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Content available remote Najlepszą bronią w operacjach przeciwrebelianckich jest „niestrzelanie”
EN
Having analysed counterinsurgency operations, the author, proves that winning or victory is not ISAF forces’ task, as some experts say. It is the Afghans who are supposed to win, not multinational forces because their task is only to support the Afghan government. Having defined the final goal of the operation in this way, the aim of the operation for multinational forces and cooperating with them other international organizations (the UN and EU), governmental organizations (e.g. USAID) and NGOs is not to destroy the Taliban but to deprive them of their foundation, i.e. support of the population. However, the basic problem in the population’s engagement and active participation is to find the entity responsible in all processes taking place while stabilizing the crisis situation. Therefore one of the best weapons in counterinsurgency operations is not to shoot and negotiate. Well-prepared integration negotiations that allow an active joining of the local population’s and international community’s goals and interests in commonly conducted process of rebuilding the country after a conflict is the most important condition to stabilize the situation in the region.
EN
The article defines various kinds of peace support operations (PSOs) and presents their place in the allied doctrine to use a military component in peace operations. Then the author discusses basic notions of the operational art connected with peace support operation planning, focusing on the identification problems and analysing the centre of gravity, and mostly on correlation between critical possibilities, critical conditions and critical points of the centre of gravity. To conclude, theoretical considerations are illustrated with the example of “planning tools” from peace support operation in Afghanistan.
EN
The process of identifying operational needs necessary to conduct net-centric operations is connected with tasks defined for the armed forces and resulting from them directions of transformation. As operations within the Alliance are the priority for our Strategy, it can be assumed that the way of defining operational needs within NATO may be also applied to assess operational needs necessary to conduct net-centric operations by the Polish Armed Forces. In the article the author refers to the assumptions developed in NATO strategic commands, i.e. Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT), according to which operational requirements relating to Transformational Objective Areas (TOAs) for NATO forces should be analysed taking into consideration the following areas: Effective Engagement, Integrated Logistics, Expeditionary Operations or Enhanced Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). In the further part of the article the author characterises more widely these particular areas. In the conclusion the author stresses special requirements set for the command system which, when appropriate “operational awareness” is reached, will be able to gain superiority and consequently lead to the enemy’s defeat.
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