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1

Koncepcje planowania operacji na początku XXI wieku

Paździorek P.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2015

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nr 4(101)

12-46

PL

Analitycy i teoretycy wojskowi, a przede wszystkim dowódcy i sztaby działający w obszarze sztuki operacyjnej poszukują nowych koncepcyjnych narzędzi planistycznych, współmiernych do dzisiejszych wymagań. Panuje powszechny osąd, że stosowanie starych analogii wieku industrialnego nie jest w stanie sprostać intelektualnej gimnastyce pożądanej w przypadku zadań XXI wieku. Celem artykułu jest zaprezentowanie wniosków z analiz szeregu innowacyjnych rozwiązań rozwijanych i wprowadzanych w okresie ostatnich dwóch dekad, które miały być antidotum na niepowodzenia wojsk w osiągnięciu celów operacyjnych i strategicznych. Są wśród nich takie koncepcje jak koncepcja natychmiastowych decydujących działań (Rapid Decise Operations RDO), mająca usprawniać planowanie, którą ostatecznie podważono i odrzucono. Koncepcja przedstawiana w doktrynach działań połączonych gdzie wprowadzono planowanie oparte na skutkach (Effect-based-planning EBP) w odniesieniu do działań opartych na skutkach (Effect-based-operations EBO). Artykuł analizuje również aspekty związane z koncepcją ocen sieci operacyjnej (Operational net Assessment ONA) oraz systemową analizą systemów (System-of-Systems Analysis SoSA). Początkowo okrzyknięte jako nowoczesne narzędzia sztuki operacyjnej i planowania, wciąż stanowią temat dyskusji i polemik co do zasadności ich wykorzystania.

EN

Analysis, military theorists and commanders and staffs acting in the area of operations seek new conceptual planning tools, commensurate with today's requirements. There is widespread judgment that the old analogy of the industrial age is unable to meet the intellectual gymnastic required for the 21st century. This article tries to analyse a range of innovative concepts developed and implemented over the last two decades, with were to be an antidote to the failure to achieve operational and strategic objectives. They include concepts such as the concept of Rapid decisive Operations (RDO) having improved planning, which ultimately has been refuted and rejected. The concept presented in the doctrines of joint operations introduced Effect-based-planning (EBP) for Effect-based-operations (EBO). This article also analyses aspects relating to the Operational Net Assessment (ONA) and System-of-Systems Analysis(Sosa). Initially hailed as modern tools in operational planning, they still remain the subject of discussion and polemics addressing the legitymacy of their use.

2

Kształcenie ustawiczne oficerów a myślenie operacyjne

Czupryński A.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2007

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nr 3(68)

243-265

EN

In order to accomplish a high degree of training to meet the demands of our Armed Forces today we need to examine our education system so as to ensure it prepares our personnel not just with knowledge but also with "know how" (abilities). Continuous changes in an educational system brings about reorganization but they may lose the standards of education required of a professional body. If the professional and specialist education is to be improved and developed during the postgraduate studies and courses, then on the lower levels of leadership, when the professional knowledge, abilities and activities are required, it is going to be inadequate to demands. I f we think about continued education of an officer being compatible with European and national standards, then officer should be trained to execute their main functions during the studies at first and second level. Thus the system of knowledge should be rationally worked out for each individual level of education for its goal to be achieved. It requires public discussion on: who, how and when to educate in order to gain the effectiveness and efficiency to meet the expectations of the institution.

3

Myślenie a sztuka wojenna

Czupryński A.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2006

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nr 1(62)

110-125

EN

The article is a synthesis of a research project entitled "Development Determinants of the Art of War. The author highlights conditions of operational thinking in human development and its influence on the development of the art of war. Operational thinking is an ability required on every command level in the process of armed fighting organisation and conducting, in the decision making process situations of high uncertainty. Developing operational thinking is not a mechanical remembering but generating creative and productive thinking. Thus operational thinking is an intellectual ability of problem perception and creative solving. In the art of war it gains a special importance because situations to be solved are determined with incomplete data which demands defining the problem, stating conditions of solving and selecting one of many solutions taking the aim into consideration. The effectiveness of operational thinking is developed in the process of institutionalised education and during problem solving social activity. In the art of war, operational thinking is determined by the expected aim and not by the current situation conditions. Its idea is to perceive dependencies that create changes in a particular problem situation and their influence on the expected result of the activity. Operational thinking in the art of war is determined by a creative approach towards problem solving in the aspect of the expected aim.

4

Myślenie i działanie operacyjne w niemieckich siłach zbrojnych

Wiatr M.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2001

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nr 2(43)

151-166

EN

The development of operational thinking in German armed forces is connected with Field Marshall H, von Moltke, commonly recognised as the modern operations creator. Since his time it has been said about forces, time and space as operational factors determining all operational activities. German operational thinking, the approach to operation concept and thus the way to wage war has been greatly influenced by Germany's central location in Europe and resulting from it subjective feeling of encircling and threat from stronger neighbours. In such a situation, German military men tended to develop principles that would balance these inconveniences. Therefore German operational thinking concentrated on concepts anabling weaker in quantity German Forces to achieve swiftly operational developments and so to defeat enemy successively and to face their allies with an accomplished fact. Therefore an essential role was played by manoeuvres on external lines, the speed of operations, gravity centre and destruction strategy. The analysis of German ideas to wage operations allows to find the following centre idea of operating German forces in time and space: fast incursion into enemy group due to forces concentration in gravity centre and to use the area being aware of the risk, then going to the flanks, most of all to the rears, cutting connection lines, closing the encirclement and finally destroying the enemy.