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The Self in the Machine

Zawieska K., Duffy B. R.

Pomiary Automatyka Robotyka

2014

R. 18, nr 2

78--82

Social human-robot interaction (HRI) has been widely recognised as one of the major challenges for robotics. This social aspect includes designing robots that embraces various humanlike characteristics regarding robot appearance and behaviour. Few HRI studies, however, address the core goal of human social interaction, i.e. the development of the self. This paper argues that social robots can constitute an illusion or an extension of the human self and should be developed as such. The concept of the self and its meanings for HRI research are here discussed from the symbolic interactionism perspective.

Interakcja społeczna między ludźmi i robotami stanowi jedno z głównych wyzwań dla współczesnej robotyki. Aspekt społeczny interakcji między ludźmi i maszynami zawiera budowanie robotów, które posiadają cechy naśladujące cechy ludzkie w kontekście wyglądu i zachowania robota. Mimo to, niewiele prac skupia się na głównym celu ludzkich interakcji społecznych z robotami, tzn. na rozwinięciu jaźni w maszynie. Autorzy niniejszej pracy twierdzą, że roboty mogą stanowić rozszerzenie ludzkiej jaźni i jako takie powinny być rozwijane. Pojęcie jaźni oraz jego znaczenie dla badań w dziedzinie Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) omawiane są w pespektywy interakcjonizmu symbolicznego.

An approach to scientific understanding of mind by defining a set of all possible contents of consciousness

Togawa T.

Biocybernetics and Biomedical Engineering

2006

Vol. 26, no. 1

5-20

The lack of a well-defined concept of consciousness which could be accessible from both the mental and neural aspects is a serious obstruction in understanding the mind. This article is an attempt to introduce a concept of the content space which is definable from the mental side but also relates to neural models. The content space is defined as a set of all possible contents of consciousness, irrespective of the fact whether the each content corresponds to the already-realized conscious experience or not. The conscious event at any moment can be regarded as a result of the past, including all the effects from the outside and the inside of the brain, and the conscious event tends to produce effects on the inside and outside of the brain. This feature can be interpreted as a mental aspect of the neural activity, so that firing of a specific neuron corresponds to a conscious event specific to a certain element of the content space. By introducing the concept of the content space, the neural and mental facets are understood as two different facets of the same event. A specific feature of the contents of the consciousness in humans is that they can be expressed by language. Thus, the linguistic accessibility or the introspection is limited by the content space. According to this assumption, unconscious events cannot be mental but are purely neural. Consequently, no room remains to suspect any mysterious neural instrument in which unconscious mental processes are took place. The self and subjectivity have been shown to be comprehensible without assuming any unknown function.