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State-sponsored and organized crime threats to maritime transportationsystems in the context of the attack on Ukraine

Cichocki R.

TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation

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2023

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Vol. 17 No. 3

717--721

EN

Due to its strategic importance and vast impact on the world economy, maritime transport has become a cyber battlefield. Cybersecurity organizations across the world notice and analyze adversaries such as Bear from Russia, Panda from China, Buffalo from Vietnam, Chollima from North Korea (DPRK), and others from Columbia, India, Turkey, and Iran, as well as hacktivist and E-Crime. In 2014 - 2023, Ukraine became the object of massive cyberattacks aimed at its political, social, and economic destabilization. This situation changes the perception of cyberspace and its importance for ensuring the security of the global economy, in particular, the maritime economy. Reports published by the US Coast Guard show that. In this publication, the author reviews the cybersecurity threat landscape targeting the maritime industry and transportation systems and analyzes the technics, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) used by threat actors.

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Ensuring cyber resilience of ship information systems

Onishchenko O., Shumilova K., Volyanskyy S., Volyanskaya Y., Volianskyi Y.

TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation

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2022

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Vol. 16 No. 1

43--50

EN

The Covid-19 pandemic brought a problem related to the inability to timely update security systems on ships during a voyage and the need to encrypt data stored in ship information systems (SISs) and shipping company information systems. The analysis of new types of worldwide cyberattacks showed that they were set off by an increase in the use of remote-controlled autonomous technologies and a spread of telework. It was proved that on ships: a) there are no cybersecurity specialists; b) there is no means of identification of cyber threats and no response plans; c) there is a lack of cybersecurity training for crews; d) encryption of confidential ship data is barely used; e) crew is a vulnerability factor in ship's security. The analysis of cyber incidents allowed us to develop a basic response plan to protect ship control systems. It was demonstrated that the basic plan can be continuously updated and improved in accordance with: a) the real state of ship systems; b) the results of performance analysis of crew actions; c) the emergence of new types of cyberattacks. To improve the security of confidential data in ship information networks theoretical framework for the development of encrypted data search engines with the identification of “dangerous” keywords for the ship information systems (SISs) was proposed. A data exchange protocol, basic requirements for SISs, and an algorithm for detecting “dangerous” keywords in messages were developed. A test search engine on encrypted data was presented, and the main components of the system were highlighted. The functionality of the system was experimentally proved, and the accuracy and speed of search on encrypted data were determined.

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An operational approach to maritime cyber resilience

Erstad E., Ostnes R., Lund M. S.

TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation

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2021

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Vol. 15 No. 1

27--34

EN

As a result of the last decades development of technology and increased connectivity of maritime vessels, the need for maritime cyber security is undoubtedly present. In 2017, IMO officially recognized “… the urgent need to raise awareness on cyber threats and vulnerabilities to support safe and secure shipping, which is operationally resilient to cyber risks”. Thus, Maritime Cyber Resilience is seen as key by IMO in the improvement of the maritime cyber security. It is assumed that human error is the cause of more than half successful cyber-attacks. If technology somehow fails, in example because of a cyber threat, the human is expected to handle the problem and provide a solution. It is therefore necessary to focus on the human aspect when considering maritime cyber threats. This paper aims to provide a working definition of “Maritime Cyber Resilience”. Further, the paper argues why the human should be a focus of study, as the human is at the sharp edge in a potential maritime cyber emergency.

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Wargaming the cyber resilience of structurally and technologically different networks

Lantto Heikki, Huopio Simo, Åkesson Bernt, Nikkarila Juha-Pekka, Suojanen Marko, Ristolainen Mari, Tuukkanen Topi

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2019

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Vol. 24, No. 2

51--64

EN

Based on a review of different analytical frameworks, it is suggested to run a table top cyber wargame when trying to analyse the effects of closed national networks being imposed in the near future. The scope of the wargame is to extract results to show how the resilience of an open national network differs from a closed national network. It is self-evident that the formation process of resilience is different between the diverse systems. The proposed wargame is a two-sided cyber table top wargame. The wargame is based on at least two blue teams, at least one red team and a control team (namely a white team). One blue team is located in the closed national networks and its system relies on closed national network infrastructure. The other blue team operates its system within open network society. By designing, constructing and executing the proposed cyber wargame we argue it is possible to find these differences and similarities as well. Current research improves cyber situation awareness and proposes a direction to be followed when trying to understand the changing circumstances of the cyber space. It also suggests how the research resources could be directed when trying to improve the situation awareness of the closing process.