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Wojsko Polskie w wydarzeniach poznańskich 1956 roku

Kajetanowicz J.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2006

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nr 3(64)A Numer specjalny

84-99

EN

The use of the Polish Army units to suppress the protests in Poznań was a surprise not only for the society but for the soldiers as well. The residents of Poznań had not anticipated that the authorities would use military units equipped with heavy armour. Therefore the appearance of a large number of tanks and armoured personnel carriers in the streets caused that the demonstration was quelled and the fighting areas were isolated. Apart from few groups of protesters, the resistance was quickly crushed due to the increasing advantage of the law enforcement forces. Military troops were not appropriately prepared to conduct this kind of tasks. Tackling groups of protesters, liquidating points of fire in buildings, dispersing crowds were not included in the training programmes. It was fully confirmed during the first hours of the events when expected successes were not reached. Later effective methods were applied that allowed dispersing the crowds and swift finish of the fire exchange. Systematic increase of the number of military units directed to Poznań resulted mainly from the fear that the protest and armed groups would spread outside the city. According to the military command, it was confirmed in attacks on police stations after which the protesters gained a lot of guns and ammunition. It was also essential to liquidate the points of fire which not only posed a threat to the troops but to the residents themselves who were the victims of random shoot-out. The introduction of the Polish Army troops against civilians had a precedence character which in future served the Polish People’s Republic authorities to copy these checked solutions. It was confirmed by the events in December 1970 and later by martial law in 1982, the final although late effect of which was the collapse of the totalitarian power and the democratisation of social-political life in Poland.

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Represje wobec zbuntowanego miasta : śledztwa i procesy

Białecki K.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2006

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nr 3(64)A Numer specjalny

104-112

EN

A gloomy announcement of repressions that the residents of rebellious Poznań could anticipate was the threat voiced by then Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz on 29th June. He said that “he who raises their hand against people’s state, shall have that hand cut off”. On the next day, Edward Gierek, one of the First Secretaries of the Polish United Workers’ Party Central Committee also threatened severe punishment at the funeral of one of the victims. Remembering what ",Stalinist justice" looked like, the residents of Poznań feared the lots of the accused. A conviction dominated that innocent people would be prosecuted. The author presents several trials that were conducted. All verdicts passed in the “trial of three ” (Józef Foltynowicz and Jerzy Sroka - 4 years and 6 months imprisonment, Kazimierz Żurek- 4 years imprisonment), and in the,”trial of nine ” (Zenon Urbanek, Stanisław Jaworek, Ludwik Wierzbicki - 6 years imprisonment, Józef Pocztowy - 3 years imprisonment, Janusz Biegański - 2.5 years imprisonment, Łukasz Piotrowski -1.5 years imprisonment, Stanisław Kauffmann - 2 years in suspension for 5, moreover, Jan Suwart and Leon Olejniczak were acquitted) were significantly lower than expected. The judges deliberately withdrew from harsh regulations of the Decree from 1946. It is worth mentioning that in the case of the “trial of ten ”, the judge first resumed the trial in order to examine new witnesses, next adjourned and finally dropped it. Undoubtedly, the speech made by Władysław Gomułka on the 7th Plenary Session of the Polish United Workers’ Party Central Committee contributed to this because he stated that “the reasons of the Poznań tragedy and deep dissatisfaction of the whole political class resided in us, party leadership, the government”. Such an interpretation conducted by Person Number One in the country in fact closed any possibilities of continuing repression.

3

Prokuratura wojskowa wobec udziału armii w tłumieniu powstańczego zrywu

Marcinkowski W.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2006

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nr 3(64)A Numer specjalny

100-103

EN

The Military Prosecution Service structure and range of competence in 1956 were defined in the regulations of the PKWN (Polish Committee of National Liberation) decree of 23rd September 1944 “Law of the Court Martial and Military Prosecution Service”. Trial proceedings relating to crimes undergoing military jurisdiction that took place in the city of Poznan were to be conducted by Garrison Military Prosecution Service in Poznan. Due to charges of taking the protesters’ side and supporting them, the military prosecution bodies investigated the cases of 9 soldiers (including one captain, an orchestra conductor). Eight of these soldiers, except the mentioned above orchestra conductor, were temporarily detained. In reference to eight suspected soldiers, the criminal proceedings were discontinued in the course of investigation and the soldiers were discharged. There are some discrepancies referring to the time of releasing the last one, but certainly he was released before the end of November 1956. Only the case against one non-commissioned officer, a corporal went to a military court in Wroclaw where it was discontinued due to the lack of criminal charges.

4

Poznań : zbuntowane miasto

Pilarczyk Z.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2006

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nr 3(64)A Numer specjalny

62-70

EN

The history of Poznań, its development and forming the particular districts of the city are presented in the article. Then the author shows the Poznań’s plants’ workers leaving their factories and marching along the streets and in detail describes the route of the manifestation. The events in Poznań were the act of people driven to extremes caused by the fact that other instruments of a social dialogue had failed as the authorities did not want to talk. The author explains why his presentation is called “Poznań - the Rebellious City The facts and conclusions drawn in the article make one agree with the thesis that the so called “Black Thursday” was the expression of the city’s rebellion as almost one third of the city residents protested at the same time against the growing bending of the economic and social reality by the authorities. The city and its streets were the stage of the escalation from a silent march to the shoot-out. Could the outbreak in Poznań be anticipated? Certainly, yes. Both the local and central authorities showed a complete ignorance of mechanisms directing the society, did not take into consideration historical conditions shaping the new social face of Poznań's residents. The city rebellion expressed the lack of agreement to ignore its inhabitants.

5

Powstanie poznańskie 1956 r. i jego następstwa

Komorowski K.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2006

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nr 3(64)A Numer specjalny

72-83

EN

Poland, destroyed by war and occupation, was in the USSR area of influence due to the great superpowers’ decision. As a result of the Cold War between the Eastern Block and the Western world of democracy, military needs grew on the both sides of the Iron Curtain. Therefore, the Eastern Block developed a programme of massive industrialisation in the conditions of centrally planned order and distribution system. It was expressed in the Six - Year Plan. The speed of industrialisation, the scope of investments, harmful collectivisation of agriculture, elimination of private property exceeded the economic borders and resulted in negative social effects through the growth of prices, limiting the consumption and finally sudden deterioration of social moods causing, in consequence, the June outbreak in Poznań. In spite of the failure, the Poznań outburst had far-reaching consequences. It undoubtedly played a key role to prepare the Polish October. After suppressing the revolt in Poznan on 28th June, various strikes and protests took place on the whole territory of Wielkopolska. Apart from workers, intelligentsia and veterans having fought for independence who were set free due to the amnesty, also peasants started to express their dissatisfaction. They began to leave the collective farms, protested against the lack of coal and compulsory deliveries, demanded the increase of fertilisers and construction materials, reminded of the local relations démocratisation and condemned the local party or Public Security Office barons. The Uprising in Poznań also influenced the revitalisation of contestation moods in other regions of Poland. In Silesia it multiplied the activity of workers and intelligentsia environments. However, people calling for political-economic demonstrations and strikes were swiftly arrested. The picture of the Poznań Uprising and its consequences in the social-political life was widely reflected on the radio and the press. The Uprising was also discussed in Europe and the world as it was eye-witnessed by thousands of foreign visitors who arrived to attend the International Fair in Poznań. The further polarisation of attitudes took place in Poland. The outrage of the society and the mood of protests put pressure on party organisations, particularly in large plants. This caused reformative attitudes within the governing party, maintaining the political system principles. In conclusion, the Polish People’s Republic after 28th June 1956 became a different country where both the authorities and the governed people realised that the continuation was not possible. Maintaining the status quo would lead to unpredictable consequences which the communists in the USSR and at home feared most. Therefore they adopted the policy of relieving the social tensions with simultaneous maintaining the political system principles.

6

Państwo ludowe z nazwy : narastanie kryzysu społeczno-politycznego i gospodarczego w Polsce w latach 1950-1956

Jankowiak S.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2006

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nr 3(64)A Numer specjalny

11-20

EN

The new reality being born in Poland at the end of the war could carry some hopes concerning real changes. The new authorities’ manifesto declared that the power would be wielded through national councils manned by patriotic Poles, in spite of their political beliefs. Significant changes leading to complete Stalinism began in 1948 when Stalin's dreams to enlarge the borders of socialism up to Gibraltar crashed. The characteristic feature of the Stalinist system was also to centralise the management of all economy sectors connected with the elimination of private property both in the city and in the country. Building a Stalinist system meant a fast collectivisation for Polish villages. The omnipotent party controlled all areas of life. The 20th Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress played a huge role in the transformation process in the Polish society awareness. Nikita Khrushchev's speech made on the last day, or in fact a secret paper, got even with Stalin's cult. Bolesław Bierut, who died in Moscow, did not return to Poland. At that time in Poland the activation of party members took place. The then methods of wielding power were criticised during the congress of party members in Warsaw. In the conditions of huge social awareness awakening, the changes taken by the authorities did not follow the reality. In the hot year of 1956, the society for a moment felt the new strength, and those who wielded power could experience that the power could actually depend on “people". Under pressure of this atmosphere, the authorities had to make transformations that could ease social tensions. In that situation Władysław Gomułka, considered the supporter of the Polish way to socialism, returned to power. Unfortunately, this “holiday of freedom ” did not last long and soon the situation came back to normal. However, the social activism caused that this “normal” was different from Stalinism times, although still distant from an ideal.

7

Ludowe Wojsko Polskie : radzieckie wzorce wychowawcze, indoktrynacja, postawa wobec społeczeństwa

Zuziak J.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2006

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nr 3(64)A Numer specjalny

47-60

EN

The genesis of the Polish People’s Army dates back to May 1943 when the Soviet government agreed to form the 1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division on its territory. Since its very beginning, the army organised by communists was subjected to thorough indoctrination with a particular intensity in 1948-1956, i.e. in the period defined in the Polish historiography as the Stalinisation of Poland and its armed forces. In order to ensure the communist party leading role in the armed forces, a political-educational department was set up in May 1943, which was transforme into a political party apparatus in November 1949. The Soviet models in the Polish People’s Army were widely present since the beginning of its formation in the USSR. Russian regulations and instructions were binding in military units created there. Russian military personnel played a vital role in the Polish People’s Army. At the beginning of 1956, Russian generals occupied almost all key positions in the Polish Military. In the first decade after the Second World War, the Polish Army constantly underwent strong political indoctrination. This process evidently intensified at the turn of the 40s and 50s. The political party apparatus and Military Information (Intelligence) used various indoctrinating methods towards all Polish Army personnel within their indoctrinate activity. Year 1956 began the process of transformation in Poland, broke away with t cult of the individual, started the process of going away from the Stalinism and farreaching sovietisation of Poland and its armed forces. Moreover, Marshall Konstanty Rokossowski and other numerous Russian generals and officers left the Polish Army.

8

Bunt, rewolta czy wypadki poznańskie?

Karwat J.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2006

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nr 3(64)A Numer specjalny

37-46

EN

The discussion concerning the right name for June ’ 56 is also a discussion of memory models. The events that took place on 28th - 30th June 1956 were squeezed into the notions limiting their broader interpretation, diminishing the significance of that historic fact. The author is fully aware of the fact that the “revolt” sounds quite pejorative, the term "revolution” used by Bajon does not seem likely to spread. Therefore, terms should be used in a very considerate and changeable way in order not to impose them onto the reader or listener who is accustomed to a universal term of Poznań June 1956. Forcing a definition, even using factual arguments, brings an opposite effect and gives rise to negative emotions. The representatives of young generation, Rafał Kościański, Rafał Leśkiewicz from Poznań Institute of National Remembrance, are doing it in a very skilful and knowledgeable way in their publications using names “revolt” and “uprising” weighing their words.

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Z dziejów ataszatu wojskowego II Rzeczypospolitej w Moskwie

Włodarkiewicz W.

Biuletyn Wojskowej Akademii Technicznej

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1999

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Vol. 48, nr 3

29-38

PL

Artykuł przedstawia warunki pracy attache wojskowego Polski w Moskwie w latach 1921-1939, w tym próbę zniszczenia samochodu ambasady RP w 1938 r., a na ich tle omówiono wybrane aspekty działalności pracowników ataszatu. Attache wojskowy reprezentował siły zbrojne Rzeczypospolitej, prowadził szczegółowe studia armii obcych i zagadnień wojskowych oraz meldował o ich rezultatach do Oddziału II Sztabu Generalnego (od 1928 r. Głównego) Wojska Polskiego oraz wykonywał inne zadania, zlecone przez ministra spraw wojskowych lub szefa Sztabu Generalnego.

EN

The paper presents the work conditions of the Polish military attache in Moscow within the years 1921-1939, including the attempt to destroy the embassy car in 1938. The aspects of operation of the attache staff are described. The military attache represented the Polish military forces, conducted the detailed study of foreign armies and the military problems and reported the results to the II Department of General Staff of the Polish Army. Other tasks ordered by minister of military affairs or by the head of General Staff were carried out.

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Sytuacja polityczno-społeczna na ziemiach polskich w okresie wkraczania Armii Czerwonej i dziłalności Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego w 1944 r.

Otocki W.

Biuletyn Wojskowej Akademii Technicznej

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1999

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Vol. 48, nr 3

51-75

PL

W końcu 1943 r. i początkach 1944 r. zaktywizowała się działalność zarówno Rządu Polskiego na emigracji oraz komunistów - tak na terenach okupowanych, jak i w ZSRR, zmierzająca do utrzymania swoich wpływów w społeczeństwie, bądź zaistnienia jako siły politycznej. Klęska Powstania Warszawskiego i zajęcie przez oddziały Armii Czerwonej wschodnich i centralnych terenów Polski przyczyniły się do likwidacji centralnego ośrodka polityczno-administracyjnego Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego, co ostatecznie przekreśliło szanse rządu emigracyjnego na objęcie władzy w kraju. Umożliwiło to Stalinowi urzeczywistnienie jego planów stworzenia w Polsce calkowicie podporządkowanej mu władzy. Realizować je miał - pod czujnym okiem oswobodzicieli - Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego. Jego działalność miała stworzyć wrażenie, że Polska pod rządami nowej władzy będzie państwem w pełni demokratycznym. Wbrew przewidywaniom przeciwników, PKWN pokazał, że jest on zdolny do tworzenia władz i ich terenowych odpowiedników oraz przyciągnięcia do współpracy różnych warstw i grup społecznych, jak również - w oparciu o Armię Czerwoną - przeprowadzić realizację głównych zadań państwowych. Tych kilka miesięcy władzy PKWN zapoczątkowało - przy biernej postawie mocarstw zachodnich - wejście Polski w sferę wpływów ZSRR, co przesądziło na 45 lat o systemie polityczno-ekonomicznym i kierunkach rozwoju kraju.

EN

The paper presents the increase of activities of the two main political groups in Poland during 1943-1944: the Polish Committee for Nation Liberation (PKWN) and the Polish authorities acting in the West. The influence and liquidation of Polish Underground Forces on the final defeat of the West oriented political groups and the victory of the communists. It is also shown how Stalin succeeded in realization his plans in subordinating Poland by using as a tool the PKWN group, which during few mounts succeeded to bring Poland into the orbit of Soviet influence.