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1
Content available Measurement of control power in corporate networks
EN
This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods for measuring indirect control in complex corporate shareholding networks. The methods use power indices to estimate the direct and indirect control in shareholding structures. Some of these methods only estimate the control power of investors (firms without shareholdings), and only a few measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks (which means investors and stock companies). None of them takes measuring the importance of mutual connections (edges in the networks) into consideration; thus we focus in particular on an extension of these methods in this paper to measure both the control-power of the firms involved in complex shareholding structures (represented by nodes in networks) and the importance (power) of linkages between the firms as elements of a whole corporate shareholding network. More precisely, we apply our approaches to a theoretical example of a corporate network. Moreover, we continue the considerations about reasonable properties for indirect control measurement. Some ideas of new properties are proposed. The paper also provides a brief review of the literature concerning the topic.
EN
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of dynamic programming. We survey the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices and point out how these approaches carry over to related power indices. Within a unified framework, we present new efficient algorithms for the Public Good index and a recently proposed power index based on minimal winning coalitions of the smallest size, as well as a very first method for computing the Johnston indices for weighted voting games efficiently. We introduce a software package providing fast C++ implementations of all the power indices mentioned in this article, discuss computing times, as well as storage requirements.
EN
This paper is devoted to the concept of indirect control in corporate shareholding networks. This topic is important in financial economics. Since shareholding size does not actually reflect an investor’s power-control in corporate shareholding networks, diverse approaches to measuring the control-power of investors has been proposed. We focus in particular on a game-theoretical approach; specifically the model of Denti and Prati (2001) and its implementation to control sharing analysis and simulation in shareholding networks thanks to the computer program „Control Sharing Simulation”.
4
Content available Indirect control and power
EN
To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex prob-lem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure.
5
Content available On Public Values and Power Indices
EN
In this paper, we analyze some values and power indices from a different point of view that are well-defined in the social context where the goods are public. In particular, we consider the Public Good index (Holler, 1982), the Public Good value (Holler and Li, 1995), the Public Help index (Bertini et al., 2008), the König and Bräuninger index (1998) also called the Zipke index (Nevison et al., 1978), and the Rae index (1969). The aims of this paper are: to propose an extension of the Public Help index to cooperative games; to introduce a new power index with its extension to a game value; and to provide some characterizations of the new index and values.
EN
A method of determination of power indices for a three-phase induction motor with a phase-wound rotor through particular losses components in the function of their integral and instantaneous values is developed. The adequacy of the method is confirmed. The prospect of its use is grounded for the situation when the state of structural assemblies and motor elements changes in the process of long-term operation and after repair.
PL
Przedstawiona została metoda określenia wskaźników trójfazowego silnika indukcyjnego z wirnikiem uzwojonym poprzez poszczególne składniki strat w funkcji ich integralnych i chwilowych wartości. Odpowiedniość metody została potwierdzona. Perspektywa stosowania tej metody oparta jest ukierunkowana na sytuacje kiedy konstrukcyjny montaż i elementy silnika zmieniły się w procesie długotrwałego działania oraz po remoncie. (Określenie wskaźników mocy dla trójfazowego silnika indukcyjnego z uzwojonym wirnikiem poprzez poszczególne składniki strat).
7
Content available remote National and ideological influence in the European Parliament
EN
In this paper we address the following question: Taking as decisional units national chapters of European political parties, is there a difference between a priori voting power of national groups in the case of "national" coordination of voting and in the case of "partisan" coordination of voting? By coordination of voting we mean two step process: in the first step there is an internal voting in the groups of units (national or partisan), in the second step there is a voting of aggregated groups (European political parties or national representations) in the EP. In both cases the voting has an ideological dimension (elementary unit is a party group), difference is only in dimension of aggregation (European parties versus national representations). Power indices methodology is used to evaluate voting power of national party groups in the cases of partisan and national coordination of voting behaviour.
PL
W pracy przedstawiono wyniki badań w których przetestowano opracowaną metodykę do określenia zużycia ciepła w ogrzewanym tunelu foliowym. W analizie teoretycznej uwzględniono strumienie ciepła wymieniane drogą konwekcji i radiacji między wnętrzem obiektu a osłoną oraz między osłoną a otoczeniem. Uzyskane na drodze teoretycznej wyniki zweryfikowano w tunelu doświadczalnym. Znaleziono zależność pozwalającą określić temperaturę osłony w funkcji łatwo mierzalnych parametrów klimatu.
EN
The paper describes results of the studies in which a developed methodology of determining heat consumption in the heated foil tunnel was tested. The theoretical analysis was performed taking into account heat fluxes exchanged due to convection and radiation between the interior of the facility and the cover and between the cover and the surrounding atmosphere. The results obtained in the theoretical way were verified in the experimental tunnel. A relation was found, allowing to determine the temperature of the cover as a function of easily measurable climate parameters.
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