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1
Content available Using quasi-experimental designs for causal effects
EN
Purpose: This paper discusses the concept of identifying the causal effects using quasiexperimental methods and applies this method to investigate the impact of high license fees on the quality of mobile Internet in Poland. Design/methodology/approach: Quasi-experiment design, especially the difference-indifferences method and the interrupted time series design were used to examine the causal effects of spectrum fees in Poland. Data on the quality of mobile Internet in Poland and around the world published by Akamai and data provided by Ookla® under the agreement1 were used for analysis. Findings: The study did not confirm the impact of high spectrum fees on the quality of the Internet in Poland. Practical implications: The results obtained can help policymakers in Poland and other countries in making decisions on spectrum management. Originality/value: This is the first paper using the quasi-experimental method to examine the effects of the 4G auction in Poland.
EN
Purpose: The spectrum is scarce recourses, so it is very important to allocate it in a way to maximize the economic and social returns to the countries` economies. Economists agree that the best way to allocate rare resources are auctions. Despite their good properties, in some environments, they can create inefficiency. We describe some potential sources of inefficiency in spectrum auctions and some negative effects of inefficient spectrum allocation. We also discuss how the government through appropriate spectrum policy and auction designing can promote efficient spectrum allocation. Design/methodology/approach: The paper is based on the literature on the spectrum auction and public documents published by national spectrum authorities. Theoretical discussions are supported by case studies of real world spectrum auctions. Much attention has been paid to the case of the Polish 4G auction. Findings: Extremely high reserve prices or rigorous approach to promoting entry could lead to price distortions, misallocation or even unsold spectrum which harm both competition and consumers. The case of the Polish 4G auction confirms that gaps in the detailed auction rules may lead to significant delays in frequency allocation and increase the risk of an ineffective auction outcome. Practical implications: In the light of our findings, it is important that the rules of the auction in the 3.6 GHz band currently planned in Poland should allow the regulator to control the pace of the auction and take into account the risk of inefficient outcome associated with passive bids. Originality/value: The discussions made in this paper could help policy makers in Poland and other countries in spectrum auction designing.
EN
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to characterize the rules of Simultaneous Multiple Round Ascending bid auction (SMRA) and to indicate factors confirming that it is an effective way of allocating radio frequencies. Design/methodology/approach: The paper draws on the literature on the spectrum auction. Theoretical discussions are supported by the real-world examples of spectrum auction. Findings: The paper presents the possibilities of modifying Simultaneous Multiple Round Ascending bid auction rules to adapt it to a specific market. Originality/value: The analysis made in this paper could help policy makers in Poland and other countries in spectrum auction designing.
PL
Rozważano podejście aukcyjne do współdzielenia widma przez systemy radiokomunikacji ruchomej w zakresach białych plam w widmie telewizyjnym (TVWS). Proponowane są dwa modele aukcyjne .w których bierze się pod uwagę specyfikę dostępnych zasobów radiowych, wymagania potencjalnych użytkowników tych zasobów oraz uwarunkowania regulatora rynku. Modele obejmują krótkookresowe aukcje powtarzane w czasie w zależności od potrzeb użytkowników (aukcja symultaniczna w czasie i jednocześnie kombinatoryczna w wymiarach częstotliwości i mocy oraz aukcja w pełni kombinatoryczna w trzech wymiarach).
EN
This paper considers the auction approach for spectrum sharing in TV white spaces (TVWS) by radio communication systems. Two auction models are proposed. In auction design, the specify of TVWS (fragmentation, different allowable transmit powers), users' demands (allocation time, bandwidth, transmit power, contiguity) and regulators' requirements are taken into account. Presented short-term auctions are non-identical objects auctions. The first one is the time simultaneous auction and combinatorial in frequency and power dimensions. The second one is fully combinatorial. The market is organized by a central entity called the spectrum broker which is responsible for selling the spectrum licenses in independent area. The information about the available spectrum resources is stored in geo-location database.
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