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EN
The probabilistic general model of critical infrastructure accident consequences consists of three particular models of semi-Markov processes such as: the process of initiating events generated by a critical infrastructure accident, the process of environmental threats coming from released chemicals that are a result of initiating events and the process of environmental degradation as a result of environmental threats. The general model of critical infrastructure accident consequences and procedure of its application to the maritime transport critical infrastructure understood as a network of ships operating at the sea waters is presented in the research. By using the statistical data coming from sea accidents reports, the general model is applied to the identification and prediction of the environmental degradation associated with ship accidents and chemical releases within the Baltic Sea. Moreover, the proposed model is applied to estimate the environmental losses associated with these accidents and the environmental degradation in the neighborhood area.
EN
This paper is both a summarization and extension of [6] and [7], where a stochastic model of interacting operations carried out in a generic Baltic Sea Region port was proposed and analyzed. Each operation involves a number of possible unwanted events (critical incidents) whose instances occur randomly and can cause instances of other events affecting this or other operations. This can lead to a cause-effect chain of events affecting one or multiple operations. The model presented in [6] is somewhat complex, therefore it was downgraded to a simpler, application-oriented version demonstrated in [7], where an algorithm computing the risks of critical incidents is constructed and then applied to a real-life example. The current paper, apart from presenting a method of computing the risks of critical incidents, occurring by themselves or resulting from the cascade effect, also features a method of root-cause analysis of such incidents. First, the formulas for the root-cause probabilities are derived, where such a probability quantifies the likelihood that a critical incident occurring in step h of a cascade was caused by another incident that initiated this cascade. Second, an algorithm computing the root-cause probabilities, based on the derived formulas, is constructed. This algorithm is illustrated by its application to the example given in [7]. The presented results can be used as a tool for fault propagation analysis and fault diagnosis applied not only to a port environment, but to any complex industrial system.
3
Content available Probabilistic safety assessment of fire hazards
EN
An as far as possible exhaustive conceptual approach has been developed to systematically address all kinds of internal and external hazards and their potential combinations in Level 1 PSA in a comprehensive manner. The approach assumes a comprehensive generic compilation of hazards being available. By means of site-specific screening process it is decided which hazards need to be analysed in detail by means of probabilistic methods. The requested extension of the plant model is carried out by a systematic approach for those hazards to be analysed in detail. For this purpose, lists of hazard relevant structures, systems and components and their failure dependencies according to the hazards are derived. The comprehensive extension of Level 1 PSA by hazards is demonstrated at the example of plant internal fires.
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