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1

Permanent Structured Cooperation : PESCO

Bobińska M.

Przegląd Nauk o Obronności

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2018

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R. 3, Nr 6

38--46

EN

The purpose of this article is to explain what is the Permanent Structure Cooperation Mechanism - PESCO and to assess its impact on the improvement of security and defence capabilities of the European Union, taking into account the following criteria: time - understood as a justification of the advisability of the actions undertaken in the perspective of the coming years, space - understood as an area in which a given solution will be applied, legal possibilities of enforcement of the undertaken commitments and the impact of the internal policies of the states on their fulfilment.

PL

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest wyjaśnienie, czym jest Mechanizm Stałej Współpracy Strukturalnej - PESCO oraz dokonanie oceny jego wpływu na poprawę stanu bezpieczeństwa i rozwój zdolności obronnych Unii Europejskiej, biorąc pod uwagę kryteria: czasu - rozumianego jako uzasadnienie celowości podjętych działań w perspektywie najbliższych lat, przestrzeni - rozumianej jako obszar, na którym dane rozwiązanie będzie mieć zastosowanie, prawnych możliwości egzekwowania podjętych zobowiązań oraz wpływu polityki wewnętrznej państw na ich wypełnianie.

2

Sytuacja w regionie Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu a bezpieczeństwo Unii Europejskiej

Karnowska-Werner M.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2012

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nr 3(88)

73-100

EN

The current situation in Northern Africa and the Middle East has caused a large-scale influx of illegal refugees to Europe which the European Union was not prepared for. Lampedusa Island was in that context recognized as a humanitarian disaster. The costs related to dealing with the dynamic waves of migrants would significantly destabilize the economic equilibrium of most EU member countries. In order to contain the illegal migration, public funds were administered to the regions mostly affected by the phenomenon, and the external borders protection was strengthened. A significant role in safeguarding the EU borders was played by FRONTEX that applied proportionate power and means in areas that were most affected by the phenomenon. Poland, at the time leading the EU presidency, provided support to countries in need, as it could draw from its rich past experience in the matter. The country also proposed several legislative changes concerning migration policy, the aim of which was to enhance and unify European Union's solutions in this field.

3

Relacje Unii Europejskiej z państwami Bałkanów Zachodnich

Majchrzak A.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2012

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nr 3(88)

192-205

EN

European countries have gone a long and turbulent way to build their sovereignty. A special area in Europe that still does not possess precise borderlines between particular counties is the Balkan Peninsula region. Due to historical and geographical reasons and political and cultural factors (ethnic and religious including) this area is named the Balkan Cauldron, powder keg or the most explosive region of Europe. The article features political and economic relations between the European Union and the Western Balkans in the area of region’s security and stabilization, as well as EU engagement in civil and military missions. Special attention is drawn to EU integration relations with the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia.

4

Wpływ traktatu z Lizbony na rozwój wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej

Helnarska K. J.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2011

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nr 2(83)

387-397

EN

The author of the article conducts a comparative analysis of the Lisbon Treaty with the Constitutional Treaty concerning the provisions of common security and defence policy. The analysis proves that provisions that had caused disputes among most European Union’s Member States were abandoned in the Lisbon Treaty. Differentiating and defining the common security and defence policy in one “section” and collecting there all articles concerning the functioning of common security and defence policy positively influenced the clarity and concreteness. In the Treaty of Nice the provisions relating to common security and defence policy were a part of common foreign policy and security, thereby they were less precise.

5

Rola Polski w kształtowaniu bezpieczeństwa zewnętrznego Unii Europejskiej w ramach Partnerstwa Wschodniego

Legucka A.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2011

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nr 2(83)

398-415

EN

The aim of this article is to present Poland’s role in the creation of the European Union's external security. Poland supports the Eastern Partnership countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. The theory of international roles allows evaluating the international activity of Poland and the European Union in the eastern neighborhood. The best-known international roles are the following: the expected role (elected or imposed), the declared one and the implemented one. Polish security in the EU depends on the stability of the eastern neighborhood and it is important to support reforms in these countries, as well as their integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

6

Użycie sił powietrznych poza granicami kraju w aspekcie formalnoprawnych regulacji krajowych i międzynarodowych

Błasik A.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2010

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nr 1(78)

33-53

EN

The use of the Polish Air Force outside the country cannot be conducted away from commonly accepted international and Polish law regulations. They create a certain kind of framework, a signpost to prepare and plan this kind of missions on the strategic level. The Polish Air Forces will plan this kind of tasks, taking into consideration all legal aspects and operational capabilities basing on detailed guidelines included in the allied doctrinal documents as well as in the Polish authorities’ decisions. This must be unconditionally taken into account during the process of preparing and training preceding each mission outside the country through appropriately adapted provisions in executive plans and orders. Moreover, it has to be taken into consideration that the situation in the world changes radically, however, laws and regulations should be constant. Security conditions, threats and risks are dynamic. Therefore, aims, tasks and ways to achieve them must be redefined. Mission commanders on almost all levels, operators, planners, as well as participants and executors (players) must take these legal standards and principles into account. A wide range o f problems makes each commander permanently deepen his knowledge of commonly accepted law.

7

Rola NATO w obszarze bezpieczeństwa europejskiego

Elak L.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2010

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nr 3(80)

14-28

EN

The article features the role and importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance in creating security in the world as a result of a deep transformation of international order after the end of the Cold War. NATO had to find its due place in the new reality and was forced to discuss the new security strategy in order to remain the most important world organization and guarantee security for all its Member States. Furthermore, the article presents the significance of the NATO - EU cooperation, which sometimes becomes simply a rivalry in crisis response in the world.

8

Europejska polityka kosmiczna : europejska autonomia strategiczna

Krzymowski A.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2010

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nr 3(80)

38-50

EN

The process of building a new international order increases the importance of space policy. The EU cannot build a Common Foreign and Security Policy without independent from the United States, own intelligence satellites and the European Space Policy, as complementary and equal in relation to the European Security Strategy. It is essential that European Union has to have space policy based on a comprehensive security and defence architecture. The Galileo program is necessary for autonomous CESDP operation and its strategic autonomy. Moreover, the development of research and implementation work in the space sector can be an important factor in maintaining and even intensifying the country’s economic growth in coming years. If, in a globalized system of international relations the EU has to be an active and important international body, it needs not just the reform of the Treaties and the institutional changes, but primarily new sources of political and strategic initiatives for the whole of the enlarged EU in terms of global competition.

9

Strategia bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej

Lusiński C.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2008

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nr 1(70)A Numer specjalny

83-92

EN

This leads to a conclusion, that an update of the European Security Strategy is necessary, but not a new document. Real effect of Lisbon Treaty functioning, the new NATO strategy and of course political will of member States will shape the range of changes. One more digression at the end. Current version of the strategy is not a strategy in fact. Future version will not be a strategy ether. These are rather visions with strategic elements. There are no clear strategic goals and ways to accomplish them in this document. The EU is not really ready yet for a classical strategy. However, this does not mean that it will not be ready in the future and it does not depreciate the meaning of the current and future document for the development of the EU.

10

Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony w realizacji polityki sąsiedztwa Unii Europejskiej

Legucka A.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2008

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nr 3(72)

17-32

EN

The article analyses the possibilities of shaping security in the European Union’s closest neighbourhood: starting with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), instruments that it has on its disposal and the effects of EU efforts in respective EU external regions. Due to the fact that the EU neighbourhood is differentiated, the EU has different possibilities to affect the stability and development of eastern, southern and northern regions. The EU has a different approach towards countries aspiring to EU membership (the Balkans, Turkey) and towards countries which have not been presented with the European perspectives (eastern and Mediterranean countries), The latter ones were grouped in the European Neighbourhood Policy concept in 2004, In the ENP assumptions, the EU desires, among others, to prevent conflicts, respond to crises and organise peace operations. This means that European Neighbourhood Policy is connected with the European Security and Defence Policy. The author gives examples of the EU support for stabilisation, monitoring, technical, military and civilian missions and tries to show their effectiveness.

11

Operacje reagowania kryzysowego w europejskiej polityce bezpieczeństwa i obrony

Panek B.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2007

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nr 4(69)

111-125

EN

The article presents the genesis and process of the European Union's (political and military) capabilities’ development in the context of transformations that have taken place over the years. The European Union, willing to become an important international society entity in the crisis management area, had to implement several deep changes. They referred not only to changes in the strategy of operations’ aspect but most of all in the area of operational capabilities’ development which will allow the European Union to take effective political, economic and military moves.

12

Realizacja wspólnej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej wobec Europy Wschodniej i Azji

Krzymowski A.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2006

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nr 4(65)

56-75

EN

The author in his article presents the European Union from the perspective of reaching beyond the formal-legislative limits as far as the executiion of the Common Foreign and Security Policy towards Eastern Europe and Asia is concerned. He argues that the EU is Russia’s main trade partner, while Ukraine, Moldova and most of the countries of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia have signed separate contracts including trade, political cooperation, environmental protection and co-operation in the area of science and culture. The author also shows strategic development of the Caucasus bordering with Russia, Turkey and Iran. This region is in the public focus due to its natural resources and Russia’s endeavours to regain exclusive geopolitical domination. The author emphasizes that the rivalry aiming to get control of these resources will have an important influence on the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia as well as the evolution of internal and international politics of such countries like Russia, China, Turkey and Iran. The geopolitical meaning of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia will increase in the perspective of 10-15 years. With the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 (and eventually Turkey) to the EU, the Southern Caucasus will become a part of wider Europe. The author emphasizes that China and India decided to use “Galileo”, the satellite navigation system of the EU, which is an interesting signal, confirming that these countries strive for closer relations with the EU, reaching above pure trade issues.

13

Europeizacja obrony a NATO

Fox L.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2006

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nr 4(65)

19-32

EN

It is worth recalling that NATO was not the only piece of security architecture erected in the immediate post-war period. But it was certainly the most enduring. The question is whether it should now be allowed to wither away or whether NA TO is sufficiently flexible that it can provide the institutional architecture to respond to the varying security threats of2006 and beyond. We are used to state-to-state threats. It is what more of our defence posture is designed to deter and repel. In recent years we have been growingly used to asymmetric threats such as terrorism and are learning to confront it at home and abroad. In the future we will have to get used to the new strategic challenges that exist, such as energy security, where fossil fuels will be used as weapons to achieve political and strategic ends. The management now requires a balancing of soft and hard power, and they must act in concert. One of the great challenges for NATO today is how an alliance, which is stepped in its military identity, can influence a world where the deployment of soft power is as crucial as that of military might.

14

Strategia bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej

Kaczmarek J.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2004

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nr 1(54)

243-262

EN

The history of the European Union development, presented in the article, terrorists attacks, which 9.11 is the symbol of when Al Qaeda attacked New York and Washington, but also different events taking place on our continent, particularly a massive murder in four commuter trains heading for Madrid during the morning rush hour on 11 March, 2005, force s to intensify activities for European security. In the Madrid attack 13 bombs, hidden in backpacks, were detonated. However, they were programmed to explode during the rescue operation. 202 people were killed (4 Poles), 1427 wounded, 9 Poles including. During the last fifty years, in consequence of political, economic and military situation, the EU developed into an economic superpower and is developing in other fields, in particular in political and military areas. It is going to become unequal partner of the United States and Canada within NATO. The EU current policy of enlargement and deepening encourages it. The European Foreign and Security Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy and European Security Strategies have been approved. The European Constitution is likely to be adopted soon. On 1 May, 10 new countries will join and the EU will come up to 25 members. Thus it will cover the area between the Atlantic Ocean, the Norwegian, Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas. It has to be recognised as a qualitative step in the EU development.

15

Problematyka bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego w projekcie traktatu ustanawiającego konstytucję dla Europy

Fehler W.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2004

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nr 2(55)

83-90

EN

The article presents the problems of internal security that are included in the Draft of the Constitution Treaty for Europe. As the activities concerning strengthening internal security are deeply rooted in the present functioning of the EU, in the introduction the author presents the basic facts and accepted legal standards that shaped a contemporary picture of the Union’s activity in the III pillar area. The analysis conducted further of provisions in the European Constitution’s draft shows numerous references to the internal security issues. They include, among others, decisions connected with the EU aims. One of the most important of them is the tendency to ensure for the European Union’s citizens the space of freedom, security and justice. The Constitution draft shows also the directions of activities to prevent and counteract the effects of natural disasters and calamities. Another element to build up internal security space that the author underlines basing on appropriate provisions of the Constitution is the Solidarity Clause that provides general rules of co-operation in case of a terrorist attack, natural calamity or disaster. The article also deals with constitution draft’s contents relating to personal security, people’s protection, energy and transport security. The main considerations are based on the analysis of provisions from Chapter IV of the European Constitution that is concerned with particular developments to create freedom, security and justice space. In this part of the article the author shows the idea of constitutional developments referring to: judicial and police co-operation; access to the administration of justice; activities against racism and xenophobia; border control; immigration and asylum policy. The article finishes with remarks concerning laws regulating Europol and general assessment of the place of the internal security problems in the European Constitution draft.

16

Prawne i stategiczne podstawy bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej

Koziej S.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2004

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nr 3(56)

49-67

EN

Security, defence including, is one of the basic domains of the European Union’s functioning. The article reviews respective provisions comprised in the draft of the constitutional treaty and in the already adopted EU security strategy. The analysis of constitutional provisions leads to the conclusion that their formulation should not raise any major reservations or doubts so as to ensure the fulfilment of the Member States’ national interests. Basically, a Member State maintains full control of the EU institutions in each and every case and every moment of the EU activities in the area of security and defence. As far as the EU defence strategy is concerned, it needs to be complemented and corrected. In particular, the Union’s interests and strategic aims should be defined and more definite guidelines for building and improving the EU security system should be established. The signing and adoption of the European Constitution should be a good occasion and necessity to achieve this.

17

Mechanizmy rozwiązywania konfliktów i misje pokojowe KBWE/OBWE

Marcinkowski C.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2004

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nr 3(56)

68-81

EN

The article presents one of the most important CSCE/OSCE functions undertaken in the last 15 years in the area of developing and implementing crisis prevention and conflict resolution instruments. Military security mechanisms have been concisely defined, i.e. the La Veletta mechanism (for peaceful conflict resolution), the Vienna mechanism (for responding to crisis situation) and the Berlin mechanism (for consultations and cooperation in emergency situations). The mechanisms for the OSCE “human dimension" - the Vienna mechanism for “human dimension”, the Moscow mechanism and the CSCE “human dimension" in the 1992 Helsinki Document have been discussed. The problems of OSCE missions called to resolve particular conflicts e.g. in Moldova, Georgia, Macedonia and Kosovo have been widely described. The philosophy of the OSCE missions functioning, their organisational and essential bases as well as their role in the conflict areas have been presented. Basing on the Charter on European Security, the principal mandatory tasks of OSCE missions in conflict areas have been listed.

18

Dokąd zmierzasz Unio?

Kaczmarek J.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2003

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nr 2(51)

33-52

EN

The European Union is undergoing a period of “difficult growing up”. Many factors contribute to it. The two most significant ones are the following: developing a most important endeavour, commonly called “going deeply and enlarging”; counteracting the effects of Iraq war which became the catalyst of relations between the UN Security Council members and the transatlantic countries, in particular between the NATO and EU members and candidates. Somebody has put it right that if Saddam Hussain had managed by provoking the war to unable achieving the mentioned above endeavours, he could have acknowledged that he reached his goal. Fortunately we have almost overcome these antagonisms. Many facts prove it, among others the UN Security Council decision of 21 May 2003 granting wide authorities to the United States and Great Britain as the powers that occupy Iraq and have the right to manage its crude oil resources. A similar decision was also taken by NATO Council that stated that NATO military authorities are promptly to advise Poland which requested to support our stabilisation forces activities' in Iraq. The American ambassador in NATO structures said that “today's resolution, i.e. univocal decision (France and Germany including), proves overcoming the divisions in NATO and the EU”. Taking this in consideration and as in the proverb saying “Forewarned is forearmed”, I think it is worth reminding the basic European Union’s principles in order to take into account the fact that our country as the EU candidate which is also in “difficult growing up” period, could overcome the difficulties more easily.