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Mrówka: mały wielki problem

Graclik A., Michlewicz M.

Przegląd Komunalny

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2015

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nr 7

50--52

PL

W ekosystemie miast liczba stawonogów może wynosić blisko 4000 osobników na metr kwadratowy. Według amerykańskiej Agencji Ochrony Środowiska (EPA), mrówki jako owady towarzyszące człowiekowi plasują się w swej dokuczliwości, potencjalnym zagrożeniu epidemiologicznym i trudności w zwalczaniu na pierwszym miejscu, pokonując tym samym nawet wszędobylskie karaczany.

EN

Ants are highly widespread organisms, which dominate a lot of ecosystems. Their plasticity allows them to adapt to new habitats, sometimes far away from their original localities. Some species are able to live near humans — in cities or even in houses. They can become not only pests which can pollute food, but also can be vectors to pathogens dangerous to humans. This is the reason, why we have to do our best to understand those small insects better. Gaining proper knowledge about their biology, ecology and even physiology will make reducing their negative impact easier.

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Konrad Gesner jako czytelnik „Carmen de bisonte” Mikołaja Hussowskiego. Perspektywy badawcze

Choptiany M.

Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki

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2013

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R. 58, nr 2

111--137

EN

This article is dedicated to the preliminary analysis of marginalia left by Conrad Gesner (1516-1565) in his personal copy of Carmen de bisonte by a Polish neo-Latin poet, Nicolaus Hussovianus. Gesner received this small volume from his former disciple, Anton Schneeberger, who had settled down in Krakow in the late 1550s, and he immediately annotated this volume, using it as an additional source of information for his zoological works, Historia animalium and Icônes animalium. Until the publication of the catalogue of Gesner’s private library, the copy of Hussovianus’s Carmen remained unknown to Polish historians of literature and science. The essay presents an outline of research perspectives related to this document and the rest of Gesner’s Nachlass. The article is followed by two appendices, one providing the bibliographical information on the Zurich copy of Carmen, the other giving a sample of Hussovianus’s text accompanied by Gesner’s notes and interventions.

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Equine masticatory organ. P. 2 Parodontium

Łyczewska-Mazurkiewicz S., Kuryszko J., Przetocka-Wydro A., Kuropka P.

Acta of Bioengineering and Biomechanics

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2003

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Vol. 5, nr 2

37-44

EN

This paper is the second part of the study devoted to the equine masticatory organ. The masticatory organ is a morphological-functional unit associated primarily with the digestive system. It includes the teeth (described in part 1); parodontium (described in the present paper); oral mucosa, maxilla and mandible as well as some of the viscerocranial bones (the temporal and zygomatic bones). temporo-mandibular joints, muscles and oral glands. The parodontium as a part of the masticatory organ can be divided into the marginal parodontium and the apical parodontium. The marginal parodontium (parodontium marginale) involves the adjoining tissues in the region of the body of a tooth: the gingivae, periodontium, periosteum and the alveolar bones. The apical parodontium (parodontium apicale) also includes the radical cementum, despite the fact that it builds a tooth.

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Equine masticatory organ. P. 1

Kuryszko J. R., Łyczewska-Mazurkiewicz S.

Acta of Bioengineering and Biomechanics

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2002

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Vol. 4, nr 2

61-72

EN

The masticatory organ is discussed in three parts. The first one is devoted to the macro- and microscopic structure of equine teeth, the second presents the structure of the parodontium formed by the cement, periodontinum, periosteum and gingivae. The last part describes physiological relations between individual masticatory joints. The masticatory organ is a morphological-functional system associated with the digestive tract. It consists of the teeth, parodontium. the bones of the maxilla and the mandible, tem-poro-mandibular and alveodental joints, dento-dental junctions as well as the nervous and muscular complex.

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Ostatni spór naukowy J. W. Goethego (1794-1832) : w 250. rocznicę urodzin poety-przyrodnika

Bednarczyk A.

Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki

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1999

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R. 44, nr 3/4

7--42

PL

Było lato 1830 roku, Goethe miał już wówczas 81 lat, gdy z Paryża dotarły do Weimaru wiadomości o wybuchu rewolucji lipcowej i wywołały na dworze wielkie poruszenie. Wychowawca młodego księcia, Szwajcar Frédéric Soret (1795-1865) opowiada, jak to odwiedził 2 sierpnia owego roku Goethego, który go przywitał słowami: „No i co pan powie na to wielkie wydarzenie? - zawołał. - Wulkan wybuchł, wszystko stoi w płomieniach, to już nie przewód sądowy przy zamkniętych drzwiach! - To straszna historia - odpowiedziałem. - Ale czyż można było w wiadomej sytuacji i przy tego rodzaju rządach oczekiwać czegoś innego, jak tylko, że wszystko skończy się wygnaniem dotychczasowej dynastii? - Zdaje się, że się nie rozumiemy, mój kochany - odparł Goethe. - Ja nie mówię wcale o tamtych ludziach, chodzi mi o całkiem inną sprawę. Mówię o tak ważnym dla nauki sporze, który wybuchł publicznie w Akademii pomiędzy panami Cuvier i Geoffroy de Saint-Hilaire!". Krótko odtworzyliśmy chronologię rozgrywających się w Akademi i wydarzeń, by wyraźniej zlokalizować moment, w którym do sporu między Geoffroy Saint- Hilaire'em a Cuvierem przyłączył się Goethe jako strona bierna w sporze. Sporządzone przez D. Kuhn zestawienie poświadczonych przez dokumenty działań bądź wypowiedzi Goethego, mających związek z owym sporem, dowodzi, zdawać by się mogło, iż Goethe sporem tym zainteresował się stosunkowo późno, bo dopiero w początkach maja 1830 roku5, a więc już po pierwszym formalnym przerwaniu dyskusji przez władze Akademii. Goethe znał jednakże, wedle wszelkiego prawdopodobieństwa, relacje prasy francuskiej, która wiele pisała o przebiegu posiedzeń w Akademii, zwłaszcza gdy postanowiono (już po drugim, jak się zdaje, posiedzeniu), iż będą one otwarte dla szerszej publiczności. Na podstawie sprawozdań prasowych, siłą rzeczy powierzchownych, nie mógł Goethe odtworzyć ze wszystkimi szczegółami najżywiej go poruszającej walki idei, jaka się toczyła we francuskiej Akademii Nauk. Gdy wreszcie 21 lipca 1830 roku książka Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire'a trafiła do jego rąk, poeta-przyrodnik nie tylko ujrzał istotę sporu w pełnym świetle, lecz nadto stał się z oddali jego uczestnikiem.

EN

The article is devoted to the famous scholarly debate between É. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and G. Cuvier at the Académie Royale des Sciences in March 1830, and, in particular, to the role that was indirectly played in it by the poet-naturalist Johann W. Goethe, who published an account of the debate, in which he revealed the essence of the dispute and presented his own stance on the theoretical issues raised in the debate. The introductory part of the current article offers an outline of the course of the debate and of the crucial points that were made, as well as a reconstruction of the theoretical positions of the two French naturalists. The article rejects the interpretation found in works on the history of biology, according to which the debate concerned the transformist views held by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. It also challenges the view that the essence of the debate had to do with idea of the unity of the animal world (exposed by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire) which was contested by Cuvier, although this had indeed given rise to the debate in the first place. An analysis of Goethe's account of the debate has allowed the author of the article to demonstrate that it was the poet-naturalist, drawing on his outstanding theoretical insight, who was able to capture the real essence of the debate. He revealed the methodological essence of the dispute, which lay hidden underneath its substantive layer. According to Goethe, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier personified - roughly speaking - two contrasting approaches to natural studies, the main characteristics of which could be subsumed, respectively, under the dichotomies of: synthetic versus analytic, holistic versus elementarist, oriented towards the ideal versus oriented towards the empirical, stressing stability versus stressing change, promoting theory versus promoting experience, and relying on the deductive method versus relying on the inductive method. Goethe made this general framework specific in his very apt description of the participants in the debate. However, in his presentation of those two contrasting approaches and models of cognition, Goethe went far beyond the material provided by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier, basing both on the views of his contemporaries as well as those that belonged to his past, such as the views held by the exponents of the German romanticist Naturphilosophie, Buffon or Daubenton. While Goethe's account may give the impression, reinforced by his other statements and writings, that in the debate he took the side of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, the present article tries to show that this impression is a superficial and misleading one. The author attempts to justify the view that, through his naturalist writings, Goethe in fact became an intermediary between Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier, as he tried to combine the two opposing approaches and cognitive models; Goethe's theory of morphological type eventually constituted an original attempt at their synthesis. The theory of morphology developed by Goethe is particularly remarkable for its dynamic conception of form as geprägte Form die lebend sich entwickelt. This unique conception of form led Goethe, in his account of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire's book, to emphasize function rather than form, and this made it very close to the views of Cuvier. Indeed, Goethe went so far in his deliberations as to conceive of the category of form as derivative with respect to that of function, and to derive the form of a bodily part from way that it functioned, which in turn was adapted to the conditions in the environment. In interpreting Goethe's approach one could follow the direction in which Cuvier's thinking was going: the form of a part (together with its purposive nature) could be considered to be a manifestation of the harmony that obtained in nature, which was described by Cuvier in his principle of the conditions for existence. Goethe treated function as one of the aspects of the being of nature, as an operating, environment-adapted form. Discovering the cognitive advantages of function, Goethe made an attempt to approach morphology in functional terms. However, the concept of function is of a teleological origin, and gives rise to a methodological problem, which is discussed quite extensively in the current article. The problem is that both in his acccount of the debate as well as in his writings on morphology, Goethe spoke strongly against the traditional concept of final causes, which was also criticized by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. The truth is, however, that all three participants of the debate - Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Cuvier and Goethe-made use in their conceptions of notions that were teleological in character. Cuvier did so in an intentional, open and consistent way, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire - in an apparently unintentional and inconsistent manner, while Goethe used the concept of usefulness (Bestimmung), which, as the article demonstrates, is an uneqivocally teleological concept, of which the poet-naturalist did not seem to be quite aware. The article stresses, in the fragment concerning the concept of usefulness, that the concept appears in the medical works of the Galen, a programmatic finalist of antiquity, under the name of chreia, and it has a similar function in those works to that which it has in Goethe's work. It is most unlikely that we are dealing with a concept borrowed by Goethe form Galen, although it must be said that the latter knew at least one of Galen's treatises. What we probably are dealing with in this case is a rather rare thing in the history of science, namely an apparent case of parallelism: a very similar concept was developed quite independently by two scholars in two different historical epochs, and had the same cognitive function attributed to it. It can be quite confidently argued that, at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, the concept was developed once again and indepedently of Galen by Goethe, who investigated the same subject-matter, in the same aspect and in the same way as did Galen over sixteen centuries before. In the Goethean theory of morphological type the concept of usefulness goal (Bestimmung) became - alongside the criterion of location - the second criterion for indentifying organs. Hence, attempts to describe and understand the regularities underlying the harmoniously functioning whole (through attempts to describe and understand the purposive structure and purposive functioning of the parts making up such a whole) led both Galen and Goethe to develop the concept of usefulness: chreia and Bestimmung. The difference between those two uses of the concept of usefulness consisted in that Galen emphasized in his finalistically oriented morphophysiology the puiposive nature of the structure and the functioning of organs, while Goethe did not seem to notice that the concept of usefulness that he was using was deeply imbued with finalism. The above shows that the Goethe's methodological analyses did not allow him to arrive at the deeper layers of teleological explanations and concepts used in the biology of his times. On the one hand, he was quite right to view the teleological approach as deriving from attempts to anthropomorphize nature and to regard final causes as an obstacle to the development of science; at the same time, however, he treated nature as a result of deliberate and planned activity on the part of what he conceived to be God. On the other hand, Goethe seemed to have forgotten his critical insight, using in his morphology notions of an unequivocally teleological origin such as that of function, and especially that of usefulness. The role that Goethe played in the dispute betewen Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier consisted, firstly, in his correct assessment of the nature of the dispute, and secondly, in his mediation between its participants. He treated the dispute as a clash betwen the two previously described contrasting approaches to the world of living nature and the two attitudes to its study. In his own standpoint, which he sketched out in the account of the debate, Goethe combined the idea of the unity of the living world (Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire) with the functionalist conception of the organism and living nature (Cuvier). Goethe's overt declaration of support for Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire was combined with a reference to the affinity of the naturalist's views with his own research, which he had been conducting for nearly half acentury. At the same time, the second part of Goethe's account was devoted to the presentation of his own deliberations on a functionalist approach to morphology, the place of function in morphology and the mutual interdependence of the concepts of form and function; he thus showed himself to be close to the functionalist views of Cuvier. In fact, Goethe's attitude to the debate between Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier, as presented in his account, demonstrates that he was critical of both naturalists and did not admit that either was fully right or wrong in the debate. Putting it briefly, Goethe's views on the subject-matter of the debate are a synthesis of the two opposing approaches that emerged in it. All of Goethe's theory of morphological type which resulted from such a synthesis is conspicuous in its complementary duality of type and metamorphosis - the stable and the changeable, the general and the particular, the synchronic and the diachronic. Further analysis allows us to uncover other pairs of complementary notions: whole-part, synthesis-analysis, theory-experience, deduction-induction, morphology-physiology, structural laws-causal laws, etc. All of these pairs were transformed by Goethe into a harmonious whole, which took the shape of the theory of morphological type, and they have their own cognitive functions in that theory. It can thus be argued that the Goethean theory of type is a synthesis of the attitudes and approaches that emerged in the debate between Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier and that it is a historical form of resolving the then unresolved dispute.