to wars fought to establish the borders of the state, the theory was replaced by practice. A significant part of the Polish population participated in the war, the rest worked for the front. During the 1921-1926 period, the state and military leadership tried to work out a program of common education, treated mainly as a reserves preparation for the needs of a potential war. Defence education for youth before conscription was preferred. Social organisations and associations conducted that defence preparation. Due to the lack of political will, there was no parliamentary law concerning this issue. After Piłsudski’s May coup, the State Office for Physical and Military Education was created, an institution responsible, among others, for defence education. It was treated still as military preparation and referred only to a part of the society. Growing military threat to the mid-thirties intensified the efforts of the state of the defence preparation. Polish military co-ordinated this activity. It made mistakes, however trying to monopolise this area of activity and to impose social organisations and associations its own model of education. The biggest fault was too little theoretical and practical preparation of the society in case of a total war with a massive participation of technical s means of fighting, also not being ready psychologically for a defeat.
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