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1

Effective learning from safety events reporting takes two: getting to the root & just culture

Carrera-Arce M.

TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation

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2021

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Vol. 15 No. 4

775--780

EN

SAFEMODE is an EU-funded project under the Horizon 2020 programme. The project brings together experience from the whole safety value chain including manufacturers, service providers, regulators, academia, and small-medium enterprises. This paper focuses on two core aspects the project is addressing: 1) the systematic collection, analysis, and categorization of Human Factors (HF) data from maritime and aviation safety events, and 2) the development of a Just Culture framework for maritime to encourage reporting of safety events and learning from them, and at which respondents feel they are treated in a fair and just manner when reporting. Learning from safety events is only possible if root causes of accidents and incidents are properly and systematically identified, analysed, and categorized, and reporters know that reporting is a “safe” and beneficial practice. The implementation of these two outcomes as part of the institutionalization strategy of the project includes recommendations to industry guidance and practice and proposals to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

2

Maritime safety culture as a condition for sustainable shipping

Pyć Dorota

Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie

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2020

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nr 61 (133)

55--61

EN

This paper addresses the importance of the development of maritime safety culture, in terms of sustainable shipping through continuous improvement of the safety management system (SMS) that enables a shipping company’s personnel to effectively implement the company’s safety and environmental policy. The main aim of the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International Safety Management Code – ISM Code), which was adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and became mandatory, by virtue of its entry into force on the 1st of July 1998, in SOLAS Chapter IX on the Management for Safe Operation of Ships, is to provide an international standard for the safe management and operation of ships as well as pollution prevention. Thus, compliance with the ISM Code and its effective enforcement is necessary to ensure adequate standards of safety and pollution prevention. The purpose of this paper is to show that the internationally unified legal measures that have been developed under the IMO in the ISM Code are an instrumental consequence of maritime safety values, and allow them to be achieved in practice. The result of this research is the justification of the thesis concerning the need to create a safety culture as a condition for sustainable shipping, including the safe operation of ships in the environment.

3

The role of the master in improving safety culture onboard ships

Bielić T., Predovan D., Čulin J.

TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation

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2017

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Vol. 11, no. 1

121--124

EN

As a complex socio-technical system marine transportation is open to risks. Due to the efforts of international organisations, flag and port administrations, classification societies and ship-owners the safety record has steadily improved. However, marine accidents resulting from inadequate safety culture still occur. In this paper examples of recent accidents related to different dimensions of safety culture are provided. The role of the master in achieving an enhanced safety is emphasised.

4

International safety management – safety management systems and the challenges of changing a culture

Hanchrow G.

TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation

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2017

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Vol. 11, no. 1

125--131

EN

Over the past generation, the ISM code has brought forth tremendous opportunities to investigate and enhance the human factor in shipping through the implementation of Safety Management Systems. One of the critical factors to this implementation has been mandatory compliance and a requirement for obtaining a Document of Compliance (DOC) for vessels operating globally or at least internationally. A primary objective of these systems is to maintain them as “living” or “dynamic” systems that are always evolving. As the ISM code has evolved, there have been instances where large organizations have opted to maintain a voluntary DOC from their respective class society. This has been accomplished with a large human factor element as typically an organizational culture does not always accept change readily especially if there is not a legal requirement to do so. In other words, when considering maritime training is it possible that organizations may represent cultural challenges? The intent of this paper will be to research large maritime operations that have opted for a document of compliance voluntarily and compare them to similar organizations that have been mandated by international law to do the same. The result should be to gain insight into the human factors that must contribute to a culture change in the organization for the purposes of a legal requirement versus the human factors that contribute to a voluntary establishment of a safety management system. This analysis will include both the executive decision making that designs a system implementation and the operational sector that must execute its implementation. All success and failures of education and training can be determined by the outcome. Did the training achieve its goal? Or has the education prepared the students to embrace a new idea in conjunction with a company goal or a new regulatory scheme? In qualifying the goal of a successful ISM integration by examining both mandatory and voluntary ISM implementation in large maritime operations, specifically ferry systems, hopefully we can learn from the various factors that have gone into each.

5

Human factor - the weakest link of security system

Chojnowska M., Królikowska I.

Annual of Navigation

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2013

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No. 20

5--24

EN

The authors of the following article reveal what happens with so-called ‘human factor’ on board during routine work as well as in life-threatening situations. They analyze two groups of variables, which determine safe behaviors: subjective (emotional, temperamental, sense of control, vocational experiences, individual experiences in emergencies) and social conditioning (organizational culture of workplace, safety culture). They point out, that in todays’ maritime education the analysis of human behaviors on board and broadening of ideals of maritime safety culture, are being devoted not enough attention. No safety system, even the most advanced one in respect of procedures, law, technology or corporeality can reduce all the possibilities of making a mistake by a human being. Therefore the authors put forward a thesis that it is a human factor that is the weakest link of security system. Based on this theory future trainings of mariners should focus on reduction of human factor in the process of making mistakes.

PL

W artykule przedstawiono znaczenie tak zwanego czynnika ludzkiego w trakcie rutynowej podróży statku oraz w sytuacjach zagrożenia życia. Analizie poddano dwie grupy zmiennych, które określają bezpieczne zachowania: subiektywne (emocje, temperament, zmysły, doświadczenie zawodowe, indywidualne doświadczenia wyniesione z sytuacji krytycznych) i uwarunkowania społeczne (kultura organizacyjna oraz kultura bezpieczeństwa). Zwrócono uwagę na niedocenianie we współczesnym szkolnictwie morskim analizy ludzkich zachowań oraz potrzeby upowszechniania ideałów morskiej kultury bezpieczeństwa. Żaden system bezpieczeństwa, nawet najbardziej zaawansowany pod względem proceduralnym, prawnym, technologicznym czy organizacyjnym, wciąż nie potrafi wyeliminować ryzyka popełniania błędu przez człowieka. Dlatego autorki wysuwają tezę, że czynnik ludzki jest nadal najsłabszym ogniwem systemu bezpieczeństwa. Opierając się na takim założeniu, proponują, by podczas szkolenia marynarzy w większej mierze uczyć, jak redukować błędy czynnika ludzkiego.