Wyniki wyszukiwania - BazTech

1

Assessment of the historical policy mixes for Poland using the game approach

Kruś L., Woroniecka-Leciejewicz I.

Control and Cybernetics

|

2018

|

Vol. 47, no. 3

277--300

EN

The study here presented pertains to the analysis of mutual interactions of the monetary and ﬁscal policies in the case of Poland. The historical policies carried out during diﬀerent periods of time and their economic eﬀects are compared with the possible strategies, obtained from the analysis of the proposed monetaryﬁscal game. In the study, the methods of non-cooperative game theory are combined with macroeconomic modeling. The respective game is formulated for monetary and ﬁscal authorities as players. Strategies of these players refer to the respective instruments of their policies: the real interest rate and the budget deﬁcit in relation to GDP. Payoﬀs include inﬂation and GDP growth, respectively. The payoﬀs are calculated using a recursive macroeconomic model estimated for the Polish economy. The model describes inﬂuences of the instruments of the monetary and ﬁscal policies on the state of the economy. The best response strategies, the Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality are analyzed. Changes of the policies towards the more restrictive or more expansive ones and their eﬀects in comparison to the historically applied are discussed. This is performed for two diﬀerent time periods – the time of recovery after 2004 and the time of the global ﬁnancial crisis after 2008.

2

Analysis of strategies in a monetary-ﬁscal game. The case of Poland

Krus L., Woroniecka-Leciejewicz I.

Control and Cybernetics

|

2016

|

Vol. 45, no. 2

163--183

EN

A monetary-ﬁscal game describing the interactions of the ﬁscal and monetary authorities is formulated and analyzed. A macroeconomic model for the Polish economy has been formulated on the basis of the concept of New Neoclassical Synthesis and respectively extended so as to accommodate the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. Several variants of the model have been estimated using statistical data for the Polish economy. It is assumed in the game that each party (monetary and ﬁscal) tries to achieve its own goal: the ﬁscal authority – the assumed GDP growth, and the monetary authority – an inﬂation level. The best response strategies of the authorities and the Nash equilibria are calculated and analyzed in two cases, namely when the decisions are made simultaneously and sequentially. The simulation results obtained indicate that when the authorities try to achieve independently their goals, in a general case the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. The best response strategies may lead to conﬂict escalation and to results which are not beneﬁcial for both parties.

3

Equilibrium strategies in a fiscal-monetary game : a simulation analysis

Woroniecka-Leciejewicz I.

Operations Research and Decisions

|

2015

|

Vol. 25, No. 2

75--100

EN

The results from a simulation analysis of the policy-mix have been presented, carried out in a fiscal-monetary game, in which fiscal and monetary authorities make decisions from the point of view of realizing their own respective economic objectives. In order to represent the interrelations between, on the one hand, the instruments of fiscal policy and of monetary policy, and, on the other hand – the economic effects resulting from their application, a modified logistic function was used. The method adopted enables consideration of the specificity of the effects of these instruments on the business cycle, consisting in the limited effectiveness of applying any extremely restrictive or expansive policy, and the respective impact on the economy. The simulation study was meant to show the influence exerted both by the parameters of the function and the priorities of the fiscal and monetary authorities on the Nash equilibrium state, corresponding to the choice of a particular combination of budgetary and monetary policies.