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EN
Natural hazards are frequently causing disturbances for different types of infrastructures, in particular for transport systems. Flooding and storm are considered as major threats to these systems. Based on examples of natural hazards’ impact on roads, possible approaches of vulnerability assessment are described. In order to reduce the threats resulting from natural hazards on road transport, appropriate technical countermeasures to increase resilience and robustness for continuous road safety and mobility are necessary. Moreover, the behaviour of the driver is also an important factor to avoid accidents in case of specific weather conditions. Autonomous driving may support a reduction of accidents in the future and, in particular, necessary evacuation processes in cases of wildfires or hurricanes.
EN
Weather-related hazards are among the most frequent causes for disturbances of critical infrastructures. Flooding, tsunamis and sea level rise are examples of major threats to all types of nuclear facilities located at the seaside or at rivers. We report about exemplary investigations concerning weather-related hazards for the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Climate change is expected to increase the already known threats but, in the long term, may also lead to new kinds of hazards. A possible future climate evolution, e.g. from warm (interglacial) to cold (glacial) periods, is not only a topic for seaside industrial facilities but also of concern in the long term safety assessment of deep geological nuclear waste repositories, in particular for high level waste, on the Baltic sea.
EN
Weather-related hazards are already among the factors most frequently causing disturbances for railways. Flooding and storm are considered major threats to the system. Climate change might in the long run produce new kinds of hazards and threats to the railway system, but the climate change will principally involve a strengthening of the already known threats, in terms of increased frequency as well as increased intensity. Based on examples of natural hazards’ impact on railways, possible approaches of vulnerability assessment are described which could also address potential consequences of climate change. In order to reduce the effects of weather hazards technical countermeasures are necessary, but also an appropriate risk management as, e.g., required for flooding in the European Union.
4
Content available How to investigate and assess combination of hazards
EN
Operating experience from different types of industrial installations has shown that combinations of different types of different hazards occur during the entire lifetime of the installations. Typically site specific occurring hazards cause or induce other hazards to occur. In particular, natural hazards rarely happen alone. Thus, it is very important to note that almost any event combination of hazards is possible and that it is necessary to identify these interactions and find ways to mitigate the effects of hazard combinations. Therefore, it is a basic task to investigate and assess the relevant combination of hazards not only for a single installation but for the respective site/industrial park. In that context domino effects and cascade effects pose particular challenges for risk management to prevent industrial accidents.
5
Content available Hazard assessment in case of external flooding
EN
Risks relating to external hazards, either natural or man-made, have to be taken into consideration in the design of nuclear and other industrial facilities. These risks have to be studied to guarantee the availability and efficiency of safety functions which, e.g. in the case of power reactors, enable a safe shutdown, maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown state, ensure the residual heat removal and the containment of radioactive products. With a view to design protection against risks related to external hazards, these hazards have to be assessed in an appropriate manner. The methods used can be either deterministic or probabilistic. In both cases, the method strongly relies on observations (e.g. flood records) that are processed to define a maximum event for the respective facility design. Moreover, the validity of these records over a certain time frame like 100 years has to be checked. Coping with external hazards such as flooding in the future requires an in-depth assessment taking into account new data, further developed methodologies and criteria. Some of these ideas, developments and applications are provided.
EN
The implementation of the CSM regulation by the European Commission in 2009 which harmonizes the risk assessment process and introduces a rather new concept of judging changes within the European railway industry. This circumstance has risen the question how other technology sectors handle the aspect of modifications and alterations. The paper discusses the approaches for judging the significance of modifications within the three transport sectors of European railways, aviation and maritime transportation and the procedure which is used in the area of nuclear safety. We will outline the similarities and differences between these four methods and discuss the underlying reasons. Finally, we will take into account the role of the European legislator and the fundamental idea of a harmonization of the different approaches.
7
Content available Resilience of nuclear plants in case of hazards
EN
Internal and external hazards analysis methods have been used recently to evaluate operating nuclear power plants (NPP) and to identify the resilience of NPP in case of hazards and potential needs for modification of plant systems and procedures as well as to support design of new plants The external hazards risk contribution has been modeled in many NPP PSA (at least for some external hazards) over the last decade, including events occurring during shutdown and low power operations. Recently, a revision of the German nuclear safety regulations has been successfully completed and these regulations entitled “Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants”, also requiring a detailed investigation of internal and external hazards and combinations of different hazards applying deterministic and probabilistic safety assessment methods.
EN
The International Atomic Energy Agency has started a few years ago a project to enhance the existing framework for safety goals for nuclear installations and currently is finalizing a publication aimed to provide guidance for a more holistic approach to establishing and utilizing safety goals for nuclear installations. The intention was to develop a more consistent and holistic framework for safety goals that would be composed of a hierarchical structure of qualitative concepts (e.g. defense in depth, various safety requirements) and quantitative risk metrics. The safety goals should be technology neutral at the higher level and should cover both normal operation and accident conditions as well as the risk to workers, public, and the environment. In the paper the development of a hierarchical framework for safety goals is described including a methodology to derive lower-(more technical) safety goals from the higher goals. Moreover a process for assessing the degree of compliance with the safety goals and their consistent use is provided. As an example the developed framework is applied to the German regulatory framework for nuclear installations but focused on nuclear power plants.
9
Content available Interface between nuclear safety and security
EN
Nuclear power plants benefit from a sophisticated and comprehensive safety regime that has been established over the years. However, the security regime for nuclear power plants is far less developed than the safety regime. Although adopting (and adapting) certain elements of the nuclear safety regime could significantly strengthen the nuclear security regime, at least four challenges are likely to surface: national sovereignty, information transparency, lack of policy consensus, and challenges of regime harmonization. Seek an optimal balance between mandatory international standards and voluntary actions and endorse consideration of additional binding and non-binding international safety and security requirements.
10
EN
Because of the growing operational age of nuclear power plants, the ageing management of structures, systems and components used in these plants is gaining an important role. Technical systems are subject to timedependent and operationally caused ageing phenomena with modifications of originally given characteristics and, thus, of relevance in terms of safety. Especially physical ageing is of importance. Therefore, a comprehensive ageing management is required. In the context of an integrated safety management it has to be shown how to integrate the safety related issues of ageing into probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). In particular the question is to be answered whether the effort for the execution of an ageing PSA is justified, in particular if the safety significant effects of ageing can be identified and quantitatively estimated. Method for prioritization of the components in the nuclear power plant considering implication of their ageing on safety of the nuclear power plant is presented. On the basis of an actual report on ageing management in German nuclear power plants and a literature survey, this paper tries to estimate the necessity and value for the introduction of an ageing PSA in Germany.
EN
As in every industry at risk, the human and organizational factors constitute the main stakes for maritime safety. Furthermore, several events at sea have been used to develop appropriate risk models. The investigation on maritime accidents is, nowadays, a very important tool to identify the problems related to human factor and can support accident prevention and the improvement of maritime safety. Part of this investigation should in future also be near misses. Operation of ships is full of regulations, instructions and guidelines also addressing human factors and safety culture to enhance safety. However, even though the roots of a safety culture have been established, there are still serious barriers to the breakthrough of the safety management. One of the most common deficiencies in the case of maritime transport is the respective monitoring and documentation usually lacking of adequacy and excellence. Nonetheless, the maritime area can be exemplified from other industries where activities are ongoing to foster and enhance safety culture.
EN
In recent years the failure frequency of transformers increased. In particular fires and explosions of main oilfilled transformers are considered as critical. Therefore, international experiences of transformer failures at nuclear and non-nuclear power plants and at substations have been investigated in more detail. Consequences of transformer failures with respect to a reliable electric power supply and distribution are addressed and proactive measures to enhance the reliability of critical infrastructure and to avoid blackouts are described.
13
Content available Critical infrastructure and resilience goals
EN
Critical infrastructure risks pose a special problem for all countries. The companies that own these infrastructures operate in competitive and regulated environments. However, it is neither practical nor possible to protect critical infrastructures from all hazards. For the government, the continuity of these infrastructures is critical to many of its fundamental missions: economic stability and growth, national security, public safety, and quality of life. In that context resilience has become an important factor to fulfil the task of the critical infrastructure protection. Thus, the development of a framework to establish resilience goals could be helpful.
EN
Transport of dangerous goods are always under critical observation of the public, in particular in case of transport of spent fuel or radioactive waste. In both cases transports are often crossing borders of countries, e.g., waste resulting from reprocessing of spent fuel. The transports could take place by ships, trucks, rails and airplanes and these options and the resulting risks are compared. Transport risk includes health and safety risks that arise from the exposures to workers and members of the public to radiation from shipments Moreover, it is shown that the more modern approach of risk-informed decision making elaborated for application to nuclear installations can also be applied to assess the risk of the transport of radioactive material.
15
EN
The results of the first fire risk assessments on an international level have shown that fires are one major contributor to the risk of a nuclear power plant depending on the plant specific fire protection concept. Therefore, fire risk assessment has today become an integral part of the probabilistic safety assessment of nuclear power plants in addition to deterministic analyses. Based on existing guidance documents a state-ofthe-art approach for performing probabilistic fire risk assessment has also been developed in Germany. This approach has been exemplarily and completely applied to a German nuclear power plant with boiling water reactor for the full power states PSA. The general approach outlines the steps necessary for performing fire risk assessment and the prerequisites for a sound and traceable database.
EN
We consider semi-Markov reliability models of multi-component systems with a discrete state space, general enough to include systems with maintenance or repair. We assume that for all system states the functioning or failure of each component is specified. In this setup we propose a component importance measure which is close in spirit to the classical steady state Barlow–Proschan importance measure for repairable binary coherent systems. We discuss our importance measure to some extent, highlighting the relation to the classical Barlow–Proschan measure, and present formulas expressing it in terms of quantities easily obtained from the building blocks of the semi-Markov process. Finally an example of a two-component cold standby system with maintenance and repair is presented which illustrates how our importance measure can be used in practical applications.
17
Content available remote Safety culture and its influence on safety
EN
Safety culture is a well-known concept in different industries worldwide, in particular in the nuclear field. Safety culture is recognized as an important factor in achieving high levels of safety performance. Although there is a wealth of information relating to safety culture, there is still no universal definition or model. Thus, the appropriate definition for the respective area such as nuclear, aviation or maritime has to be determined. However, the essence of safety culture is the ability and willingness of the organization to understand safety, hazards and means of preventing them as well as to act safely. Safety can only be achieved through the use of reliable structures, components, systems, and procedures as well as plant personnel committed to a strong safety culture.
PL
Kultura bezpieczeństwa jest dobrze znaną ideą rozpowszechnioną w wielu gałęziach przemysłu, w szczególności w obszarze energetyki jądrowej. Kultura bezpieczeństwa jest uważana za ważny czynnik pozwalający na osiągnięcie wysokiego poziomu bezpiecznego działania obiektów przemysłowych. Choć istnieje wiele źródeł informacji dotyczących kultury bezpieczeństwa, to ciągle nie ma uniwersalnej definicji tego pojęcia czy jego modelu. Tak więc konieczne jest określenie definicji kultury bezpieczeństwa w odniesieniu do poszczególnych obszarów takich, jak energia jądrowa, lotnictwo czy marynarka. Jednak najbardziej istotną cechą kultury bezpieczeństwa jest zdolność i chęć każdej organizacji do rozumienia zasad bezpiecznego działania, istniejących zagrożeń i sposobów działania pozwalających na ich uniknięcie i na działanie w sposób bezpieczny. Bezpieczeństwo można osiągnąć jedynie w przypadku stosowania niezawodnych konstrukcji, elementów składowych, systemów i procedur, a także przy silnym zaangażowaniu się personelu zakładu w działania na rzecz kultury bezpieczeństwa.
18
Content available remote Risk and consequences of transformer explosions and fires in nuclear power plants
EN
The high failure frequency and the resultant reliability and safety implications in recent years of transformers, in particular at nuclear power plants (NPP), required an in-depth assessment. Fires of main transformers are considered as critical because of the large quantity of oil in contact with high voltage elements. Therefore, these phenomena have been investigated in more detail using the information from the OECD FIRE database for NPP. 12.8 % of all fires and, thus, the most frequent fire source in this database are transformer fires, mainly fires of high voltage oil-filled transformers. Thus, possible diagnostic measures to avoid such events and enhance the reliability currently discussed in Germany are shortly described. Moreover, consequences of transformer failures with respect to a reliable electric power supply are addressed.
PL
Wysoka częstotliwość awarii transformatorów, w szczególności w elektrowniach jądrowych (NPP) w oraz wynikające z tego następstwa dla bezpieczeństwa, wymagają dogłębnej oceny. Pożary głównych transformatorów są uważane za awarie krytyczne, gdyż duża ilość oleju ma kontakt w elementami pod wysokim napięciem. Z tego powodu te zjawiska zostały przebadane bardziej szczegółowo z wykorzystaniem informacji z bazy danych ODCE FIRE stworzonej na potrzeby elektrowni jądrowych. Ta baza danych podaje, że przyczyną 12,8% wszystkich pożarów, czyli najczęstszym źródłem ognia, było zapalenie się transformatorów, głównie wysokonapięciowych transformatorów wypełnionych olejem. Z tego powodu w artykule pokrótce opisano omawiane obecnie w Niemczech działania diagnostyczne mające na celu uniknięcie takich wypadków i zwiększenie niezawodności urządzeń. Przedstawiono ponadto skutki awarii transformatorów w odniesieniu do niezawodności zasilania w energię elektryczną.
EN
It is state-of-the-art that a Level 1 PSA also includes a fire PSA for all plant operational states. In performing Fire PSA not only the malfunction of the components has to be assessed but also all supply systems and cables have to be traced for a given component. In the past it was assumed in the case of a fire in a compartment that all components and cables in that compartment are not functional anymore. However, this is in many cases a too conservative approach and could lead to overestimated fire induced core damage frequencies. Therefore, a method is necessary to assess in a more realistic manner the effects of cables failures caused by fire. Such a procedure requires a sound data base on equipment, list of cables and their properties as well as cable routing. Two methods are described which are currently developed. One of them is a cable failure mode and effect analysis which is easier to apply in practice.
20
EN
External hazards such as explosions can be safety significant contributors to the risk in case of operation of industrial plants. The procedure to assess external hazard explosion pressure waves within probabilistic safety assessment starts with a screening procedure in order to determine scope and content of the assessment. The second step is to choose an appropriate approach in case that a full scope analysis has to be performed. Several methods can be applied to evaluate the probability of occurrence of an external explosion event. The presented results indicate that the probability of occurrence of external explosion pressure waves can be successfully assessed by means of the Monte Carlo simulation, in particular in difficult site-specific conditions.
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