We introduce a number of logics to reason about collective propositional attitudes that are defined by means of the majority rule. It is well known that majoritarian aggregation is subject to irrationality, as the results in social choice theory and judgment aggregation show. The proposed logics for modelling collective attitudes are based on a substructural propositional logic that allows for circumventing inconsistent outcomes. Individual and collective propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, obligations, are then modelled by means of minimal modalities to ensure a number of basic principles. In this way, a viable consistent modelling of collective attitudes is obtained.
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The logic RM3 is the 3-valued extension of the logic R-Mingle (RM). RM (and so, RM3) does not have the variable- sharing property (vsp), but RM3 (and so, RM) lacks the more “offending" “paradoxes of relevance”, such as A → (B → A) or ⌐A → (A → B). Thus, RM and RM3 can be useful when “some relevance”, but not the full vsp, is needed. Sublogics of RM3 with the vsp are well known, but this is not the case with those lacking this property. The first aim of this paper is to define an ample family of sublogics of RM3 without the vsp. The second one is to provide these sublogics and RM3 itself with a general Routley- Meyer semantics, that is, the semantics devised for relevant logics in the early seventies of the past century.
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