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Przywrócić pamięć: generał brygady Franciszek Wład

Małecki Z. J.

Zeszyty Naukowe. Inżynieria Lądowa i Wodna w Kształtowaniu Środowiska

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2015

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Nr 12

107--111

PL

Gen. brygady Franciszek Wład (1888–1939 r.) w okresie od 1928 r. do 1930 r. był dowódcą piechoty dywizyjnej w 25 Dywizji Piechoty w Kaliszu. W czasie walk nad Bzurą 18 września 1939 r. osobiście dowodząc, ranny od kul, poszarpany odłamkiem granatu, zmarł po kilku godzinach. Generał obecnie spoczywa na cmentarzu wojskowym na Powązkach w Warszawie.

EN

Brigadier General Franciszek Wład (1888-1939) in the period between 1928 and 1930 was the commander of infantry in the 25th Infantry Division in Kalisz. Being a commander in the battle of the Bzura on the 18th of September in 1939 he got shot, and wounded by a grenade shrapnel died several hours later. The General is buried in Powązki Military Cemetary in Warsaw.

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Operacyjne aspekty bitwy nad Bzurą : pierwsza faza bitwy 9-12 września 1939 roku

Tym J. S.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2011

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nr 4(85)

226-246

EN

The Battle of the Bzura, the operations of the Poznań and Pomorze Armies, became the main Polish forces’ battle in the 1939 Campaign and was the only offensive turn in the operational scale. Gen. Tadeusz Kutrzeba’s forces’ attack was the crowning achievement of the 1939 Campaign offensive effort that no other Polish army in 1939 or any French one in 1940 managed to achieve. The author of the article, an assistant professor at the Branch of Modern Conflicts and War History Analyses at National Defence University, characterized generally the Polish operational art in 1919-1939 and operational command in the 1939 Campaign. Moreover, he analysed the area where the Battle of the Bzura took place. This enabled him to examine its operational aspects in the context of operational art assumptions functioning then and unchangeable principles of the art of war. The analysis of operational premises of the battle, the concept of its waging and the course of its initial phase allowed the author to identify its operational objectives, key points, decisive points, main effort approach, lines of operation as well as the base of operation of the Polish forces’ opponent, i.e. the German 8th Army. The considerations concerning the centre of gravity of this operational unit are also valuable. The author noted that during the course of operations in 9-12 September the Poznań Army undoubtedly achieved tactical success forcing German divisions of the 8th Army to withdraw to the south and inflicting heavy losses on them. However, the operational objective was not reached, as the left-wing divisions of the 8th Army were not defeated. Moreover, ensuring freedom of operation in the direction of the middle Vistula and Warsaw was not achieved. The author also referred to the discussion concerning the Battle of the Bzura that was held in 1945-1958 in military periodicals by its participants – graduates of Higher War College. The author left an open question about a culminating point of the Polish operations in the first phase of the Battle of the Bzura which at the same time paves the way and direction for possible further discussion.

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Największa bitwa kampanii obronnej 1939 roku

Stańczyk H.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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1999

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nr 2(35)A Numer specialny

94-109