Wyniki wyszukiwania - BazTech

1

Cyber security requirements for railway control systems according to standard IEC 62443

Tworek Bartłomiej

Prace Naukowe Politechniki Warszawskiej. Transport

|

2020

|

z. 131

79--86

EN

Modern railway control systems are based on computer and embedded systems. This components are connected directly via ICT networks, it is also possible to use wireless industrial networks. Cyber security attacks in automation control systems are becoming more dangerous and common. To protect these safety critical systems, the standard IEC 62443 has been developed. This standard provides guidelines and requirements for industrial automation and control systems which also apply to railway systems. This article is mainly focused on chapter IEC 62443-4-2 which provides Technical security requirements for IACS components. Proper protection against cyber attacks is also important for maintaining RAMS parameters (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety). Railway control systems performs mainly safety critical functionality which are related with railway traffic management. Safety related control algorithms and vital modules cannot be disturbed by security mechanisms and functions. The analysis of cyber threats should be performed by railway infrastructure operators in cooperation with manufacturers of railway control systems. It is important to determine what level of requirements fulfilment according to standard IEC 62443 must be met (security level). Railway traffic control systems are long life and high availability systems, therefore they should be properly maintained during lifecycle. The manufacturer of railway control systems and end user should together develop a policy and guidelines for securing the systems against cyber attacks.

2

The software safety of railway control system applied to cross level protection

Lewiński A., Trzaska K.

Zeszyty Naukowe. Transport / Politechnika Śląska

|

2003

|

z. 51

337-343

EN

This paper presents a problem of building the safety software of railway control system using theory of software correctness. The correctness of software has an important effect to performance the fail-safe systems, especially SIL4 (safety integrity levels 4). For example Authors present the railway control system applied to cross level protection.

PL

W referacie przedstawiono problemy budowy bezpiecznego oprogramowania aplikacji kolejowych przy wykorzystaniu teorii poprawności oprogramowania. Poprawne oprogramowanie ma istotny wpływ na działanie systemów uwarunkowanych bezpieczeństwem, zwłaszcza 4 poziomu bezpieczeństwa (SIL4). Jako przykład autorzy przedstawili uproszczony system samoczynnej sygnalizacji przejazdowej.

3

The semi-functional and reliability modelling of railway control system

Lewiński A., Sumiła M.

Zeszyty Naukowe. Transport / Politechnika Śląska

|

2003

|

z. 51

327-335

EN

The correct and reliable software, properly integrated with hardware, allows analysing the safety on the system integrity level using quantity measures determined corresponding to typical reliability and maintenance numbers of parameters. Paper presents that a safety related raiway control system have to be described by several numbers of parameters. In the consequence it allows to determine system integrity level. An example presents a model of a safety railroad control system, which respect UE standards.

PL

Poprawne modelowanie kolejkowych systemów sterowania wymaga uwzględnienia wielu parametrów mających wpływ na pracę systemu w warunkach bezpieczeństwa. Wymaga to analizy zarówno pod kątem urządzeń jak i oprogramowania takich systemów. W artykule za przykład posłużył model samoczynnej sygnalizacji przejazdowej, gdyż odpowiada on najwyższemu poziomowi bezpieczeństwa, tzw. fail-safe, wg międzynarodowych standardów CENELEC. Zakładając Markowski charakter procesów wyznaczono szereg zasadniczych parametrów tego systemu.