Wyniki wyszukiwania - BazTech

1

Violation of territorial integrity as a tool for waging long-term hybrid warfare (against the backdrop of power games in the South Caucasus region)

Iskandarov Khayal Ibrahim, Gawliczek Piotr, Soboń Andrzej

Security and Defence Quarterly

|

2024

|

Vol. 45, No. 1

1--17

EN

This paper seeks to examine the violation of territorial integrity as a stage of hybrid warfare. Grounded in the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism, this study analyses nations’ foreign policy strategies considering both global and domestic factors. Employing primarily qualitative research, this study concentrates on a case study of the South Caucasus region. Against the backdrop of the war which broke out in the early 2022 between Russia and Ukraine, the preservation of territorial integrity emerges as an imperative aspect of national security policy. Despite the longstanding recognition of territorial integrity as a fundamental tenet of international law over the centuries, this war has galvanised all nations with regard to the violation of territorial integrity. The paper delineates the principles of territorial integrity vis-à-vis the national security of the South Caucasus countries, substantiating the assertion that violation of the territorial integrity of the particular countries in this region serves the interests of external actors, either directly or indirectly, and is employed as a strategic tool in the pursuit of protracted hybrid warfare.

2

The digital future of information. Determinants of the use of open source intelligence

Lipińska Agnieszka

Cybersecurity and Law

|

2024

|

Vol. 11 (1)

271--280

EN

Cyberspace as a place of information acquisition is in constant flux. Recognizing the threats and challenges associated with it is one of the key elements influencing national security. Knowledge of the current conditions affecting information security and the possibility of obtaining information is an essential element of the work of the institutions forming the state security system. This article will outline the factors affecting the future of information operation and distribution in the digital world25confirming the increased need for OSINT in state institutions, especially in the face of new challenges. These include: hacktivism, the dissemination of specialized tools and technologies for data acquisition and analysis among the network user community, hybrid and diplomatic-propaganda activities carried out in the info-sphere by nation states. The article will also provide a forecast of the development of cyberspace in the context of future OSINT activities.

PL

Cyberprzestrzeń jako miejsce pozyskiwania informacji podlega ciągłym przemianom. Rozpoznawanie związanych z nią zagrożeń i wyzwań stanowi jeden z elementów wpły-wających na bezpieczeństwo narodowe. Znajomość aktualnych uwarunkowań wpły-wających na bezpieczeństwa informacji i możliwości ich uzyskania stanowi niezbędny element pracy instytucji tworzących system bezpieczeństwa państwa. W niniejszym artykule przedstawiono czynniki wpływające na przyszłość funkcjonowania i dystry¬bucji informacji w świecie cyfrowym potwierdzające wzrost konieczności stosowania OSINT w instytucjach państwowych, szczególnie w obliczu nowych wyzwań. Należą do nich: haktywizm, upowszechnienie wśród użytkowników sieci specjalistycznych narzędzi i technologii do pozyskiwania i analizy danych, działania hybrydowe i dyplomatyczno-pro-pagandowe prowadzone w infosferze przez państwa narodowe. Ponadto przedstawiono prognozę rozwoju cyberprzestrzeni w kontekście przyszłych działań OSINT.

3

Introduction to Special Issue on Navigating NATO dynamics: Addressing various challenges in the international security environment

Chapman Bert, Gryz Jarosław, Zombanakis George

Security and Defence Quarterly

|

2023

|

Vol. 44, No. 4

1--4

4

Defensive lawfare and deterrence: Analysis of Latvia’s approach to legal bases in the context of hybrid warfare (2014-2022)

Bodnieks Valerijs

Security and Defence Quarterly

|

2023

|

Vol. 42, No. 2

55--67

EN

Following the ‘hybrid form’ of Russian aggression in Ukraine that emerged in 2014, the period after February 24th, 2022 is referred to as the ‘new reality’. Hence, the question that needs to be addressed is how to deter and prevent Russian aggression of this kind. The national legal framework against the aggressor is a part of the deterrence policy and can be construed as defensive lawfare. Focusing on Latvia, the aim of the paper is to analyse defensive lawfare and deterrence in the context of hybrid warfare. The following research question has been identified: What is Latvia’s approach to establishing defensive lawfare in terms of hybrid warfare? For the empirical analysis, the chronological framework has been set from 2014 to 2022. To complete the empirical analysis of the present paper, both qualitative and quantitative research has been implemented comprising document analysis and semi-structured interviews, as well as content analysis, respectively. The improvement of a regulatory base and the development of deterrence, whilst using regulatory acts, is an element of deterrence and a way to act legally. The law can be used as a weapon. Lawfare, a concept with three definitions, has two forms: defensive a nd offensive. Latvia’s legal base includes a regulation to overcome hybrid threats and to implement a broad-spectrum of defence measures. Latvia’s regulatory framework is designed for defence purposes, whilst also being a way of promoting deterrence. Decision makers must be able to manoeuvre with the powers assigned to them.

5

Protection of Polish critical infrastructure (CI) against air threats

Piekarski Michał, Wojtasik Karolina

Security and Defence Quarterly

|

2022

|

Vol. 39, No. 3

76--87

EN

The goal of this paper is to analyse challenges related to protecting Polish critical infrastructure (CI) against air threats, such as UAVs, as a case study in a wider discussion on protection of critical infrastructure worldwide. The Polish legal definition of critical infrastructure and laws regarding the protection of such facilities are explained in the article in order to provide context. A review of scientific literature and open-source analysis of known air attacks on CI and the capabilities of air platforms are also included, with special attention being paid to unmanned systems. The threats themselves have been divided into two groups of scenarios: peacetime threats and crisis situations that have hybrid wartime scenarios. Depending on the scenario, the different capabilities of actors must be taken into account. Peacetime air threats include the use of commercially available drones. Those devices have limited capabilities, in terms of weaponisation, due to the limited weight of their cargo and the flight range. More advanced devices, including custom–built drones and military systems, can be supplied and used by state actors. Therefore, there are different requirements regarding protection systems. In peacetime, anti-drone systems are certainly recommended due to their capabilities and safety of use for bystanders. In more dangerous scenarios, typical military systems, including Very Short-Range Air Defence, Short-Range Air Defence and Medium Range Air Defence systems have to be employed or dedicated kinetic counter-drone systems deployed.

6

Economic coercion as a means of hybrid warfare: The South Caucasus as a focal poin

Iskandarov Khayal, Gawliczek Piotr

Security and Defence Quarterly

|

2022

|

Vol. 40, No. 4

47--57

EN

The rapidly changing security environment has brought a plethora of non-military measures to the fore. These measures have completely changed the nature of hostilities by giving them a hybrid character. With regard to the South Caucasus region, the chasm among the political courses pursued by particular states makes the overall region more susceptible to diverse external threats of a political, economic, military and cultural nature. This paper focuses on the economic component of the hybrid warfare in the South Caucasus region. The issues are considered from a security point of view and not from an economic perspective. The vulnerabilities of particular nations in the region to economic coercion are highlighted in the paper and suggestions for improving them made. The authors underscore the regional unity in the South Caucasus as a prerequisite for eliminating or at least mitigating economic dependence and healing the “regional fracture” that has lasted for decades.

7

Territorial defense forces in hybrid warfare in the light of experience of the conflict in Ukraine

Horyń Wojciech, Tomasik Robert

Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces

|

2022

|

Vol. 54, No. 1(203)

81--95

EN

One of the experiences of the initial stages of the development of the eastern Ukraine conflict was the decision of the authorities in Kyiv to establish the so-called volunteer battalions (BTRO) and, among them, the territorial defense battalions. This article presents synthetically the tasks set for the above military formations. The authors consider which of the BTRO designed capabilities can be useful and effective against an aggressor using hybrid combat methods. They refer primarily to the course of events taking place during the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The authors discuss the capabilities of territorial defense subunits of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that can effectively defend against hybrid warfare. While looking to answer the question presented, materials and articles on current Russian war preparation and warfare concepts were analyzed. Attention was primarily paid to their practical application during the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. Subsequently, documents and publications related to the creation and tasks posed to the Territorial Defense Battalions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were examined. Assumptions concerning their organization and functioning were considered in the context of achieving the designed operational capabilities. The summary presents the conclusions of the compilation of the above work. They concern particularly the concept of territorial application of the discussed military formations, the possibility of their establishing cooperation with regular subunits of the Armed Forces to supplement their ability to perform tasks, as well as issues related to cooperation with local authorities and communities.

PL

Jednym z doświadczeń początkowych faz rozwoju konfliktu na wschodniej Ukrainie była decyzja władz w Kijowie o powołaniu tzw. batalionów ochotniczych (BTRO), a wśród nich batalionów obrony terytorialnej. Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia w sposób syntetyczny zadania stawiane wobec powyższych formacji militarnych. Autorzy rozważają, które z projektowanych zdolności BTRO mogą być przydatne i skuteczne wobec agresora stosującego hybrydowe metody walki. Odwołują się przy tym przede wszystkim do przebiegu wydarzeń mających miejsce w czasie konfliktu we Wschodniej Ukrainie i podczas aneksji półwyspu krymskiego. Autorzy rozważają jakie zdolności pododdziałów obrony terytorialnej Sił Zbrojnych Ukrainy mogą być skuteczne w obronie przed hybrydowym sposobem prowadzenia wojny. Szukając odpowiedzi na przedstawione pytanie poddano analizie materiały i artykuły dotyczące aktualnych rosyjskich koncepcji przygotowania i prowadzenia wojny. W szczególności zwrócono uwagę na praktyczne ich zastosowanie podczas trwającego konfliktu na wschodzie Ukrainy i w czasie aneksji Krymu. Następnie zbadano dokumenty i publikacje związane z utworzeniem i zadaniami stawianymi wobec batalionów obrony terytorialnej Sił Zbrojnych Ukrainy. Rozważano założenia dotyczące ich organizacji i funkcjonowania w kontekście możliwości osiągnięcia projektowanych zdolności do działania. W podsumowaniu przedstawiono wnioski z zestawienia powyższych prac. Odnoszą się one w szczególności do: koncepcji terytorialnego zastosowania omawianych formacji wojskowych, możliwości nawiązania przez nie współdziałania z regularnymi pododdziałami Sił Zbrojnych w celu uzupełnienia ich zdolności do wykonywania zadań, a także do zagadnień związanych ze współpracą z lokalnymi władzami i społecznościami.

8

Rosyjski mechanizm destabilizacji jako współczynnik strategii walki – wybrane aspekty

Kwiatkowski Wojciech

Zeszyty Naukowe SGSP / Szkoła Główna Służby Pożarniczej

|

2021

|

Nr 79 (tom 3)

125--138

PL

Dążenia do ingerowania państwa „X” w politykę wewnętrzną państwa „Y” i próby wpływania na nastroje jego ludności nie są zjawiskiem nowym. Poszczególne organizmy państwowe starają się umocnić swój przekaz i uskutecznić go przy wykorzystaniu mechanizmów destabilizacji. Ich zakres oraz wymiar bywa bardzo zróżnicowany. Niezwykle szerokie spektrum w tej dziedzinie można przypisać Federacji Rosyjskiej. Przygotowany artykuł ma umożliwić przegląd wybranych aspektów mechanizmu używanych przez Rosjan celem prowadzenia działań destabilizacyjnych. Przedstawione zostały przykłady z lat 2014–2020, kiedy to stosowane przez Kreml zabiegi socjotechniczne miały bardzo intensywny charakter. Przybliżono zatem rosyjską działalność w postaci m.in. posługiwania się elementami wojny hybrydowej, jak chociażby szerzenie dezinformacji czy używanie środków w obszarze fake newsów. Ponadto dotknięto tematu działań wymierzonych w jedność i integralność terytorialną państw. Niniejszy artykuł w głównej mierze traktuje o problemie w ujęciu polskim, ale poruszono także zagadnienia o wymiarze międzynarodowym. Zaprezentowano przykłady działalności wymierzonej tak w państwo i społeczeństwo polskie, jak również innych krajów. Poznanie przytoczonych wymiarów mechanizmu powinno uwrażliwić odbiorców na treść udostępnianych informacji i zmusić ich do refleksji nad źródłem transmisji oraz autentycznością przekazu.

EN

The efforts to interfere with state «X» in the internal policy of state «Y» and attempts to influence the mood of its population are not a new phenomenon. Individual state organisms endeavour to strengthen their message and make it effective by using the mechanisms of destabilization. Their scope and size can be highly diversified. The extremely broad spectrum in this area can be attributed to the Russian Federation. The article is intended to provide an overview of selected aspects of the mechanism used by the Russians in order to carry out destabilization activities. Examples from the years 2014–2020 are presented, which was a time when social engineering measures used by the Kremlin were of a very intensive nature. The article shows the Russian activities in the form of, inter alia, the application of hybrid warfare elements, such as dissemination of disinformation, or using fake news measures. Further, the subject of actions aimed at the unity and territorial integrity of states has been touched upon. This article deals primarily with the problem perceived from the Polish perspective, but also addresses issues of an international dimension. Examples were presented of activities aimed at both the Polish state and society and at other countries. Exploring these dimensions of the mechanism should sensitise the public to the content of the information provided and make them reflect on the source of the transmission and the authenticity of the message.

9

Lawfare as part of hybrid wars: The experience of Ukraine in conflict with Russian Federation

Tropin Zakhar

Security and Defence Quarterly

|

2021

|

Vol. 33, No. 1

15--29

EN

The main objective of the article is to prove the need for the state to have a centralised legal strategy to ensure the protection of state interests on an international level during a hybrid conflict. Centralisation of control and the planning and implementation of legal actions on an international level are core elements of such a strategy, especially for actions under the jurisdiction of international institutions. This article provides an analysis of treaties and of the practice of adjudication in Ukraine during the conflict with the Russian Federation. The findings of the study show that the legal dimension of hybrid conflict has some sub-levels: legal actions of states in hybrid conflicts taken at interstate level; the level of enterprises controlled by the state; and the private level. The practice of Ukraine shows that the exercising of a multilevel legal encounter during a hybrid war faces a number of problems including the intersection of actions (sometimes even direct conflict), even among authorities involved in the legal protection of state interests; and problems with collecting and analysing the information necessary to protect state interests in the legal dimension; state authorities that are not directly involved in a legal encounter may exercise actions which will complicate the legal position of the state. One of the first steps taken by the state in a hybrid conflict is, therefore, to create special authority or entrust an existing one with the coordination of the functions of lawfare. The next step of such an authority is the strategic "programming" of the opponent's legal actions with the aim of achieving an advantage in the legal dimension of a hybrid conflict.

10

The securitisation of hybrid warfare through practices within the Iran-Israel conflict - Israel's practices to securitize Hezbollah's Proxy War

Kaunert Christian, Wertman Ori

Security and Defence Quarterly

|

2020

|

Vol. 31, No. 4

99--114

EN

Iran has been waging a hybrid war against Israel since the Islamic revolution of 1979. In an era when conventional wars have given way to a different method, hybrid warfare, the main challenge facing states is how to deal with this new type of security threat. Thus, while states have previously faced security threats from regular enemy states’ armies, nowadays hybrid warfare in which non-state actors play a key role has become a widespread security threat that requires democratic states to use very different strategies and tactics to overcome it. Using securitisation theory, which explores how normal issues transform into security threats, this article analyses how the State of Israel has securitised Iranian hybrid warfare which has been mainly executed through its proxy terror organisations of Hezbollah. It does so by applying a revised version of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation framework, which focuses on security practices and is underpinned by an understanding of security as belonging to a continuum. The proxy terror organisations have moved towards the end point of the continuum, which is characterised by survival, existential threats, and militarisation, albeit without completely reaching the end point.

11

Small sea, big problems: chances and challenges of military security in Baltic region

Piekarski Michał

Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces

|

2020

|

Vol. 52, No. 3(197)

620--631

EN

The article aims to analyze the chances and challenges related to the military security of states surrounding the Baltic Sea. Notably, the problem of the protection of maritime traffic and other sea-related economic activities shall be described. Particular attention shall be given to possible scenarios of “hybrid warfare.” Based on possible threats characteristics, several aspects of changes in organizations and ways of employment of naval forces, border, and coast guard forces and special operations forces.

PL

Tematem artykułu jest analiza szans i wyzwań związanych z bezpieczeństwem militarnym państw otaczających Morze Bałtyckie. W szczególności opisano problem bezpieczeństwa transportu morskiego oraz innej działalności gospodarczej związanej z morzem. Szczególna uwaga została zwrócona na możliwe scenariusze „wojny hybrydowej” w tym regionie. W oparciu o możliwą charakterystykę zagrożeń istotnymi aspektami są postulowane zmiany w organizacji oraz sposobach wykorzystania sił morskich, formacji granicznych oraz wojsk specjalnych.

12

The strategy of waging hybrid warfare in the 21st century

Mitręga Adrian

Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Morskiego

|

2020

|

R. XIV

187--203

EN

Over the last decade, the concept of hybrid warfare has aroused great in-terest among the global community dealing with security issues, both military, and non-military. The specificity of hybrid warfare is that the fight is not for territories, but for the minds, and attitudes of citizens of other countries, and the means of combat are very sophisticated. Any hybrid war is based on a strategy that involves achievement victory by setting goals, overall plan and systematic impact on ene-my's vulnerabilities using a hybrid threat complex. In connection with the above, the aim of the article is to present the role of the strategy in waging hybrid war-fare, as well as in developing mechanisms to counteract hybrid threats.

PL

W ciągu ostatniej dekady koncepcja wojny hybrydowej wzbudziła duże za-interesowanie światowej społeczności zajmującej się problematyką bezpieczeń-stwa, zarówno militarnego, jak i pozamilitarnego. Specyfika wojny hybrydowej polega na tym, że walka nie toczy się o terytoria, ale o umysły i postawy obywateli innych państw, a środki walki są bardzo wyrafinowane. Każda wojna hybrydowa opiera się na strategii, która zakłada osiągnięcie zwycięstwa poprzez wyznaczanie celów, ogólny plan i systematyczne oddziaływanie na podatności wroga przy uży-ciu kompleksu zagrożeń hybrydowych. W związku z powyższym, celem artykułu jest przedstawienie roli jaką pełni strategia w prowadzeniu wojny hybrydowej, a także w opracowaniu mechanizmów przeciwdziałania zagrożeniom hybrydowym.

13

Influence of global security environment on collective security and defence science

Mitrovic Miroslav

Security and Defence Quarterly

|

2019

|

Vol. 24, No. 2

5--20

EN

Globalisation is a phenomenon which influences every aspect of contemporary life. Neo-liberal ideas lead to the multifunctional interdependence of geopolitics, the political economy, international relations, security, and defence issues. In the globalised world, many issues can be raised: Where are the roots of modern conflict? Who are the stakeholders in international relations? What are the dominant forms of contemporary conflicts? Do the forms of collective security fulfill the legitimacy of objectivity? What are the new challenges for modern defence science? Through the multidisciplinary approach, based on academic literature, as well scholars research papers, this work aims to contribute to the clarifying a rational approach to modern defence science in the contemporary, global security environment.

14

Hybridity – a ‘new’ method to accomplish dominance

Elak Leszek, Śliwa Zdzisław

Security and Defence Quarterly

|

2019

|

Vol. 23, No. 1

3--22

EN

The term ‘hybrid warfare’ proved to be very popular among academics, military thinkers and professionals leading to a variety of defi nitions and approaches. It was linked with the new generation concept popularised by Russian military thought. The essence of the hybridity is not new, as using a combination of military and non-military instruments is as old as mankind and is recognised but interpreted diff erently. The paper examines both the concept and its implementation based on case studies and theoretical considerations. It debates possible ways of using it to confront targeted nations by a combination of a variety of tools and approaches.

15

The conflict in Ukraine : a new-generation warfare

Sobczak K.

Studia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego

|

2018

|

R. 8, Nr 14

303--314

EN

The aim of this paper is to illustrate the underlying concepts and characteristics of hybrid warfare – a new type of modern warfare utilising unconventional methods and “proxy wars” which involve national minorities, terrorist groups and local communities. The paper also describes the current capabilities of states to engage in new warfare without declaring war while using all resources available, and identifies the advanced disinformation and propaganda mechanisms employed to achieve political objectives. The paper further provides a background to the outbreak of war in Ukraine by highlighting the causes and consequences of Russia’s preparing for and launching the invasion of a European country in contravention of all international laws and agreements. The subject is dealt with comprehensively, from the annexation of Crimea to the destabilisation of south-eastern Ukraine by separatist military groups.

PL

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie idei oraz charakterystyki nowego rodzaju konfliktu zbrojnego, jakim jest wojna hybrydowa ‒ wojna niekonwencjonalna, nowoczesna, toczona przy wykorzystaniu mniejszości narodowych, ugrupowań terrorystycznych czy lokalnej społeczności, tzw. „wojna zastępcza”. Przybliżono zdolności prowadzenia nowoczesnych działań wojennych bez ich oficjalnego wypowiedzenia przy wykorzystaniu wszelkich dostępnych środków oraz zwrócono uwagę na wykorzystywanie zaawansowanych mechanizmów dezinformacji i propagandy do osiągania zakładanych celów politycznych. Następnie przedstawiono genezę zarzewia konfliktu i wybuchu wojny na Ukrainie poprzez uwypuklenie przyczyn i następstw przygotowania i przeprowadzenia łamiącej wszelkie prawa i umowy międzynarodowe inwazji na europejski kraj, poczynając od zaanektowania Półwyspu Krymskiego poprzez destabilizację południowo-wschodniej części Ukrainy przy wykorzystaniu separatystycznych ugrupowań bojowych.

16

Hybridity : hallmarks of a new warfare

Elak L.

Studia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego

|

2018

|

R. 8, Nr 14

315--332

EN

The term ‘hybrid’, used in connotation with military domain, proved to be very popular at the beginning of the current century. It is linked with using other than military tools in combination with military pressure to influence security situation in other opposing nations. It is based on valid assumption that it is not necessary to use combat power in globalized world to impact other nation’s internal situation, which could lead to their partial or complete subordination.

PL

Termin „hybrydowy” używany w odniesieniu do domeny wojskowej okazał się bardzo popularny na początku obecnego stulecia. Związane jest to z wykorzystaniem innych niż wojskowe narzędzi w połączeniu z wojskową presją, aby wpłynąć na sytuację bezpieczeństwa w innych przeciwnych narodach. Opiera się na prawidłowym założeniu, że nie jest konieczne wykorzystywanie siły bojowej w zglobalizowanym świecie do wpływania na wewnętrzną sytuację innych narodów, co może prowadzić do ich częściowego lub całkowitego podporządkowania.

17

The Special Forces in the age of hybrid warfare

Podloch M.

Zeszyty Naukowe / Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych im. gen. T. Kościuszki

|

2017

|

Nr 2

48--58

EN

This article attempts to locate the Special Forces in the light of dynamic changes in the environment of national security caused by the situation in Ukraine. The author focuses attention on the issues related to the outline of the essence of activities referred to as “hybrid”, and the possibility of using the Special Forces’ potential in terms of identification and elimination of threats, being a tool of these activities. The analysis of the potential has been performed at two levels: reducing risks and countering threats.

18

Polish military security doctrine in the years 2004-2014 – selected aspects

Rybarczyk P.

Zeszyty Naukowe / Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych im. gen. T. Kościuszki

|

2017

|

Nr 2

59--73

EN

In view of today's physical threats, Poland has adopted a new security doctrine. This publication in its assumption intends to outline the thesis on the centralized management and command of the unified military structure, in the context of the systemic approach to our country defense strategy. The study contemplates the Russia's policy, aimed at strengthening its position of a global great power in terms of weakening ties within North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with a particular focus on the regional interests of each of its members. The presented concept of the contemporary army based on joint task forces, characterized by close co-operation of various types of forces and efficient logistics, managed by the modern chain of command, is the major development direction in the field of defense. It is of crucial importance to reorganize our military forces in correlation to the hybrid dimension of contemporary war conflicts.

19

Interinstitutional dimension concerning planning, training and force engagement as response to the hybrid war

Ioniţă D., Pînzariu S., Bârsan G., Raţiu A., Moşteanu D.

Zeszyty Naukowe / Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych im. gen. T. Kościuszki

|

2017

|

Nr 4

37--48

EN

The proliferation of risks and unconventional threats, especially the hybrid ones, requires the finding of integrated security solutions, both nationally and internationally. The beginning of the millennium reveals new ideas for conducting military conflicts. Thus, within the future confrontations characterized by a high degree of complexity, awareness of the need and development of some mechanisms necessary for the inter-institutional integration and the effects of the actions of all power tools, military and civilian, is a priority of major significance. In this regard, the present article presents some mechanisms, guidelines and methods that could lead to inter-institutional integration.

20

Definicje wojny hybrydowej I jej postrzeganie przez Rosjan

Gostomczyk B.

Wiedza Obronna

|

2017

|

nr 3-4

62--73

PL

W artykule przedstawiam dwie koncepcje rozumienia wojny hybrydowej – państw Zachodu i Rosji. Wskazuję na odmienne traktowanie wojny hybrydowej jako elementu działań wojennych, destrukcyjnych oddziaływań na systemy bezpieczeństwa państwowego czy dezinformacji. Uwarunkowane jest to geostrategiczną koncepcją polityki danego państwa, czy grupy państw.

EN

In this article I present two concepts of understanding the hybrid war – Western countries and Russia. I point to the different treatment of the hybrid war as part of warfare, the destructive impact on state security systems or disinformation. This is conditioned by the geostrategic concept of the policy of a given state or group of states.