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Problem destabilizującego gromadzenia i rozpowszechniania broni strzeleckiej i broni lekkiej oraz amunicji w prawie Unii Europejskiej

Sobczak Jacek

Cybersecurity and Law

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2019

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Vol. 2 (2)

175--192

PL

Coraz bardziej zauważalny staje się problem destabilizującego gromadzenia i rozpowszechniania broni strzeleckiej i broni lekkiej oraz amunicji, nawet do tego stopnia, że stosowne regulacje przyjęła również Unia Europejska. Rada Europejska przyjęła strategię dotyczącą zwalczania nielegalnego gromadzenia broni strzeleckiej i broni lekkiej oraz amunicji do tych rodzajów broni, obejmującą przy tym również nielegalny handel nimi. Strategia ta wzywa do tego, aby wesprzeć przyjęcie prawnie wiążącego instrumentu pozwalającego na śledzenie i oznaczanie broni strzeleckiej i broni lekkiej oraz amunicji do tych rodzajów broni. Przyjmując międzynarodowy instrument umożliwiający śledzenie, takiej broni państwa zobowiązują się do przyjęcia wielu środków zapewniających odpowiednie oznaczanie i rejestrowanie tej broni oraz do zacieśnienia współpracy w śledzeniu nielegalnego handlu nią.

EN

The issue of the destabilising activities of accumulating and trafficking small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition is becoming increasingly noticeable, even to the extent that the European Union has adopted commensurate regulations. The European Council has adopted a strategy to combat the illicit accumulation of SALW and their ammunition, as well as their trafficking. This strategy calls for promoting the adoption of a legally binding instrument on the tracing and marking of SALW and their ammunition. By adopting an internationally binding instrument on the tracing and marking of SALW and their ammunition, countries undertake to take multiple measures which will allow them to effectively mark and register such weapons and tighten cooperation in tracing their illicit trafficking.

2

Eurocorps in European Common Security and Defense Policy : Functioning, Structure, Competence

Knap A.

Kwartalnik Bellona

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2018

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Nr 1

15--27

EN

In the last two years, the perception of security situation in Europe has dramatically changed. Considering the strained situation of tensions and crises in close proximity of Europe, Brexit, and a series of unprecedented terrorist attacks inside the EU states, it is highly essential that the countries be capable of joint activity in the context of key EU interests and menace. The EU societies are well informed about the threats to the Schengen Area. Such forms of threats to security as unprecedented in size illegal immigration, terrorist acts on the European territory, the falling of state structures, the sinking of the African and Middle East states into the abyss of internal wars, the reinforcement of Russia’s military potential or the North Korea’s attempts to deter international societies by means of nuclear potential should all be a reason enough for further European integration. However, considering negative tendencies inside most of the EU member states to reduce expenses on defense1, international command structures such as Eurocorps, despite the aforementioned threats, are presently facing disadvantageous processes, such as reducing human resources or equipment. On the other hand, when facing the same threats, present command structures in NATO as regards structures and tasks, as well as the revived will to enforce common security and defense policy in the EU are a chance for wider engagement of international military units and may drive Eurocorps to become a proper tool in the future for development of the security system of the framework and associated nations. It can be assumed that the EC cooperation of recent years with the EU organizations will make the balancing of NATO and EU tasks dominant during the Common Committee’s decision-making on the future engagement of Eurocorps. From the point of view of national interest, considering autonomous decision on reducing personnel and equipment, there are several arguments supporting further interest in Eurocorps within the frames of international defense cooperation. The problem of further integration within the multinational military structure, such as Eurocorps, seems still ongoing, because the change of threat nature in the environment of European security, including a politically noticeable shift of main interest to the “old EU”, and the declaration of strategic partnership between the EU and NATO2 as being complementary, and not competitive, all justifies the necessity to search further for initiatives of building more effective system of security in our part of continent. Such situation requires the engagement of Poland in various European defense initiatives. Poland, being a state of serious military potential, is faced with high expectations regarding decision-making and its influence on the shape of European security system, including the participation in the future defense structures at different levels, which can be a factor in building a strong position of the Polish Armed Forces in international structures.

3

NATO’s defence policy dilemma in the Baltic States

Milevski L.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2017

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Vol. 14, No. 1

51--68

EN

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the dilemma NATO has faced since February 2014 in its defence policy regarding the Baltic States. If NATO pursues a policy of deterrence, it might trigger war because Russia, the would-be deteree, may perceive actions taken by NATO as not intended to strengthen deterrence but rather to intimidate or coerce it. If it pursues an alternate policy of leaving the Baltic States visibly undefended, it might trigger war because Russia may see this as a sign of weakness and a gap to be exploited. This article investigates the logic of the dilemma, before considering whether NATO’s choice, made at the Warsaw Summit of July 2016, is working as intended. Ultimately, we cannot predict the answer and, therefore, we should consider all possible outcomes, including those which lead to a defensive war in the Baltic States.

4

Zaangażowanie Polski w realizację wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony w świetle prezydencji Polski w Radzie UE

Ciupiński A.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2012

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nr 3(88)

114-125

EN

After the Lisbon Treaty came in force, Poland was the forth country in turn after Spain, Belgium and Hungary to take over the EU presidency. Polish presidency priorities included the intention to strengthen the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). That surprised some European capitals, as Poland had been earlier perceived as an “Atlantic orthodox” in opposition to projects developing EU defence capabilities. In fact, the Polish government and military authorities had mistrusted of visions and projects concerning European strategic autonomy. Therefore two stages should be distinguished in Poland’s engagement in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. They embrace five-year periods of 2004 and 2004-2009. The date of 1 May 2004 marks the dividing line when the Republic of Poland became a European Union’ Member State after having signed the accession treaty in Athens a year before. The article features Poland’s attitude to CSDP before the accession, Poland’s contribution to CSDP after the accession, engagement in pursuing European Headline Goal – 2010 and the place of CSDP in the Polish presidency programme.

5

Współpraca francusko-brytyjska w dziedzinie obrony i bezpieczeństwa i jej implikacje dla europejskiego i euroatlantyckiego bezpieczeństwa

Helnarska K.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2012

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nr 3(88)

126-141

EN

The current changing strategic environment requires a more effective European Union's common security and defence policy. France and the UK are determined to play a leading part in this new context and joint their efforts in this area. In November 2010 these two countries signed an agreement to cooperate in many important fields such as capabilities, industry, operations, intelligence and in defence programmes. New treaty on defence and nuclear joint working with France marked a "new chapter" in a long history of defence cooperation with the UK. The French and UK agreed to develop the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF): an early entry force capable of facing multiple threats up to the highest intensity, available for bilateral, NATO, European Union, United Nations or other operations. The nuclear treaty establishes a joint Technology Development Centre in the UK testing nuclear explosion simulation and another facility in France that will model performance of nuclear warheads and materials to ensure long-term viability, security and safety.

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Programowanie pozamilitarnych przygotowań obronnych w Polsce wobec wyzwań XXI wieku

Kuliczkowski M.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2010

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nr 2(79)

34-59

EN

The programming of the state’s non-military defence preparations is apart of the defence planning system and remains the basic tool ofpursuing the state’s defence policy in the area of maintaining and developing its defence potential and preparing the Polish Armed Forces, government and local administration bodies to act in the conditions of external threat and war. The aim of the article is to show synthetically the process of defence preparations programming system in Poland after 1989. In order to achieve this goal, the author focuses on presenting legal and organisational conditions of non-military defence preparation programming in Poland and adjusting its principles to the system adopted in NATO and on characteristics of programs in this area. Presenting these problems in a holistic approach systemizes the knowledge concerning the place and role of programming finance and service activities in non-military structures of the state defence system carried out for the defence of the state in the time of peace51. The conclusion shows positivefeatures of the national system of defence programming and factors that decrease its effectiveness, as well as directions of this system transformation to face the 21st century challenges. Conducting a complex analysis and systemizing the knowledge in this area was possible thanks to the author’s five-year work in the Department of Strategy and Defence Planning, MoD and also due to the help and kindness of defence cells employees at the Ministries of Economy, Infrastructure, Treasure, as well as the Mazowian Province Office.

7

Analiza i ocena statystyczna wystarczalności obronnej państw NATO w latach 2000-2005

Górski P., Płaczek J.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2008

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nr 2(71)

167-188

EN

The issue of defence sufficiency brings about many theoretical and practical problems. This results both from the methodological nature and pertaining to the content one as it is an interdisciplinary matter of a political, military and economic character. Each country considers this issue individually, assessing first of all the level of external threats, the level of armed forces' modernity, budget situation of a given country and social attitudes and priorities. Also the membership in a military and economic alliance (community) is important. The analysis of this issue is conducted not only by the legislative and executive powers but by the whole society. In the literature on the subject there are many publications connected with general shaping of the policy under analysis in this respect, mainly due to political or military aspect. However, there is no current research on economic and defence aspect. This article is a response to this demand. Its aim is to show using statistic conclusions the regularities that appear in the area of NATO Member States’ defence sufficiency in 2000-2005.

8

Rola państwa w zarządzaniu i zapewnieniu sektorowych podstaw bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego

Płaczek J., Skarżyński M.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2007

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nr 1(66)

242-251

PL

Celem tego artykułu jest przedstawienie ogólnej strategii kształtowania podstaw bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego jako istotnego elementu zarządzania państwa w zakresie bezpieczeństwa i obronności państwa. Skupimy się na trzech głównych zagadnieniach. Na początku zdefiniujemy pojęcie bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego. Dalej nakreślimy współczesną rolę i znaczenie geoekonomii w geopolityce. Te dwa punkty będą stanowiły niezbędne tło do nakreślenia, zasygnalizowanych w tytule opracowania, sektorowych podstaw bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego naszego kraju. Podjęte dociekania należy traktować jako syntetyczne ujęcie problemu.

EN

The aim of the article is to illustrate the overall strategy of forming economic security basics as an essential element of managing a country in security and defence aspects. In this regard we have focused on three elements. First, we have defined the term economic security. Next, we discuss the contemporary role and meaning of global economy and geopolitics. These two points are essential to show the background of the economic sector security basics of our country. We discuss this issue in two aspects: social-economical and security-economical. The investigations should be considered as a synthesis of the problem.

9

Ogólna informacja o Unii Europejskiej oraz Europejskiej Polityce Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony

Barthlen C.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2007

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nr 1(66)

23-30

EN

The Author delivers the conceptual frame of the security issues with regards to the European Union, while touching upon the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). He stresses the importance of the security policy decision making bodies in the European Union. ESDP is intergovernmental organized and clearly separated from the EU Commission and other EU Pillars. The European Council is the overall decision making body of the heads of state and government. It takes decisions in external relations, meets in the format of foreign affairs ministers and /or the defence ministers. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets twice every week. It is the forum of the memberstates' ambassadors to EU for ESDP matters. They monitor the international political situation, prepare decisions for the European Council and give political advice. They also ensure the proper implementation of Council decisions. The Author also focuses on the European Security Strategy which provides Europe’s overarching guidelines towards security in the future, with the guiding principle: “A secure Europe in a better world”. This strategy consists of three parts. The first part addresses the global challenges and key threats, like terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failures and organised crime. The second part indicates the three strategic objectives of the EU: addressing the threats, building security in the EU’s neighbourhood and promoting an international order based on multilateralism. Finally, the third part analyses possible policies, instruments and implications for Europe: the EU needs to be more active, more capable and more coherent and has to work with partners.

10

Bezpieczeństwo lotnictwa cywilnego i zwalczanie terroryzmu powietrznego w polskiej polityce traktatowej

Śmiałek W.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2003

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nr 4(53)

176-189

EN

The increase of air terrorism phenomenon causes the necessity to take effective protective measures. The international legal co-operation (both bilateral and multilateral) contributes to combating terrorism. For many years Poland has tried to participate in this process working in various important bodies, although the intensity of our engagement has differed. After 1990 the government of the Polish Republic did its best in order to fully prepare and engage in fighting against air terrorism. Poland is a party of the most significant international conventions under the CIAO concerning civilian air travel and fight against air terrorism (the Hague, Montreal and Tokyo conventions). Signing these conventions meant the necessity to introduce essential changes in our law. The treaties signed with our neighbours and other countries are an important factor in Polish co-operation on an international arena in the area of preventing and fighting terrorism. Among 19 treaties and pacts, only two of them did not refer to fighting terrorism. The approach to fighting terrorism and the range of co-operation is different in selective treaties. However, there are some similarities. A new phenomenon in the Polish treaty policy is following provisions of the signed treaties in the international co-operation in the area of crime prevention and fighting, including terrorism conducted by the Ministry of the Interior (and Administration), its agendas and institutions (approximately 40 agreements). Treaties, contracts and bilateral agreements are a stabilising factor to perceive commercial aviation from the Polish point of view.

11

Stanowisko Polski w sprawie polityki obronnej Unii Europejskiej

Zięba R.

Problemy Techniki Uzbrojenia

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2002

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R. 31, z. 83

69--80

PL

Omówiono wybrane zagadnienia polityki międzynarodowej, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem stanowiska Polski wobec procesów integracyjnych Unii Europejskiej. Polska poszukuje solidnych gwarancji bezpieczeństwa, które upatruje przede wszystkim w NATO, ale także chce zapewnić swojemu społeczeństwu trwały rozwój gospodarczy i cywilizacyjny, co jest zależne od przyszłego członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej.

EN

Some questions of international policy and especially of Polish position against European Union integration processes are presented. Poland seeks a reliable guarantee for security mainly by NATO and wants to provide a stable economic and civilisation development for its society by future membership in European Union.

12

Bułgarska ekonomika obrony : refleksje nad obiektem i treścią badań

Stankiewicz W.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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1998

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nr 4(33)

226-237

EN

Bulgarian defence economics, after gaining independence in 1878 and until World War II, was based on agriculture and weak processing industry. A rapid industrialisation and agriculture collectivisation was conducted in 1946-1989. Arms factories were developed basing on the heavy industry. The defence production structure resulted from the Warsaw Pact settlements and close tights with the USSR. The political system transformation that took place after 1989 brought defence reductions and approaching European defence structures. The reflection of defence-economic practice was Bulgarian defence economics, developed mainly as a didactic discipline. Handbooks of the following lecturers: S. Danew, W. Wasilew and J. Kosaszka were entitled, at first, as „war economics” and, at present, as „defence economics”. Prof. T. Iwanow is a leader of Bulgarian specialists. His works include contemporary theory of security economics and the practice of Bulgarian defence-economic policy.