Rebellions have been common throughout history, and each was unique in its own way. However, there are more similarities than one could think of. Whereas some of them seek the implementation of certain laws or rights for minorities, others have the purpose to completely overthrow the current government. Those are called insurgencies. And as we know, every action has a counter reaction. Same goes for insurgencies. But what exactly is a counter insurgency? How does it work? And most importantly, what are the best strategies and tactics for a higher chance of success? This paper seeks to answer those questions and also to broaden the reader’s horizon on the topic of counter insurgency.
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Political, ethnic and religious conflict has given rise to insurgency groups employing a variety of strategies worldwide. In Nigeria, civilians in strife-torn Borno State have formed a number of counter-insurgency (COIN) groups, among which the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) has emerged as a major player. The group began in 2009 as a simple call for volunteers, and now numbers over 26 000 men and women. While research has been conducted on other COIN groups, little is known of CJTF. Concerns have been raised about the CJTF metamorphosing into an ethnic militia, accused of human rights abuses, robbery, rape and hooliganism. Despite these reported atrocities, local people support them, regarding them as unsung heroes. The study investigates the group’s potential as a useful counter insurgency measure, using David Galula’s COIN theory to analyse the group’s actions and to contest the dualistic understanding of conventional vs unconventional, local peacebuilding approaches. The study adopts a qualitative, ethnographic methodology, locating the research in the context of global development and security discourse. The study aims to establish the value of the CJTF COIN group, to position unconventional local COIN as a viable complementary to conventional methods and to proffer clues as to how security initiatives may more successfully combat Islamic insurgency in Nigeria. The study employed both primary and secondary data. Field work for the study was carried out for six months between 2018 and 2019 in Maiduguri Metropolis and its environs in Borno State.
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