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Measurement of control power in corporate networks

Stach Izabella, Mercik Jacek

Operations Research and Decisions

2021

Vol. 31, No. 1

98--121

This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods for measuring indirect control in complex corporate shareholding networks. The methods use power indices to estimate the direct and indirect control in shareholding structures. Some of these methods only estimate the control power of investors (firms without shareholdings), and only a few measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks (which means investors and stock companies). None of them takes measuring the importance of mutual connections (edges in the networks) into consideration; thus we focus in particular on an extension of these methods in this paper to measure both the control-power of the firms involved in complex shareholding structures (represented by nodes in networks) and the importance (power) of linkages between the firms as elements of a whole corporate shareholding network. More precisely, we apply our approaches to a theoretical example of a corporate network. Moreover, we continue the considerations about reasonable properties for indirect control measurement. Some ideas of new properties are proposed. The paper also provides a brief review of the literature concerning the topic.

Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems

Carreras F., Freixas J., Magaňa A.

Operations Research and Decisions

2016

Vol. 26, No. 2

31--52

An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one established in Lisbon. We mainly consider the voting systems designed for the enlarged European Union adopted in the Athens summit, held in April 2003 but this analysis can be applied to any other system. First, it is shown that the dimension of these voting systems does not, in general, reduce. Next, the egalitarian effects of superposing two or three weighted majority games (often by introducing additional consensus) are considered. Finally, the decisiveness of these voting systems is evaluated and compared.

Weighted multi-criteria simple games and voting systems

Monroy L., Fernandez F. R.

Foundations of Computing and Decision Sciences

2007

Vol. 32, No. 4

295-313

Multi-criteria simple games provide mathematical models for describing and analyzing group decision problems when the decision makers consider multiple qualitative criteria simultaneously. Voting systems and related social choice situations may be modelled as multi-criteria simple games. The goal of this paper is to propose a generalization of the notion of weighted simple games within this context. The basic concepts and the model are first introduced. Two different weighted representations for a multi-criteria simple game is established and its dimension is defined. Furthermore, we provide an extension of the classic Theorem of Taylor and Zwicker for these types of games, which permits both, the weighted representation of a multi-criteria simple game and a bound of its dimension to be obtained.