The article is a collection of the author’s thoughts concerning tactical aspects of the Battle of Cannae fought between the Roman and Carthaginian armies during the Second Punic War. It is worth stressing that the Carthaginians defeated almost two-fold numerically superior enemy, closing them in a double envelopment and almost completely destroyed them. The reasons of the victory of forces under Hannibal’s command lies in his respecting such axioms of fighting as correct defining of the point of gravity of operations and its manoeuvring in the course of fighting, the unity of command, cooperation of services, building advantage in a decisive time and place, surprise and taking advantage of its consequences, manoeuvre, maintaining reserves, correct evaluation of the enemy and the use of terrain. Moreover, the author points out mistakes made by the Romans such as improper choice of place, not seeing the possibility of Carthaginians’ counter-manoeuvre, looking for the settlement in the front assault and improper command organization. The article underlines the necessity of drawing conclusions resulting from past military confrontations that could prove useful in preparing modern variants of force operations. The material respects the criterion of historical truth that is proved by a great number of quoted sources dealing with the problem of that unprecedented battle in the history of the art of war.
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