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Jak to z „Żarnowcem” było – refleksja 30 lat po wstrzymaniu budowy. Część II: Jak powstała decyzja rządowa i jej konsekwencje

Kiełbasa Władysław

Postępy Techniki Jądrowej

|

2019

|

z. 3

2--16

PL

W artykule (podzielonym na dwie części) przedstawiono historię Elektrowni Jądrowej (EJ) „Żarnowiec”: • W części I (lata 1971-1989) – od przygotowania tej inwestycji, poprzez budowę, początki przygotowania rozruchu i eksploatacji, aż do wstrzymania budowy; • W części II (lata 1989-2006) – analizy techniczne i ekonomiczne przedsięwzięcia, powstanie decyzji rządowej o zaniechaniu tej budowy, likwidacja budowy (porzucenie bez rozbiórki rozpoczętych obiektów i uporządkowania terenu), oraz dalsze działania i zdarzenia do czasu ponownego podjęcia przez polski Rząd pomysłu powrotu do energetyki jądrowej. Historię tę pokazano na tle sytuacji gospodarczej, społecznej i politycznej w Polsce, z uwzględnieniem także aspektów międzynarodowych, które miały wpływ na losy tej inwestycji. Szczególną uwagę poświęcono znaczeniu, jakie dla podjęcia decyzji o zaniechaniu kontynuacji budowy EJ „Żarnowiec” miała katastrofalna awaria czarnobylska, której skutki radiacyjne dotknęły także społeczeństwo polskie. Ponadto, omówiono zwięźle także historię komercyjnego wprowadzenia w krajach europejskich i w b. ZSRR radzieckich reaktorów WWER-440 modelu W-213, wyposażonych w układy bezpieczeństwa zaprojektowane, zgodnie ze światową praktyką, na warunki granicznej (maksymalnej) awarii projektowej (MAP), zapoczątkowanej rozerwaniem głównego rurociągu obiegu pierwotnego reaktora (LB LOCA1).

EN

In the article (divided into two parts) the history of the Zarnowiec Nuclear Power Plant has been presented: • In Part I (years 1971-1989) – since the early project development phase, through plant construction, beginning of preparations for commissioning and operation, till plant construction stoppage; • In Part II (years 1989-2006) – project technical and economic analyses, development process of the governmental decision on cancellation of the project, construction site “liquidation” (abandoning the construction site without dismantling the partly constructed facilities and no remediation work), and further actions and events till resuming by the Polish Government an idea of returning to nuclear power. That history has been shown on the background of the economic, social and political situation in Poland, while considering also the international context and aspects having bearing on the destiny of this project. A particular attention has been also given to the significance of the Chernobyl disaster, radiological consequences of which have affected the Polish general public, for the subsequent decision on discontinuation of the Zarnowiec NPP project. Moreover, the history of commercial introduction to European countries and the former Soviet Union the new Soviet-designed power reactors VVER-440, model V-213, that were equipped with engineered safety features designed, in accordance with common international practice, to copy with a bounding (maximal) design basis accident initiated by the main reactor coolant system pipe break (LB LOCA), has been outlined.

2

Jak to z „Żarnowcem” było – refleksja 30 lat po wstrzymaniu budowy. Część 1: Od początków do wstrzymania budowy

Kiełbasa Władysław

Postępy Techniki Jądrowej

|

2019

|

z. 2

2--13

PL

W artykule (podzielonym na dwie części) przedstawiono historię Elektrowni Jądrowej (EJ) „Żarnowiec”: • W części I (lata 1971-1989) – od przygotowania tej inwestycji, poprzez budowę, początki przygotowania rozruchu i eksploatacji, aż do wstrzymania budowy; • W części II (lata 1989-2006) – analizy techniczne i ekonomiczne przedsięwzięcia, powstanie decyzji rządowej o zaniechaniu tej budowy, likwidacja budowy (porzucenie bez rozbiórki rozpoczętych obiektów i uporządkowania terenu), oraz dalsze działania i zdarzenia do czasu ponownego podjęcia przez polski Rząd pomysłu powrotu do energetyki jądrowej. Historię tę pokazano na tle sytuacji gospodarczej, społecznej i politycznej w Polsce, z uwzględnieniem także aspektów międzynarodowych, które miały wpływ na losy tej inwestycji. Szczególną uwagę poświęcono znaczeniu, jakie dla podjęcia decyzji o zaniechaniu kontynuacji budowy EJ „Żarnowiec” miała katastrofalna awaria czarnobylska, której skutki radiacyjne dotknęły także społeczeństwo polskie. Ponadto, omówiono zwięźle także historię komercyjnego wprowadzenia w krajach europejskich i w b. ZSRR radzieckich reaktorów WWER-440 modelu W-213, wyposażonych w układy bezpieczeństwa zaprojektowane, zgodnie ze światową praktyką, na warunki granicznej (maksymalnej) awarii projektowej (MAP), zapoczątkowanej rozerwaniem głównego rurociągu obiegu pierwotnego reaktora (LB LOCA1).

EN

In the article (divided into two parts) the history of the Zarnowiec Nuclear Power Plant has been presented: • In Part I (years 1971-1989) – since the early project development phase, through plant construction, beginning of preparations for commissioning and operation, till plant construction stoppage; • In Part II (years 1989-2006) – project technical and economic analyses, development process of the governmental decision on cancellation of the project, construction site “liquidation” (abandoning the construction site without dismantling the partly constructed facilities and no remediation work), and further actions and events till resuming by the Polish Government an idea of returning to nuclear power. That history has been shown on the background of the economic, social and political situation in Poland, while considering also the international context and aspects having bearing on the destiny of this project. A particular attention has been also given to the significance of the Chernobyl disaster, radiological consequences of which have affected the Polish general public, for the subsequent decision on discontinuation of the Zarnowiec NPP project. Moreover, the history of commercial introduction to European countries and the former Soviet Union the new Soviet-designed power reactors VVER-440, model V-213, that were equipped with engineered safety features designed, in accordance with common international practice, to copy with a bounding (maximal) design basis accident initiated by the main reactor coolant system pipe break (LB LOCA), has been outlined.

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An evaluation of the range-gated-imaging technology under dense aerosol environments

Cho J. W., Choi Y. S., Jeong K. M.

Opto-Electronics Review

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2018

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Vol. 26, No. 4

270--278

EN

Range-gated-imaging system, which can be used to eliminate backscatter in strong scattering environments, is based on two high speed technologies. It uses high power, ultra-short pulse laser as the light source. And it opens the optical gate of an ICCD camera with a micro-channel-plate image intensifier in a very short time while the laser pulses reflected by the object is coming back to the ICCD camera. Using this range-gated-imaging technology, the effect of scattered light can be reduced and a clear image is obtained. In this paper, the test results of the range-gated-imaging system under dense aerosol environments, which simulates environments in the reactor containment building when the severe accident of the nuclear power plant occurred, are described. To evaluate the observation performance of the range-gated-imaging system under such dense fog environment, we made a test facility. Fog particles are sprayed into the test facility until fog concentration is reached to the postulated concentration level of the severe accident of the nuclear power plant. At such dense fog concentration conditions, we compared and evaluated the observation performances of the range-gated-imaging system and the CCD camera.

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Estimation of radiation doses for transition from emergency to existing exposure situation

Hamed A. A., Salem E. F., Abdien A. K.

Nukleonika

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2015

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Vol. 60, No. 4, part 2

943--950

EN

The transition from emergency to existing exposure situation is an important stage in the nuclear or radiological emergency plan. It requires arrangements to be put in place and to be implemented so as to ensure that the transition is made in a coordinated and orderly manner of guidelines for adjusting the undertaken protective actions and other response actions. The delivering radiation doses to public and environmental pollution are monitoring that measurements should be implemented according to certain plan of intervention and protective actions in the different stages of the N/R accident. In this study, a computer model (RASCAL) is used to calculate the effect of severe accident could have detected on an operating nuclear power reactor PWR and the possible impact on the public. Features for the decision to implement the transition from emergency to existing exposure situation are proposed depending on the estimation of the collection of deliver exposure doses to the public and environment due to monitoring the different radiation sources resulting from the N/R accident.

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Safety analysis of coolant needed supply for Spent Fuel Pool in light of Fukushima Accident

Malicki M., Skolik K., Oettingen M.

Logistyka

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2015

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nr 4

9450--9457, CD3

EN

The Fukushima accident shows us that not only the core and reactor could make problems during unexpected events but also Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). That accident encouraged many experts to reconsider safety features in this area of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) and to be more mindful of this potential problem. Preparing precise analysis of such accidents could provide important information about possible consequences and bring up essential solutions about how to improve SFP fuel management and safety systems related with the fuel storage process. This paper delivers analysis based on the Fukushima SFP unit 4 accident from March 11th 2011. The Fukushima type accident was caused by a lack of heat reception: water vaporization was the only way for heat to escape from SFP. Critical to avoid serious consequences in that situation is to know when and how much water must be provided by the operator to the SFP to ensure the assembly is submerged into a coolant. During this accident the SFP was almost full, 1530 of 1560 spots were taken and instruments, safety or safety-related systems like heat exchangers were not available.

6

Computer codes in the safety analysis for nuclear power plants. Computational capabilities of thermal-hydraulic tools, using the example of the RELAP5 code

Skrzypek E., Skrzypek M.

Journal of Power Technologies

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2014

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Vol. 94, nr 5

41--50

EN

Safety is a paramount concern of the Nuclear Power Program in Poland. To this end there is a need to investigate the design of the proposed reactor and its operation principles and perform multiple analyses both before the reactor start-up (The Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR) and during its operational life. In the worldwide nuclear community hundreds of people are involved in this complicated and complex process. Due to the sophistication of the phenomena occurring during operation and accidents, the number of analyses is increasing rapidly. Currently, much interest in this field is focused on the use of computer codes and high computational power.

7

Some thermal-hydraulic aspects of reflooding of an overheated, partly degraded nuclear reactor core

Frid W., Miettinen J., Sjöberg A.

Zeszyty Naukowe Politechniki Świętokrzyskiej. Mechanika

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1999

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Z. 67

235--244

EN

In studies of postulated, unmitigated severe accidents in LWRs it is assumed that cooling of the reactor core is lost which leads to core uncovery and heat-up. core degradation and eventually melt-down of the core. Restoring water supply to the reactor core in order to prevent core damage and to terminate accident progression is the main objective of the accident management. In some Boiling Water Reactors it is necessary to consider a possibility that the reactor may become critical during the reflooding phase. The reason is that the melting of the control rods and their relocation from the core is likely to start before the melting and relocation of the fuel. The two-phase flow and heat transfer phenomena associated with reflooding and quenching of the reactor core are complex and not completely understood, especially under severe accident conditions due to high fuel temperatures and. In the case of recriticality, strong thermal-hydraulic transients when the core reaches critical conditions. In this paper, the two-phase flow and heat transfer phenomena during reflooding of an overheated, partly degraded core are discussed. The reflooding model developed for the RECRIT code is briefly described, as well as some validation against experimental data.