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Badanie regulacji i taryf usług wodnych i kanalizacyjnych w Polsce oraz wybranych państwach Europy

Sikoń Antoni

Technologia Wody

2019

Nr 3 (65)

48--55

Odzysk kosztów usług wodnych i kanalizacyjnych stanowi ważny element gospodarowania wodą w Unii Europejskiej. Ramowa Dyrektywa Wodna wprowadziła zasadę odzysku kosztów usług wodnych i ściekowych. Promuje ona internalizację kosztów środowiskowych i zasobowych, a ceny wody i ścieków winny umożliwić odzysk kosztów tych usług . Do odzysku tych kosztów muszą przyczyniać się główni użytkownicy usług, tacy jak gospodarstwa domowe, przemysł i rolnictwo. Artykuł przedstawia regulacje taryf dotyczących wody i ścieków w Polsce i w wybranych państwach Europy, ze specjalnym podkreśleniem polskich reform w tej dziedzinie.

The cost recovery of municipal water and wastewater services is an important element for water resources management in European Union. The Water Framework Directive introduced the principle of cost recovery for water and wastewater services. It promotes the internalization of environmental and resources costs and water and wastewater prices must allow for costs recovery of these services. The main water uses for households, industry and agriculture must contribute to the recovery of these costs. This article describes water and wastewater regulations of tariffs in Poland and in selected counties of Europe, with special emphasis on Polish reforms at this area.

Experience with Regulation of Network Quality in Italy, the UK and the Netherlands

Ajodhia V., Petrov K., Scarsi G. C., Franken B.

Electrical Power Quality and Utilisation. Magazine

2006

Vol. 2, iss. 1

3--9

Both theory and practice suggest that incentive price regulation, without additional quality measures, eventually leads to quality degradation: the strong cost reduction incentives (driven by the profit incentive) have the perverse effect of inducing suh-standard quality levels. Thus, under economic regulation models using incentive schemes, quality regulation becomes imperative. This paper describes experience in Italy, the Netherlands and the UK with regulation of network quality. It shows that regulation could influence network quality significantly using different types of regulation. Starting with indirect instruments like the publication of reliability statistics, Regulators proceed with introducing standards and attached penalties, e.g. in case a power interruption takes longer than a predefined threshold, the customer facing the interruption receives a payment. Finally, incentive schemes are introduced. Incentive schemes compare measured network quality and targets. In case the network companies fail to meet their targets they are penalised. In contrary, when they exceed their targets they are rewarded. We show that, especially in Italy, network quality improved significantly, after the incentive schemes were introduced. However, the limited information about relations between costs and quality, and about customer preferences, strongly affects the effectiveness of such quality incentive schemes. Designing a method to properly compare companies and translate this into an integrated price and quality regulation system is a challenge that still lies ahead.