When a database owner needs to disclose her data, she can k-anonymize her data to protect the involved individuals’ privacy. However, if the data is distributed between two owners, then it is an open question whether the two owners can jointly k-anonymize the union of their data, such that the information suppressed in one owner's data is not revealed to the other owner. In this paper, we study this problemof distributed k-anonymization. We have two major results: First, it is impossible to design an unconditionally private protocol that implements any normal k-anonymization function, where normal k-anonymization functions are a very broad class of k-anonymization functions. Second, we give an efficent protocol that implements a normal k-anonymization function and show that it is private against polynomial-time adversaries. Our results have many potential applications and can be extended to three or more parties.
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