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1
Content available Transformation into anti-manipulation method in voting. Changes in properties
Sosnowska Honorata
Control and Cybernetics
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2022
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Vol. 51, No. 4
487--499
EN
This paper examines the properties of the anti-manipulation method in voting. Such a method can be used by committees and similar bodies to ensure that votes reflect genuine preferences. The anti-manipulation method is based on the Borda Count and discourages strategic voting by excluding scores that deviate excessively from the mean. The method does not eliminate strategic voting but diminishes the motivation to apply it. We compare the properties of the Borda Count and the anti-manipulation method. The properties, which are most often found in the literature, were chosen for comparison. Thus, the following properties are examined: consistency, vulnerability to the no-show paradox, vulnerability to the subset choice condition, homogeneity, monotonicity, and vulnerability to the reversal bias paradox as well as the Condorcet winner and loser paradoxes. The anti-manipulation method fails to satisfy most of these properties. A real data example, the voting of a certain jury, is used as a counterexample in most cases.
2
Content available Voting and MCDM: the pedagogy of the Saari triangle
Hakula Jaakko
Control and Cybernetics
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2021
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Vol. 50, No. 3
401--412
EN
The essay has a twofold objective: primarily, to present an application of voting theory as a possible evaluation method, and concurrently, to offer a pedagogic framework, based on that very application. Evaluation and certain notions of preference and value have common semantic roots. By equating preference and choice, we end up amidst social choice (SC) theory and voting methods, also manageable as joint decisions in multiple-criteria decision making (MCDM). With the aid of the Saari triangle some essential differences of pairwise and positional voting rules for up to three alternatives can be depicted. A voting or decision rule does not necessarily follow the true preferences of the actors, but may mirror the problematics of the chosen rule. The Saari triangle makes it possible to visualize some paradoxical results in the exemplary evaluations of digital websites through an imaginary case description via voting and MCDM. As candidates and voters in SC are put to stand for alternatives and criteria in MCDM, the methodological and pedagogical goals of the study are achieved.
3
Content available Tajność głosowania a i-voting. Wątpliwości prawne związane z głosowaniem przez internet
Zając Paweł
Cybersecurity and Law
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2019
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Vol. 2 (2)
25--37
PL
Przymiot tajności głosowania stanowi jeden z fundamentalnych kanonów prawa wyborczego. Gwarantuje on prawo do anonimizacji oddanego głosu co wiąże się z zerwaniem więzi pomiędzy wyborcą a oddanym przez niego głosem na etapie ustalania wyników wyborów. Jednak w wyniku postępującego procesu technologizacji życia społecznego mającego za cel ułatwienie jednostkom funkcjonowania w życiu publicznym objawiającego się m.in. w możliwości głosowania przez internet z dowolnego miejsca (i-voting), zasada ta zostaje marginalizowana. I-voting nie zapewnia bowiem realnej gwarancji zapewnienia zachowania tajności podczas procesu głosowania, jednak mimo to rozwiązanie to przyjęte zostało w kilku krajach. Niniejszy artykuł porusza kwestie wątpliwości natury prawnej związane z zastosowaniem i-votingu w polskim porządku prawnym.
EN
The secret ballot is one of the fundamental canons of electoral law. It guarantees the right to anonymize the vote, which means breaking the bond between the voter and his voice at the stage of determining the election results. However, as a result of the progressing process of technologization of social life aimed at making a easier for individuals to function in public life, manifesting itself, inter alia, in the possibility of voting via the internet from anywhere (i-voting), this rule is marginalized. I-voting does not provide a real guarantee of ensuring secrecy during the voting process, but nevertheless these solutions have been adopted in several countries. This article raises questions of legal nature related to the use of i-voting in the Polish legal order.
4
Application of majority voting protocols to supporting trading decisions
Opaliński A.
Rynek Energii
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2014
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Nr 4
136--141
EN
A broad spectrum of analysis and prediction indicators and methods exists to support trading decisions, but no hard knowledge exist to tell in advance which of them will fit best in a given timeframe. To support trading decisions, a multi-agent self-organizing system has been proposed. The system is based on history based dynamic weight voting and selects the right indicators based on their past performance. The formal analysis is given and verification is described, which proved the system to possess the desired features.
PL
Istnieje szerokie spektrum narzędzi i metod wspierających decyzje handlowe, lecz brakuje jasnych reguł ich stosowania. Zaproponowano samoorganizujący się system agentowy do wspierania decyzji handlowych. System, bazując na glosowaniu z dynamicznymi wagami, wskazuje efektywne indykatory na podstawie ich poprzednich osiągnięć. Przedstawiono analizę formalną i wyniki weryfikacji, potwierdzającej cechy rozwiązania.
5
Content available Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation
Sosnowska H.
Operations Research and Decisions
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2014
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Vol. 24, No. 4
75--88
EN
The voting procedure has been presented with rotation scheme used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. The main game theoretical approaches have been presented elsewhere. That paper considered the Shapley value computed in accordance with these approaches. The Banzhaf value has been analysed and the results compared with the results for the Shapley value.
6
Content available Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank
Sosnowska H.
Operations Research and Decisions
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2013
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Vol. 23, No. 1
75--86
EN
Game theoreticians usually deal with standard voting methods such as plurality voting or approval voting. In reality however, some complicated non-standard voting methods are used. In this paper the voting method and rotation scheme have been presented used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. We present game theoretical approaches for analyzing this method and different methods of computing the Shapley value for games connected with voting under such rotation schemes.
7
Content available remote Ensembles of Classifiers Based on Approximate Reducts
Wróblewski J.
Fundamenta Informaticae
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2001
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Vol. 47, nr 3,4
351-360
EN
The problem of improving rough set based expert systems by modifying a notion of reduct is discussed. The notion of approximate reduct is introduced, as well as some proposals of quality measure for such a reduct. The complete classifying system based on approximate reducts is presented and discussed. It is proved that the problem of finding optimal set of classifying agents based on approximate reducts is NP-hard; the genetic algorithm is applied to find the suboptimal set. Experimental results show that the classifying system is effective and relatively fast.
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