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EN
The food packaging material and its quality assessment based on permeability, tensile strength, swelling, transmittance, and biofilm formation are discussed in this chapter. The semi-Markov model of food packaging material quality change process is introduced and its characteristics are determined. Next, the safety and resilience indicators are proposed for multi-state analysis, identification, prediction and optimization of packaged food product consumption safety.
PL
W pracy omówiono pojęcie funkcji bezpieczeństwa dla obwodu sterowania maszyny, które jest jednym z podstawowych pojęć, pozwalających projektować maszyny zgodnie z zasadniczymi wymaganiami bezpieczeństwa. Przedstawione też zostały podstawy architektury układów realizujących funkcje bezpieczeństwa w maszynach. Na przykładzie fundamentalnego obwodu zatrzymania awaryjnego wyjaśniono podstawy parametrów niezawodnościowych dla elementów elektromechanicznych. Wyjaśniono także pojęcie wymuszonego prowadzenia styków. Podano podstawowe wzory i przygotowano podstawy do dalszego wyjaśnienia zagadnienia poziomu zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa.
EN
The paper discusses the concept of the safety function for the machine control circuit, which is one of the basic concepts that allow to design machines in accordance with the safety requirements. The basics of the architecture of systems implementing safety functions in machines were also discussed. Using the example of the fundamental emergency stop circuit, the basics of the reliability parameters for electromechanical components are explained. The concept of forced contact guidance is also explained. The basic formulas are given and the basis for further clarification of the performance level (PL) is prepared.
3
Content available remote Performance Level (PL). Pt 1, Basic Parameter of the Machine Safety Function (SF)
EN
The paper discusses the concept of the safety function for the machine control circuit, which is one of the basic concepts that allow to design machines in accordance with the safety requirements. The basics of the architecture of systems implementing safety functions in machines were also discussed. Using the example of the fundamental emergency stop circuit, the basics of the reliability parameters for electromechanical components are explained. The concept of forced contact guidance is also explained. The basic formulas are given and the basis for further clarification of the performance level (PL) is prepared.
PL
W pracy omówiono pojęcie funkcji bezpieczeństwa dla obwodu sterowania maszyny, które jest jednym z podstawowych pojęć, pozwalających projektować maszyny zgodnie z zasadniczymi wymaganiami bezpieczeństwa. Przedstawione też zostały podstawy architektury układów realizujących funkcje bezpieczeństwa w maszynach. Na przykładzie fundamentalnego obwodu zatrzymania awaryjnego wyjaśniono podstawy parametrów niezawodnościowych dla elementów elektromechanicznych. Wyjaśniono także pojęcie wymuszonego prowadzenia styków. Podano podstawowe wzory i przygotowano podstawy do dalszego wyjaśnienia zagadnienia poziomu zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa.
EN
Industrial large-scale urea production creates a number of hazards due to equipment and machine failures as well as service errors. Failures can cause material, environmental and human losses. The work presents the assessment of safety hazards and failure effects for selected emergency scenarios of Mitsui - Toatsu's urea synthesis reactor. A fragment of the process implemented in the synthesis node was covered by HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study), and the critical points, from the security point of view, were identified. Several emergency scenarios for various types of failures and various effects are presented. The analyzed contingency scenarios include: blocking the valve on the outflow from the reactor and leaks caused by corrosion resulting from the maintenance of improper technological parameters of the process. The work suggested the need for new security measures and modernization of the installation by using the safety function for the selected critical point. The hazards analyzed and the contingency scenarios developed are essential for risk assessment and its possible reduction.
PL
W celu uzyskania możliwości implementacji funkcji bezpieczeństwa zgodnie z wymaganiami zasadniczymi dyrektywy 2006/42/WE niezbędne jest określenie wymagań dotyczących wyposażenia bezpieczeństwa wykorzystującego technikę RFID. Wymagania te powinny zmierzać w kierunku zapewnienia spełnienia wymagań zasadniczych w sposób dotyczący elementów bezpieczeństwa wymienionych w ich orientacyjnym wykazie (załącznik V do dyrektywy 2006/42/WE).
EN
In case of intention to implement safety function according the essential requirements of directive 2006/42/WE, the safety equipment which applies the RFID technology shall satisfy the suitable particular requirements. These requirements directed be directed on the essential requirements of safety elements listed in Annex V do directive 2006/42/WE. (Preparation of Papers for VIII Symposium of Paragraf 34 – The setting of requirements for safety equipment using RFID technology).
6
Content available Safety of multistate ageing systems
EN
Basic notions of the ageing multistate systems safety analysis are introduced. The system components and the system multistate safety functions are defined. The mean values and variances of the multistate systems lifetimes in the safety state subsets and the mean values of their lifetimes in the particular safety states are defined. The multi-state system risk function and the moment of exceeding by the system the critical safety state are introduced. The exemplary safety structures of the multistate systems with ageing components are defined and their safety functions are determined. As a particular case, the safety functions of the considered multistate systems composed of components having exponential safety functions are determined. Applications of the proposed multistate system safety models to the evaluation and prediction of the safty characteristics of the oil piping transportation system is presented as well.
7
Content available remote Wykorzystanie techniki RFID do ograniczania ryzyka użytkowania maszyn
PL
W artykule przedstawiono zagadnienia wykorzystania techniki identyfikacji za pomocą częstotliwości radiowych (ang. Radio Frequency IDentification – RFID) do zapewniania bezpieczeństwa użytkowania maszyn. Z technicznego punktu widzenia zastosowanie systemu RFID do realizacji funkcji bezpieczeństwa jest możliwe, lecz nie wszystkie rozwiązania pozwolą spełnić wymagania bezpieczeństwa funkcjonalnego na odpowiednim poziomie nienaruszalności bezpieczeństwa SIL (lub poziomie zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa PL). Jest to spowodowane niektórymi istotnymi wadami techniki RFID w zastosowaniach związanych z bezpieczeństwem.
EN
The paper presents the questions of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology application to safety of machinery. From the technical point of view the application of RFID system for safety function is possible, but not all solutions can satisfy functional safety requirements on the suitable safety integrity level SIL (or performance level PL). It is caused by certain important disadvantages of RFID technology applied as safety measures.
8
Content available Complex technical systems safety prediction
EN
There are presented general safety analytical models of complex multistate technical systems related to their operation processes. They are the integrated general models of complex technical systems, linking their multistate safety models and their operation processes models and considering variable at the different operation states safety structures and their components safety parameters. The conditional safety functions at the system particular operation states and independent of the system particular operation states the unconditional safety function and the risk function of the complex technical systems are defined. These joint models of the safety and the variable in time system operation processes are constructed for multistate series, parallel, “m out of n”, consecutive “m out of n: F”, series-parallel, parallel-series, series-“m out of k”, “mi out of li”-series, series-consecutive “m out of k: F” and consecutive “mi out of li: F”-series systems. The joint models are applied to determining safety characteristics of these systems related to their varying in time safety structures and their components safety characteristics. Under the assumption that the considered systems are exponential, the unconditional safety functions of these systems are determined. The proposed models and methods are applied to the safety analysis, evaluation and prediction of the one subsystem of the port grain transportation system related to varying in time their operation processes, structures and components safety parameters.
EN
The joint general model of safety of complex technical systems in variable operation conditions linking a semimarkov modeling of the system operation processes with a multi-state approach to system safety analysis and linear programming are applied in maritime transport to safety and risk optimization of a ferry technical system.
EN
Basic safety structures of multi-state systems of components with degrading safety states related to their variable operation conditions are defined. For these systems the conditional and unconditional multi-state safety functions are determined. A semi-markov process for the considered systems operation modelling is applied. Further, the paper offers an approach to the solution of a practically important problem of linking the multi-state systems safety models and the systems operation processes models. Theoretical definitions and results are illustrated by the example of their application in the safety and risk evaluation of the Stena Baltica ferry operating at the Baltic Sea. The ferry transportation system has been considered in varying in time operation conditions. The system safety structure and its components safety functions were changing in variable operation conditions.
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