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1

Trajectory-based multimodal transport management for resilient transportation

Engler E., Gewies S., Banyś P., Grunewald E.

Transport Problems

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2018

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T. 13, z. 1

81--96

EN

The transport of goods and persons with two or more transport carriers (road, rail, air, inland waterway, or sea) results in multipartite transport chains whose profitability depends on the cost-effectiveness of the transport carriers involved as well as on the capability of multimodal transport management. Currently, differences with regard to the technical equipment used and infrastructural facilities available as well as administrative and public organizational structures in place are the major obstacles to comprehensive multimodal transport management within and beyond European Union borders. Though information and communication technologies (ICT) have entered into all traffic and transport systems, the levels of ICT penetration achieved in controlling, monitoring, and managing of system operation and processes are currently quite different [1-5]. One of the reasons for that is the lack of homogenous ICT standards and, as a result, the technological barriers for interconnectivity between different systems, processes, applications, and stakeholders [2]. The proposed trajectory-based concept is considered as suitable approach to perform the smart and adaptable planning, operation, and management of systems with dissimilar structures, a wide diversity of actors, and distributed responsibilities. It is therefore expected that it will be especially well suited to facilitate multimodal transport management for future Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS). Based on the “transport trajectory” formulation introduced here, it will be shown that a trajectory-based status description is generally possible for all transport-relevant components and processes. The expected benefit of the trajectory-based transport management is illustrated by means of selected transportation scenarios.

2

Guidelines for the coordinated enhancement of the maritime position, navigation and time data system

Engler E., Hoppe M., Ritterbusch J., Ehlers T., Becker C., Ehrke K.-C., Callsen-Bracker H.

Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie

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2016

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nr 45 (117)

44--53

EN

Reliable knowledge of a ship’s position and movement in relation to other traffic participants and obstacles is a fundamental requirement for navigation and avoiding collisions and groundings. Consequently, the onboard provision of resilient position, navigation and time data (PNT) is emphasized by the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) e-navigation strategy, solution S3 “Improved reliability, resilience and integrity of bridge equipment and navigation information” and by the assigned risk control option RCO5 “Improved reliability and resilience of onboard PNT systems”. An initial step towards resilient PNT has been realized by the maritime community with the development of the performance standards for shipborne multi-system radionavigation receiver equipment (MRR). This MRR performance standard (PS) supports the full use of data coming from current and future radionavigation systems and services. Consequently, the combined use of several global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and the additional use of space based augmentation systems (SBAS) as well as optional terrestrial radionavigation systems (e.g. eLoran or R-Mode) will be supported to increase the performance of positioning and timing. As a second step, the development of guidelines for an onboard PNT (data processing) unit has been identified as supplementary and necessary. The starting point is the onboard use of a combination of GNSS receivers and autarkic systems (e.g. radar, gyro, echosounders with bathymetric data) for a comprehensive provision of required PNT data. Redundancy in the available data enables the application of integrity monitoring functions to evaluate the current usability of safety-critical data and components. The aim of the guidelines is the specification of data processing rules towards the resilient provision of standardized PNT data and integrity information. For this purpose, a modular architecture for an onboard PNT system is introduced and scaled to the need for data input as well as the performance of data output.

3

Interdependencies between evaluation of collision risks and performance of shipborne PNT data provision

Banyś P., Engler E., Heymann F.

Transport Problems

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2016

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T. 11, z. 4

151--165

EN

The highest priority for safe ship navigation is the avoidance of collisions and groundings. For this purpose, the concept of ship domain has been introduced to describe the surrounding effective, waters which should be kept clear of other ships and obstacles. In the last decades, a large variety of ship domains have been developed differing in the applied method of their determination as well as in the modelled shape, size, and safety areas. However, a ship domain should be adjusted in real time to enable a reliable evaluation of collision risks by the officers of the watch. Until today in discussions about modelling and utilization of ship domains, it has been mostly unnoticed that the performance of vessel’s position (P), navigation (N), and timing data (T) ultimately determines the accuracy and integrity of indicated ship domain. This paper addresses this question, and starts with a comprehensive analysis of AIS data to prove the violation of ship domains in the maritime practice. A simulation system has been developed to enable, for the first time, investigation into the extent inaccuracies in PNT data result to a faulty evaluation of collision risks. The simulation results have shown that there is a non-negligible risk of not detecting a collision, if inaccuracies of sensor data remain unnoticed.

PL

Zapobieganiu wypadkom na morzu przyznaje się najwyższy priorytet w ramach bezpiecznego prowadzenia statku. Dla poprawy bezpieczeństwa żeglugi stworzono koncepcję domeny statku. Definiuje ona taki obszar wokół jednostki pływającej, w którym nie powinno być ani żadnych innych uczestników ruchu morskiego, ani przeszkód. Na przestrzeni minionych dziesięcioleci powstały rozmaite domeny statku różniące się między sobą sposobem ich definiowania, modelowaniem kształtu, rozmiarem czy strefami bezpieczeństwa. Istotnym warunkiem do należytej oceny ryzyka kolizji jest umożliwienie oficerowi wachtowemu dopasowania w czasie rzeczywistym domeny statku do panujących warunków. W dotychczasowych dyskusjach na temat modelowania i stosowania domeny statku przeważnie pomijano istotną zależność pomiędzy dokładnością pozycji statku (P), wektora ruchu (N) oraz znacznika czasu (T) a dokładnością i spójnością domeny statku. W niniejszym artykule poruszono kwestię powyższego związku. Na wstępie przeprowadzono dogłębną analizę danych AIS i dowiedziono się, że naruszanie domeny statku ma miejsce w praktyce żeglugowej. Ponadto opracowano system symulacyjny, który po raz pierwszy umożliwia badanie wpływu niedokładności danych PNT na błędność oceny ryzyka kolizji. Wyniki symulacji potwierdziły, że istnieje poważna możliwość niewykrycia groźnej sytuacji zbliżeniowej, jeżeli pozostanie niedostateczna dokładność czujników pokładowych niezauważona.

4

Motion-based consistency audit of onboard Global Navigation Satellite System reference as reported by static Automatic Identification System data

Banyś P., Heymann F., Engler E., Noack T.

Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie

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2015

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nr 44 (116)

49--56

EN

The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is widely used for reporting vessel movements and broadcasting additional information related to the current voyage or constant parameters like the IMO number or the overall dimension of the hull. Since dynamic AIS data is shared mostly without human interaction, and is not flawless, the static AIS content edited manually is vulnerable to human error. This work introduces a simple vessel motion pattern approach that determines the probable foredeck/afterdeck location of the GNSS reference used by the AIS transponder, and compares it to the hull parameters obtained from the static AIS data, to find observable errors in the static AIS configuration of the mount point of the GNSS reference antenna.

5

Comparison of AIS-based prediction of the distance at the CPA with factual separation between vessels

Banyś P., Heymann F., Engler E., Noack T.

Annual of Navigation

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2014

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No. 21

5--18

EN

Since its deployment in 2004, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) has been considered a significant improvement of watchkeeping duties at sea. According to current regulations, AIS has not been recognised as an approved anticollision instrument yet. However, it would be difficult to rule out a possibility that AIS, being an essential part of the onboard SOLAS — compliant configuration, is unaidedly used for collision avoidance tasks. Recent research activities of DLR’s Department of Nautical Systems have shown that AIS transmissions may contain a lot of incomplete data and the system does not have any dependable information on its data integrity. For that reason, the computation of the closest point of approach (CPA) and the time to the CPA (TCPA) are analysed based on AIS data involving multiple vessels, in order to compare the predictions with factual approaches between vessels and to evaluate the usability of AIS data, in its present form, for the appraisal of the traffic situation around each vessel.

PL

System automatycznej identyfikacji (AIS) rozwinął się w 2004 roku i odtąd jest uważany za istotny czynnik poprawiający jakość pełnienia wachty morskiej. W aktualnych regulacjach AIS nie jest uznawany za urządzenie antykolizyjne, jednak trudno nie dostrzec możliwości, jakie ma ten — wedle konwencji SOLAS — zasadniczy element obowiązkowego wyposażenia. Badania prowadzone w Wydziale Systemów Nawigacyjnych DLR wykazały, że informacje przekazywane za pośrednictwem AIS mogą zawierać wiele danych niepełnych, a system nie ma żadnego mechanizmu zapewniającego przesyłanie informacji o wiarygodności tych danych. Dlatego w artykule zaprezentowano obliczenia punktu największego zbliżenia (CPA) oraz czasu do tego punktu (TCPA) na podstawie danych z AIS od różnych statków, by porównać prognozy z faktycznymi manewrami, a następnie ocenić użyteczność danych AIS w obecnej postaci dla szacowania sytuacji kolizyjnych w warunkach rzeczywistych.

6

Timestamp Discrepancies in Multisensor NMEA Environment during Survey Voyage

Banyś P., Engler E., Heymann F., Noack T.

Zeszyty Naukowe / Akademia Morska w Szczecinie

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2013

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nr 36 (108) z. 1

22--26

EN

The standard for interfacing marine electronic devices (NMEA – National Marine Electronics Association), does not provide unambiguous information regarding the reliability of data and its timing. In this paper, time delays in navigational data are investigated. For this purpose AIS and navigational data collected offshore and onshore are used. The investigations are concentrated on lags among various NMEA sentences recorded in a relational database during the survey voyage. The analysis is based on standard elements of descriptive statistics.

7

Concept for an Onboard Integrated PNT Unit

Ziebold R., Dai Z., Noack T., Engler E.

TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation

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2011

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Vol. 5, no. 2

149--156

EN

A robust electronic position, navigation and timing system (PNT) is considered as one of the core elements for the realization of IMO-s (International Maritime Organization) e-Navigation strategy. Ro-bustness can be interpreted as the capability of an integrated PNT system to provide PNT relevant data with the desired accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability under consideration of changing application condi-tions and requirements. Generally an integrated PNT system is a composite of service components – like GNSS, Augmentation Systems and terrestrial Navigation Systems – and an on-board integrated PNT Unit, which uses the available navigation and augmentation signals in combination with additional data of sensors aboard to provide accurate and robust PNT information of the ship. In this paper a concept of such an on-board integrated PNT Unit will be presented, which is designed to fulfill the specific user requirements for civil waterway applications. At first, the user requirements for an integrated PNT Unit will be overviewed. After that, existing integrity monitoring approaches will be analyzed. Finally, a first integration scheme for an integrated PNT Unit will be presented with a special focus on the internal integrity monitoring concept.

8

GNSS signal error part determination for satellite based navigation within maritime high precision applications

Hirrle A., Engler E.

Zeszyty Naukowe / Akademia Morska w Szczecinie

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2009

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nr 18 (90)

48-53

EN

For satellite based navigation within maritime applications, the IMO defines requirements for further GNSS systems (IMO, 2002). In order to meet e.g. the demands for automatic docking (absolute accuracy: 0.1 m horizontal, integrity: 0.25 m Alert Limit, 10 s Time to Alarm, 10E–5 Integrity Risk (per 3 h), accurate code and phase measurements are essential. As these measurements are distorted by effects of various error sources, efficient error detection and correction are of main interest. This paper presents the idea of describing the influence of error sources in both, time and frequency domain to derive a competent basis for evaluating the signal's quality and detecting outliers. This offers a fundament for signal classification (usable, unusable), prediction of signal states and error correction and thus the compliance with the given requirements. First a description of the used analysis method, the Hilbert Huang Transform is given. By means of data recorded at Tromsoe/Norway and Rostock/Germany, first results are discussed.

PL

Nawigacja satelitarna używana na statkach morskich musi spełniać wymagania określone przez Międzynarodową Organizację Morską [1]. Dokładne kodowanie oraz pomiar faz są niezbędne do spełnienia wymagań np. automatycznego dokowania (całkowita dokładność: 0,1 m w poziomie, integralność: 0,25 m wartość do zgłoszenia alarmu (Alert Limit), 10 s – czas do zgłoszenia alarmu (Time to Alarm), 10E–5 – ryzyko wiarygodności (Integrity Risk) – na 3 h. Pomiary te zniekształcone są poprzez działanie różnych źródeł błędów. Główne zainteresowanie skupia się na skutecznym wykrywaniu i korekcji tych błędów. W artykule przedstawiono ideę opisującą wpływ źródeł błędów w domenach czasu i częstotliwości w celu uzyskania właściwej podstawy do oceny jakości sygnału i wykrywania wartości nietypowych. Umożliwia to stworzenie podstaw do klasyfikacji sygnału (użyteczny, nieużyteczny), przewidywania stanów sygnału i korekcji błędów, a tym samym zgodność ze stawianymi wymogami. W pierwszej części artykułu przedstawiona została transformacja Gilberta Huang oraz zaprezentowano pierwsze wyniki na podstawie danych zarejestrowanych w Tromsoe (Norwegia) i w Rostoku (Niemcy).