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EN
In the process of designing safety systems, an integrated approach in safety and cybersecurity analysis is necessary. The paper describes a new technique of increasing resilience through integrated analysis of functional safety and cybersecurity. It is a modeling methodology based on the combination of the multifactor method utilizing modified risk graphs, used previously for Safety Integrity Level (SIL) assessment, and the Non-Functional Requirements (NFR) approach. The NFR approach, based on the analysis of graphical representation of conceptual and physical components of the system, contributes a technique to include cybersecurity through the Softgoal Interdependency Graph. The assessment methodology is outlined in detail and applied to a case study involving an industrial control system. The analysis turns out to be effective in both aspects: confirming the findings of the multifactor approach based on modified risk graphs and complementing the traditional analysis to increase resilience in discovering and mitigating security vulnerabilities for SIL assessment by the use of NFR.
EN
The article discusses the problem of choosing the optimal frequency of functional tests, taking into account the reliability and law requirements, but also the impact of business aspects in the company. The subject of functional test interval is well described for purposes of the process industry. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the machinery safety functions with low demand mode. This is followed by a presentation of the current business approach, which, in order to achieve industrial excellence, monitor their performance through the appropriate selection of key performance indicators. In addition, companies are increasingly exploring potential risks in the following areas: new challenges in advanced risk management, including the perception of the company’s facilities as a safe workplace insight of customers and business partners. Eliminating potential hazards is increasingly taking into account, especially the impact of human activity and its interaction with machines. The case study has been presented based on the machines used for the production of tire semi-finished products. In this article, the authors propose a solution for selecting the interval of functional tests of safety functions and additional machine protection measures as a compromise to achieve satisfactory results in terms of safety requirements, performance and legal requirements.
EN
This article addresses some functional safety assessment procedures with cybersecurity aspects in critical industrial installations with regard to the functional safety requirements specified in standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. The functional safety management includes hazard identification, risk analysis and assessment, specification of overall safety requirements and definition of safety functions. Based on the risk assessment results, the safety integrity level (SIL) is determined for consecutive safety functions. These functions are implemented within the industrial control system (ICS) and/or the distributed control system (DCS) that consists of the basic process control system (BPCS) and/or the safety instrumented system (SIS). The determination of the required SIL related to the required risk mitigation is based on the semi-quantitative evaluation method. Verification of the SIL for the considered architectures o fthe BPCS and/or the SIS is supported by probabilistic models with appropriate data and model parameters including cybersecurity related aspects. The proposed approach is illustrated on the example of critical industrial installations.
EN
The work is devoted important issues of the management in maritime critical infrastructure of functional safety analysis, in particular the safety integrity level (SIL) verification of safety functions to be implemented within the distributed control and protection systems with regard to cyber security aspects. A method based on quantitative and qualitative information is proposed for the SIL (IEC 61508, 61511) verification with regard of the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) (ISO/IEC 15408), the security assurance levels (SAL) (IEC 62443), and the number of protection rings described in the Secure Safety (SeSa-SINTEF) methodology. The proposed approach will be composed of the following items: process and procedure based safety and cyber security management, integrated safety and security assessment of industrial control system (ICS) of the maritime critical infrastructure. Proposed methodology is illustrated on case study that based on the part of installation critical maritime infrastructure.
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